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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over two decades ago Paul Epstein proclaimed that “the time for performance 
measurement is finally coming!” (Epstein, 1992, p. 513). His prophecy can be termed to 
have come true as the adoption and implementation of performance measurement and 
management systems has increased manyfold 20 years later. Not everyone, though, 
shares this opinion. Some scholars have considered the spread of performance 
management systems to be a fad, which would disappear with time when the focus of 
public management will move toward something more bright and trendy (Van Thiel & 
Leeuw, 2002; Radin, 2000, 2006). Other scholars (e.g., Moynihan, 2008; Melkers & 
Willoughby, 2005) have shown that although performance management systems are 
implemented in the public sector, they are not being used to make decisions, which halts 
the justification of the exercise.  
Nevertheless, the adoption of performance management systems in the public 
sector has weathered many storms (Moynihan, 2008; Boyne, 2006). Even if we consider 
it a fad, we have to admit that it is an especially prolonged one. For at least three decades, 
performance management has proved its worth in the eyes of many public managers and 
planners, and has been subsequently implemented for better public sector management.  
Due to an increased awareness and educational level today, citizens are becoming 
more aware about the complexity of government functions, as well as more concerned 
about the use of their tax money (Ham & Alberti, 2002; Chanley et al., 2000; Thomas, 
1998). People demand an efficient and effective use of their tax dollars by public 
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agencies in performing various governance functions. Public functions and services 
should not only be relevant to public needs, they should also bring the maximum desired 
results while using minimal resources. Performance management is used as a tool not 
only to justify government expenses, but also to help public managers in terms of better 
planning, accountability, resource allocation, goal focusing, and many other benefits I 
shall discuss in subsequent chapters (Poister, 2003; Redburn, et al., 2007; Behn, 2003 
etc.).  
As interest in and concerns about performance management systems continue to 
grow, scholars have increasingly suggested methods to better design and implement these 
systems in the public sector organizations, with the underlying assumption that they will 
help public organizations perform better. These suggestions include approaches to design 
and implement performance management activities, including target selection, indicator 
adoption, data collection and analysis, and reporting of results. These recommendations 
are available in the form of books and research articles that cover a wide variety of 
performance management systems and their respective usage settings. Scholars argue that 
by using their recommendations (termed as “recommended practices” from here 
onwards) in designing and implementing performance management systems, system 
designers and managers can improve organizational performance; a claim I intend to 
examine in this paper. There are scores of recommended practices spread out in the 
literature, which not only lack theoretical foundations, but also might be contradictory to 
each other.   
In this study, I have synthesized the most common recommended practices in the 
literature, with some empirical grounding and relation to police agencies (target 
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population), and linked them to the four conditions of the goal-setting theory. Using a 
management model proposed by Meier and O’Toole (1999, 2001), I explored the efficacy 
of following recommended practices in designing and implementing performance 
management systems for local police departments in the US. I used the 2012 Uniform 
Crime Report (UCR) dataset prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and 
original surveys of the chiefs of various police agencies for this undertaking. I used 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to compare the performance of police 
agencies (measured in terms of number of crimes per 100,000 people) to the extent to 
which they follow recommended practices while designing and implementing 
performance management systems in their respective agencies.  
The results from this study suggest do not suggest a link between the 
recommended practices and police performance, as only the practices of using 
performance information and providing discretion to officers were found to be supporting 
the hypotheses for only one out of the eight crime categories. These two significant 
results might be attributed to chance alone. The results, hence, raise questions about the 
effectiveness of the recommended practices in improving organizational performance. 
Justification of the use of recommended practices, however, can still be traced to goal-
setting theory.  
1.1. Purpose of Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the recommended practices for 
designing and implementing performance management systems. I will test whether the 
police organizations adhering to the recommended practices in designing and 
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implementing performance management systems generate better performance results than 
those who do not. 
1.2. Performance Management 
Performance management is a cyclical process where an organization first 
establishes goals and lays out the plans to reach them. Indicators are then identified, 
which could appropriately demonstrate the progress toward the target. The organization 
then engages itself in collecting the appropriate data corresponding to those indicators 
during the program implementation, which are then analyzed by comparing the results 
with standards, past performance, or other organizations. Appropriate actions and 
decisions are made which might help improve organizational performance, and be 
reflected by the indicator measurement obtained by future data collection (Moynihan, 
2008; Armstrong, 2000; Poister, 2003). The last step provides feedback for the initial step 
by providing the information needed to re-align organizational goals, targets, strategies, 
standards, etc. (Moynihan, 2008; Armstrong, 2000; Poister, 2003). This entire process 
repeats itself monthly, quarterly, annually, or any time period that the system designers 
might have planned (Moynihan, 2008; Armstrong, 2000). 
Moynihan (2008) defines performance management as a “system that generates 
performance information through strategic planning and performance measurement 
routines and that connects this information to decision values, where, ideally, the 
information influences a range of possible decisions” (p. 5). There are, hence, three 
components of performance management: strategic planning, performance measurement, 
and taking actions based on the information generated through strategic planning and 
performance measurement. The strategic planning component deals with establishing a 
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direction for the organization, setting broad and specific objectives, and setting targets at 
various levels in the organization (Poister, 2010). The performance measurement 
component deals with targeting what is to be measured, selecting the indicators, 
collecting and analyzing the data, and reporting the results (Bouckaert & Van Dooren, 
2010, p. 25). Finally, the action component deals with using the information generated 
through the above two components to take actions and make decisions regarding human 
resources, capital management, information technology, leadership, and result-based 
management capacities to improve organizational performance (Ingraham, 2007). Thus, it 
is clear that from a global or organization-wide perspective, all three components are 
dependent on each other. Strategic planning provides the overall direction and goals of 
the program to performance measurement and action component, and uses the feedback 
information from the performance measurement process in order to revise organizational 
goals, targets, strategies, services, operation, standards, and so on (Moynihan, 2008; 
Armstrong, 2000; Poister, 2010). 
                     Strategic Planning                                                                             Performance Measurement             
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Figure 1: Performance Management System (Poister, 2003, pg. 16) 
 
1.2.1. Justification and Applicability: 
  Hatry (2006) argues that “performance should be measured for all public/private, 
big/small, and developed/developing countries and organizations rendering all sorts of 
services and products” (p. 6). It is also often said, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t 
manage it” (Armstrong, 2000, p. 52). According to some scholars, public sector 
management is incomplete without performance management, as the managers will not 
be able to determine how well or how poorly their establishments are doing, if their 
decisions are beneficial or harmful, what should be planned, what aspects need attention, 
and so on (Halachmi & Bouckaert, 1996). Good management is all about performance 
improvement and a manager cannot improve performance unless he/she knows what the 
current performance of the organization is, or probably more importantly, what the trend 
of performance is in the organization (Armstrong, 2000). Performance management is 
reported to help managers and employees focus on policy priorities and achieve the 
required targets; as put by Mason Haire, “What gets measured gets done” (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982, p. 268).  
1.2.2. Theoretical Framework:  
Goal-setting theory states that under certain conditions, people will strive to 
achieve set goals and targets (Ryan, 1970; Locke et al. 1970; Rand & Peikoff, 1990; 
Locke, 1996). Setting goals motivates the employees to achieve them so they may 
increase self-satisfaction as well as gain recognition from their superiors and peers. The 
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genesis of performance management can also be traced in employee motivation theories 
such as McClelland’s Needs of Achievement Theory (1965). According to the Needs of 
Achievement Theory, if employees are provided with feedback on their work in a 
moderately challenging environment, they will try to improve their performance in order 
to gain expertise and success (Rainey, 2003). Positive as well as constructive feedback is 
a major source of motivation increment in employees, as they appreciate attention by 
superiors and peers, and try to obtain more favorable feedback on their work (Geister et 
al., 2006; Komaki et al., 1982). 
According to Moynihan (2008), the underlying assumptions for the adoption of 
the performance management system can be found in principal-agent theory. According 
to principal-agent theory, agents possess more information about the on-ground working 
conditions than the principals, and they might use this information imbalance in their 
favor rather than in the benefit of the missions and objectives for which the principals 
have asked for their services (Ostrom, 1990, 1999). Performance management systems 
work to decrease the information gap between the principals and their agents by 
providing regular program progress and performance information to them (Melkers & 
Willoughby, 2005). By linking their compensation to a certain performance measure, the 
principals might be able to increase the attention of their workers specifically to the 
actions that increase value for them (Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). The principals can 
thus use this information to ascertain, monitor, and control the direction of the chartered 
programs or projects. In short, performance management helps the principals impose 
their world-view, values, and desires on their agents by setting appropriate performance 
targets and seeking a follow up on progress toward those goals (Bouckaert & Balk, 
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1991). As a result, this process might lend more control to the principals over their 
agents. 
Of all of the above theories, justification for performance management can best be 
grounded under goal-setting theory. Goal-setting theory states that “working toward a 
determinate goal would lead to a higher level of task interest than would be the case with 
an abstract goal such as do your best” (Locke and Bryan 1967, 121). When an 
organization measures an entity and assigns goals, the organization conveys to its 
employees what it values most and that entity gains more importance than what it might 
have stated (Latham, 2000). Hence, the goals should be expressed through measurable 
results, in order to track employee achievement (McConkie, 1979).  
The basis of goal-setting theory rests on the assumption that the previous 
performance is lower than the desired level of performance, which ideally moves higher 
as the previous performance increases, making the goals progressive (Carroll & Tosi, 
1973). There needs to be a balance between the difficulty and ease to reach the goals. 
While employees might not put effort toward reaching goals they consider to be 
unachievable, they would not feel self-satisfaction or receive recognition if the goals are 
too easy to achieve (Miner, 2006).  
Goal-setting theory also argues that the motivational effects of feedback or 
knowledge of results can be reached only through goal-setting, and in its absence, the 
feedback is unable to generate any motivation for people to perform better (Miner, 2006). 
Goal-setting theory assumes that the employees or the organization possess the required 
knowledge, time, money, people, equipment, skills, and ability to attain the goals 
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(Latham, 2000; Latham & Locke, 2007), and setting goals is the reason why some people 
have higher performance than others even with similar skills, ability, and knowledge 
(Latham & Locke, 1991).  
The mechanisms of the theory are such that goals motivate people to persistently 
focus their energies, skills, strategies, and knowledge on the targets, while decreasing the 
focus of their effort on non-relevant and unimportant activities (Miner, 2006). Maximum 
effort is not exerted by the individuals in the absence of specific goals, as people have 
been found to be rating their performance higher when given non-specific, do-your-best 
goals, compared to specific measurable ones by giving themselves the benefit of the 
doubt, which they would not be able to award themselves in the presence of specific 
goals (Kernan & Lord, 1989; Klein, 1990; Mento, Locke, & Klein, 1990; Latham & 
Locke, 1991). In the pursuit of measurable goals, the subjects adopt directional 
mechanisms, conscious problem solving, and creative innovation, well beyond and better 
than the automatic levels of effort, persistence, and direction (Miner, 2006; Latham & 
Baldes, 1975; Latham & Saari, 1982; Shapiro & Hollenbeck, 1990; Smith, Locke, & 
Barry, 1990).   
The motivation to achieve goals can be changed by tying incentives to behavior 
(Locke, Bryan, & Kendall, 1968; Miner, 2006). However, incentives will have no impact 
on behavior if goals and intentions to achieve them remain constant (Locke, Bryan, & 
Kendall, 1968; Miner, 2006). Factors such as authority, peer groups, publicness of goal 
statements, incentives, punishments, satisfaction, and competition all contribute to the 
desirability of trying for a goal as well as to the ability of the subject to achieve them 
(Miner, 2006).  
10 
 
We can identify four major conditions or components of goal-setting theory from 
the above discussion. In order for goal-setting to be successful in improving 
organizational performance, the goals should be: 
i. Clarity - to reduce ambiguity and subjective interpretation. 
ii. Challenging - so they are neither too difficult nor too easy.  
iii. Commitment - so the employees are aware of their importance. 
iv. Feedback - so the employees are aware of their progress toward the goals. 
I have used the above framework as the basis of the study by linking the 
recommended practices available in the police management literature (the target 
population) to these four components of goal-setting theory. I have adopted the Meier and 
O’Toole management model (1999) as an analysis model to test the effectiveness of these 
practices.  
1.2.3. Performance Management in the Public Sector:  
The first evidence of the implementation of a performance management system in 
the context of public administration is found in New York City as early as 1906. The 
New York Bureau of Municipal Research (NYBMR) used to benchmark its 
organizational performance on efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity measures 
against past and targeted performance (Williams, 2004). The information on performance 
indicators was collected through diverse media, such as employee and citizen surveys, 
municipal statistics, and cost-accounting techniques (Williams, 2004).  
Since those times the magnitude and scope of performance management systems 
implementation has grown. Organizational performance results are reportedly used 
everywhere from city halls to congressional sessions and from local governments to 
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federal governments throughout the world in order to defend and justify the efficacy of 
government programs (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002; Cook, 2007). The adoption of 
performance management systems has also found its way into public sector departments 
such as defense, tourism, education, health, and so on. Performance measurement system 
adoption is not limited to the US, as an overwhelming majority (79%) of Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries, as well as some other countries such 
as Mali, Ethiopia, Slovenia, and South Africa, have implemented performance 
management methodology in order to improve their governance (Curristine, 2005; 
Robinson, 2009). 
The expansion of the New Public Management (NPM) movement, of which 
performance management is an integral part, has made an important contribution to the 
increasing adoption of this tool. New Zealand, being the leader of the NPM movement, 
boasts a strong performance management system, as all local governments are 
encouraged to set specific goals for their departments and to base their decisions deeply 
on the outcomes of the performance results (Goldman & Brashares, 1991; McTigue, 
2011). In the US, presidential initiatives such as the NPR (National Performance Review 
of 1993) and PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool of 2004) have made strong 
contributions in the adoption of performance management systems throughout the 
federal, state and local governments and various agencies (Gilmour & Lewis, 2006a, 
2006b). Furthermore, support from national organizations such as the National Academy 
of Public Administration (NAPA) and Governmental Accounting and Standard Board 
(GASB) have also contributed to the spread of performance measurement systems across 
the public sector (Aristegueta, 1999) and in federal agencies such as the Naval Education 
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and Training Command, Postal Inspection Services, Departments of Labor and 
Agriculture, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc. (Barrett, 2007). 
Over the past couple of decades, the adoption of performance management 
systems in US states rose from 31 in the 1990s to all 50 states in recent years (Melkers & 
Willoughby, 1998; Gilmour & Lewis, 2006a, 2006b; Cook, 2007). In her study on 
performance management practices in the states of Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, Aristigueta (1999) found all these states to be adopting 
performance management at varying degrees. Texas and Washington are prime examples 
of the states where performance management is taken very seriously throughout and 
enjoys ample support from politicians as well as public employees (Hager et al., 2001; 
SEIU Report, 2010). Utah and Kentucky make moderate use of this methodology, while 
states such as North Carolina and California have been found flirting with performance 
management by adopting, dumping, and re-adopting it under different names and guises 
(Hager & Hobson, 2001). There are also examples from states such as Arkansas, where 
the system has not yet been properly implemented (Cook, 2007), and Massachusetts, 
where the legislature disapproved its adoption (Hager & Hobson, 2001).  
Local governments have historically been the front-runners in adopting 
performance measurement methodology (Williams, 2004), and a staggering 74% of the 
88 local governments surveyed by Grizzle (1985) were found to be using performance 
measurement as far back as the 1980s. Ammons (2001), however, gave a less optimistic 
figure of 50% of local governments using performance measurement systems, while 
Melkers and Willoughby (2005) found 50% of the local governments to be making full 
use of performance measurement and 20% making partial use in their various 
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departments. Through a comprehensive survey on the use of performance measurement 
systems in local governments, Poister and Streib (1999) found that 38 percent of the 
cities surveyed make meaningful use of performance measurement systems, out of which 
23 percent have central city-wide performance measurement systems.   
1.2.4. Limitations and Hazards of Performance Management: 
“In Poland under communism, the performance of furniture factories was measured in 
the 
tonnes of furniture shipped. As a result, Poland now has the heaviest furniture on the 
planet.” Report on Business, Globe & Mail (Toronto), August 1996. 
Despite the strong theoretical evidence and pragmatic assumptions in its favor, the 
use and utility of performance management has not lived up to expectations (Moynihan 
& Pandey, 2006; Moynihan, 2008; Willoughby, 2004). This scenario might be explained 
by incrementalism theory, which contests the logic that performance management might 
have any impact on an agency’s performance. This theory suggests that performance 
information does not matter in making decisions, as organizations evolve through a series 
of small changes based on their past and political needs, instead of rational performance 
information (Moynihan & Pandey, 2006).   
Another reason for the poor utilization of performance measurement might lie in 
dialogue theory (Moynihan & Pandey, 2006). According to dialogue theory, people might 
interpret the same information in their own different ways, and will subsequently differ 
on the decisions which need to be taken. Ambiguity is an inherent part of an organization, 
and the various actors present arguments which mirror their own perspectives, hence 
creating possible disagreements (Moynihan & Pandey, 2006). Hence, the assumption that 
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explicit information coming out of a performance management system will lead to 
specific decisions does not hold ground. 
Heinrich and Marschke (2010) critique performance management systems 
through the perspective of principal-agent theory, which, ironically, forms an important 
theoretical foundation for their use. They argue that public programs and their goals are 
complex enough to impose the dilemma of setting multiple, difficult-to-measure, and 
competing targets for the employees. Owing to the fact that agents will focus on the tasks 
which are being measured, principals will be forced to include a wide variety of such 
measures in the performance management system, which would complicate the system so 
much that the system will become essentially ineffective (Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). 
Performance management system designers cannot fully capture the possible distortions 
in the system before it is implemented, and the agents might learn about these distortions 
and short-comings faster, which might lead to a possible gaming of the system (Heinrich 
& Marschke, 2010). 
Radin (2006) provides an extensive analysis of the limitations of performance 
management systems in the public sector in her book “Challenging the Performance 
Movement: Accountability, Complexity, and Democratic Values”. She points toward 
problems such as choosing to serve only the customers which the agency knows will 
increase their performance statistics, gaming the numbers, and focusing on teaching to 
the test instead of learning in schools. The application of performance management to the 
accident and emergency units of some hospitals in England, by specifying a four-hour 
case clearance target, led to perverse behavior as the staff in these departments were 
found to direct patients to other wards which were not equipped to deal with those 
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patients (Loveday, 2005). Some ambulance services in the UK responded to the setting of 
response-time targets by measuring time from the moment the ambulance leaves for 
service instead of measuring the response from receiving the emergency call (Loveday, 
2005).   
Radin also criticizes some of the basic underlying assumptions of performance 
management, such as that goals can be clearly defined and attached to actors, outcomes 
can be quantified, data are available, and results can be delivered to and used by an actor 
with authority. Radin (2006) discusses the objective, numerical, and quantitative nature 
of performance management, which overlooks the subjective nature of complexity 
inherent in all social and public programs. A further source of complexity might exist due 
to the inability of performance management systems to deal with equity issues under the 
fragmented structure of political power in the US (Radin, 2006). Radin also criticizes the 
one-size-fits-all approach to implementing performance management systems, which has 
been used under the New Public Management approach such as the PART and 
Government Performance and Results Act.  
  Performance management is a resource-intensive exercise and requires ample 
staff, support systems, and time for sufficient analysis to yield important information 
(Leeuw, 2000). Performance measures do not assess the causality of their given results, 
which is of paramount concern for public managers and policy makers in order to make 
the appropriate amendments (Hatry, 2006; de Lancer Julnes, 2008). Performance 
measures, even with all their objectivity, are still imperfect estimators of true 
performance (de Lancer Julnes, 2008) and are no substitute for experience and human 
judgment (Moynihan, 2008). 
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 Issues pertaining to the proper identification and measurability of program 
outcomes are further impediments to the success of performance management (Kelly & 
Rivenbark, 2003). Outcomes for public services such as national security, health, and 
provision of justice are extremely difficult to measure owing to their complex social and 
collective nature (Bouckaert & Balk, 1991; Leeuw, 2000). Furthermore, public 
organizations often work to achieve many contradictory goals at the same time, which 
further convolutes the possibility of effective performance management (Dixit, 2002). 
The use of output and process measurement as surrogates for hard-to-measure outcomes 
can be misleading and may have validity and inaccuracy problems; for example, hours of 
patrol is a relatively easy-to-measure output of police effort but might not translate into 
the desired outcome, such as reduction in crimes committed (Bouckaert & Balk, 1991; 
Hatry, 2006; de Lancer Julnes, 2008; Poister, 2003). 
 Performance management has been found by some scholars (Leeuw, 2000; Smith, 
1993) to have undesirable impacts on organizations, while a belief in the prowess of 
quantitative measures to bring performance improvement has been termed as naïve by 
others (Bouckaert & Balk, 1991). Strict adherence to the pursuit of performance 
management could lead to a fixation on a handful of measures by public managers, 
resulting in a narrow focus on the measures rather than on the broader government goals, 
which might even lead to perverse behaviors (Smith, 1993; Leeuw, 2000; Fitz-Gibbon, 
1997; Bouckaert & Balk, 1991). The desire to improve performance might lead to further 
tightening of performance targets, which might decrease innovation and trust by forcing 
the measured entity to become confirmative and prescriptive (Caulkin, 2009). Some 
performance measures can even be misleading or become irrelevant with time and lead 
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decision-makers to make wrong choices (Bouckaert & Balk, 1991; Meyer & Gupta, 
1994; Leeuw, 2000).  
Barnow and Heinrich (2010) explore the various reasons due to which 
performance management systems might not be suitable for improving organizational 
performance. They raise concerns about the way performance of organizations is 
measured, as many of the variables which have an impact on organizational performance 
but are independent of the control of public managers might be either left out of the 
analysis or might be just too many to be included in the analysis (Barnow & Heinrich, 
2010). They point to the fact that there are still no established statistical methods which 
would help us deal with the omitted variable bias. The comparison of performance results 
across organizations is another important issue, as all organizations work in different 
environments and have their own dynamics which need to be taken into account, hence 
impeding a general comparison (Barnow & Heinrich, 2010). Furthermore, some 
organizations might keep their performance targets higher than others on purpose, which 
defeats the purpose of more equitable implementation and comparison of performance 
across organizations (Barnow & Heinrich, 2010). The positivistic and technical nature of 
most performance targets and indicators has also been cited by scholars as a limitation to 
successful performance measurement system implementation (Barnow & Heinrich, 
2010).  
Scholars (e.g., Poister, 2003; Hatry, 2006; Bouckaert, Van Dooren & Balk, 2010) 
have recommended many practices to help us rectify the limitations and hazards of 
performance management, which lead to its limited use and ineffectiveness. Following 
recommended practices is meant to increase the effectiveness and use of performance 
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measurement systems (Cormican & O'Sullivan, 2004; Battor et al., 2008; Newell et al., 
2003).     
1.3. Recommended Practices – Where Do They All Come From? 
Practices recommended by scholars to improve public management systems 
mostly come from case studies, quantitative analyses, or books written on a particular 
field of management (Reijers & Liman Mansar, 2005; Martin, 1978; Golovin, 1997). As 
far as case studies are concerned, scholars or research teams pin down a particularly well-
performing organization out of many others in a specific area, and try to find out what 
that organization does differently in order to yield better results than its counterparts 
(Reijers & Liman Mansar, 2005). Scholars also engage themselves in surveys and 
interviews with managers and other senior researchers to identify the practices which 
could lead to the desired outcome, and collect their findings in the form of recommended 
practices (e.g., see Cormican & O'Sullivan, 2004).  
Some business and public organizations conduct studies on their own 
management processes and try to identify the practices which produce the most desirable 
results through benchmarking with other organizations in the same domain (Zairi & 
Ahmed, 1999; Camp, 1989; Spender, 2008). Every employee working in an organization 
has the potential to identify the recommended practices to make their job more effective 
and efficient (Spender, 2008; Furlong & Salisbury, 2005), and the process of employee 
interaction in order to exchange information involves a lot of communication, 
negotiation, and sense-making (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Cook & Brown, 1999; Weick, 
1995). Such an interaction of organizational actors combined with their troves of 
knowledge results in the creation of a general knowledge base for the recommended 
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practices (Newell et al., 2003; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Cook & Brown, 1999; Weick, 
1995).   
Professional organizations also instigate research in their affiliated organizations 
and members to find recommended practices in their particular fields (e.g., see Barczak et 
al., 2009). In the public sector, examples of recommended practices development can be 
seen sparingly in the literature. The recommended practice collection program initiated 
by the English Department of Educational and Skills (DfES) between 2000 and 2003 is 
one such example. As a part of the program, public school teachers were awarded 
scholarships to compile recommended practices in teaching and school management 
processes (Furlong & Salisbury, 2005). 
Most of the recommended practices in management, though, emerge through a 
network and interaction of scholars, practitioners, job experiences, educational levels, and 
professional organizations (Paauwe & Boselie, 2005). Organizations, employees, and 
scholars evolve with time by reacting to their environments, which gives rise to certain 
practices aimed to avoid or benefit from internal and external situations and events 
(Paauwe & Boselie, 2005).  
The collection and compilation of recommended practices in management 
through the available literature and research is also a very common practice in the 
development of a unified recommended practices structure. Battor et al. (2008), for 
example, compiled management practices in fields such as customer relations 
management, vision development, and knowledge sharing, which had already been 
evaluated for effectiveness by other researchers, and collected them all under one roof to 
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give a complete picture of recommended practices in organizational management which 
could yield better organizational performance. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Impact of Recommended Practices on Organizational Performance 
Fast-learning organizations which absorb the effective recommended practices 
sooner than others perform better and gain a competitive advantage over their 
counterparts because of early adoption (Zahra & George, 2002; Zott, 2002). In their 
model showing the impact of the adoption and implementation of the effective 
recommended practices on organizational performance, Zahra and George (2002) argue 
that the more an organization acquires, assimilates, and exploits these practices, the more 
likely it will be to perform better than other organizations. This view is also supported by 
researchers such as March (1991), Liebeskind (1996), Zott (2002), and Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990). 
 
 
 
 
The notion that the use of recommended practices yields better performance in 
organizations is supported by many theories such as the organizational learning paradigm 
(Huber, 1991), the dynamic capabilities view of firms (Mowery et al., 1996), the 
knowledge-based view of firms (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Conner & Prahalad, 1996), 
and the resource-based view of organizations (Barney, 1991; Robins & Wiersema 1995; 
Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1995; Barney, 2001; Szulanski, 1996). These theories suggest 
Early Adoption of 
Effective 
Recommended 
Practice  
High Assimilation 
and Exploitation 
of Recommended 
Practice 
Increased 
Organizational 
Performance 
Figure 2: Pathway of the Impact of Recommended Practice Impact on Organizational Performance. 
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that the difference between low-performing and high-performing organizations lies in the 
ability of better-performing organizations to adopt new methodologies and management 
processes, gain superior knowledge, and hence gain a competitive edge (Kim, 1998; 
Beer, 1972; Douglas, 1986; Sandelands & Stablein, 1987; Teece et al., 2005; Teece & 
Pisano, 1994). 
Organizations which adopt recommended practices lead other organizations in 
terms of performance as they can better read the changes in their environments and make 
internal changes sooner and hence can take full advantage of the new situation or save 
themselves from possible adversity (Zahra & George, 2002; Lei et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, as the recommended practices are routinized, organizations gain experience 
in handling them effectively and efficiently, which reduces the need for them to invest in 
frequent changes (Zahra & George, 2002; Teece et al., 2005; Zott, 2002). 
2.2. Evaluation of Recommended Practices 
There is nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency that which should not be done at 
all. 
–Peter Drucker 
Evaluation of recommended practices in public management can be defined as 
“the selective observation of a set of exemplars across different contexts in order to 
derive more generalizable principles and theories of management” (Overman & Boyd, 
1994, p. 69). The evaluation of recommended practices and advice has been an area of 
key interest in the research realm in the past decade. As recommended practices are 
compiled over time in any field, it becomes important to separate the good ones from the 
ineffective ones. As shown in the previous section, recommended practices emerge 
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through books, experience, networks, research, and case studies. Not only can these 
recommendations be faulty and weak, they can also become irrelevant with time or work 
only in specific conditions (Bracmort, et al., 2004; Newell, Edelman, et al., 2003). Hence 
it is important that the effectiveness of recommended practices is evaluated in order to 
save resources, enhance the literature, verify previous findings, and extract better results 
for organizations (Lurey & Raisinghani, 2001).  
2.2.1. The Role of Theories in Recommended Practice Evaluation: 
Overman and Boyd (1994) find the genesis of recommended practices evaluation 
in public organizations in post-bureaucratic reform theory. The theory as presented by 
Elaine Kamarck (2007) in her book The End of Government … As We Know It: Making 
Public Policy Work states that the future belongs only to small and innovative 
governments with skilled and talented employees (Wang, 2007). According to Overman 
and Boyd (1994), public management research evaluates best practices under the 
influence of post-bureaucratic reforms, and aims on creating a “customer-driven, value-
focused, entrepreneurial, market-oriented” government (p. 67).  
While post-bureaucratic reform theory might provide us justification for 
recommended practices needing to be evaluated, all the methods of recommended 
practice formulation have one basic flaw: These methods are theoretically self-validating 
due to their experimental, and thus, inductive nature (Overman & Boyd, 1994). Since 
most of the recommended practices emerge through observation and serve a very 
practical purpose of improving practice, little emphasis is given to the theoretical 
underpinnings behind the recommendation (Overman & Boyd, 1994). In order to fill this 
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gap, I have linked the recommended practices to goal-setting theory such that the analysis 
can be grounded under a theoretical framework.   
2.2.2. Previous Evaluations of Recommended Practices in Management: 
Barczak et al. (2009) investigated the effectiveness of recommended practices in 
management in business organizations through case studies and found them to be 
effective. Lurey & Raisinghani (2001) evaluated the recommended practices employed 
by several US companies in order to manage virtual teams. Through a qualitative study 
involving 67 individuals across 12 teams, they found that the teams that used more of the 
recommended practices performed better that the teams which made less use of these 
practices.  
Many case studies have been conducted by scholars in the business and public 
sectors to evaluate the effectiveness of management recommended practices on 
organizational performance (e.g., Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006; Christmann, 2000; 
Reijers & Liman Mansar, 2005), and a positive picture of the effectiveness of 
recommended practices has emerged as these studies usually agree on the potency of 
such practices on organizational performance.  
Cooper (1998) evaluated the recommended practices pertaining to quality, 
resource commitment, management commitment, teamwork, culture, and linking 
strategies to resources used to develop new products in 161 business industries in the US, 
Germany, Denmark and Canada, and found these practices to have a positive impact on 
organizational performance. Through a meta-analysis of the literature and a subsequent 
survey, Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) found that the companies who adopted 
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recommended practices in quality costing techniques fared better in reducing the cost of 
bringing quality to their products. The recommended practices, however, need to be 
altered to fit the internal and external context of the organization (Schiffauerova & 
Thomson, 2006). 
 The above discussion suggests that the evaluation of recommended practices is a 
growing concern in the field of organizational management and is supported by theories 
and scholarly assertions. Many studies, both qualitative and quantitative, have been 
carried out to evaluate the impact of the use of recommended practices in the past and 
have shown that the use of recommended practices has a positive impact on 
organizational performance. It can be observed that organizations that adopt 
recommended practices earlier and/or use them with a higher intensity compared to 
others show better performance. There are, however, no such studies carried out in the 
literature to evaluate the recommended practices for performance management systems, 
another gap which I intend to fill with this dissertation.  I am using local police agencies 
as my target population.  
2.3.  Target Population – Local Police Agencies in the US  
Implementation, use, and the success of performance management systems are 
considered to be complicated and daunting for police agencies due to their inherent 
structures (Ashby et al., 2007). Police agencies have to maintain a balance between the 
demands of the community, social justice, organizational flexibility, budgeted resources, 
accountability, fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness (den Heyer, 2011). While a 
majority of police agencies use performance management systems (Andersson & 
Tengblad, 2009; Van Sluis et al., 2008; DeLorenzi et al., 2006), there are many problems 
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that have accompanied their use, such as abuse of authority, increased sense of 
marginalization among minority communities, and data manipulation (Ashby et al., 2007; 
den Heyer, 2011). It is presumed that better performance management systems can be 
designed based on recommended practices, which would help improve organizational 
performance, in part, by reducing some of the limitations and hazards caused by the 
systems. I am testing this claim in this dissertation.  
Police agencies serve as a suitable target population for this study, as there is 
objective performance data available on police performance in terms of crime rate 
statistics, through the UCR database. The UCR provides a ready source of determinants 
of police performance, which we can compare with the extent to which police agencies 
use recommended practices to design and implement their performance management 
systems.   
2.3.1. Police Structure and Reforms in the US: 
Police departments in the US are divided on a state, local, and special purpose 
basis (Reaves, 1992). In this study, I will focus on local police departments, divided at 
the city and town level across the US. These departments are governed under their 
respective city or town governments, with a singular police chief managing both 
uniformed officers and civilian employees.   
The traditional police structure is based on Frederick Taylor’s scientific 
management and Max Webber’s model and hence emphasizes efficiency, orderliness, 
output, and bureaucracy (Thibault et al., 2004). Historically, police agencies had 
paramilitary-like, rigid, centralized, and bureaucratic structures with defined authority, 
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responsibility, and communication, while being largely isolated from the community 
(Coleman, 2008; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).  
Police agencies, however, are gradually evolving into more organic systems by 
adopting various proven and unproven methods in order to stay competitive and relevant 
in an ever-changing environment. Police establishments across the US are becoming 
increasingly diverse with the induction of more women, minority, and gay officers 
(Mastrofski, 2006; Thibault et al., 2004).  Furthermore, these agencies are spending large 
amounts of resources to encourage their officers to attain a college education and undergo 
professional training (Mastrofski, 2006). They are also trying to improve their data 
collection and analysis techniques (Weisburd & Braga, 2006; Mastrofski, 2006), which 
has shifted their focus from abstract, general, and complex management styles to more 
data driven and precision-based methods (Manning, 2006; Mastrofski, 2006).  
Some police reforms, such as community policing, require police to embrace new 
functions such as community organization in their job description, while a shift in public 
focus on anti-terrorism activities has led local police forces to work more closely with 
other local and federal law enforcement agencies as well as with the fire, medical, 
transportation, communications, and infrastructure establishments (Mastrofski, 2006). An 
increase in the immigrant population, which is largely unfamiliar to the established social 
network in the US, and who speak different languages and are uprooted from their own 
communities, is also impacting the way police agencies carry out their jobs (Mastrofski, 
2006). 
With the increasing complexities and sophistication in addressing crime and 
public concerns about their efficiency and effectiveness, police departments are moving 
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toward management reforms to improve their performance levels (Walker, 1977; Shane, 
2010; Reiss, 1992). Management reforms have been carried out in the police force due to 
pressures on the police to respond to constraints on public expenditures (Levine, 1985), 
changing sociological standards (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005), changes in the 
public’s perception about social behavior and police behavior (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000; 
Bryett, 1999; Leishman et al., 1995, Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005), control of the 
police force (Johnston, 1988), a need to inculcate professionalism (Kingshott, 2006), and 
to demonstrate cost‐effectiveness to the public (Butler, 1992). Everything from structural 
changes to the induction of corporate strategy has been applied (Moore & Stephens, 
1991), resulting in transforming the dynamics of police services from a dominantly 
professional and bureaucratic approach to one which incorporates community needs and 
development of strategies to solve public problems (Kelling, 1992; Langworthy & Travis, 
1999).  
Adoption of management techniques such as Management By Objectives, 
Program Evaluation and Review Techniques, Organizational Development, Zero-Based 
Budgeting, and Programming, Planning, and Budgeting has been occurring in the police 
departments under the systems-management approach since the 1960s (Thibault et al., 
2004). Since the last three decades, however, proactive police management is taking over 
the systems management approach in police departments (Thibault et al., 2004). 
Proactive police management ensures that police departments focus on crime prevention, 
are committed to community involvement, use diverse crime control techniques, employ 
specialists rather than generalists, adopt modern communication and budgeting 
technology, plan on emergency and crisis management, consult stakeholders, and make 
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use of data (Thibault et al., 2004).  Performance management remains an integral part of 
both systems-management and proactive-police-management approaches, but not so 
much for the traditional police management approach. 
Proactive police management includes reforms such as community-oriented 
policing and problem-oriented policing. While community-oriented policing focuses on 
encouraging the public to share responsibility for public safety (Geller et al., 1995; 
Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994), problem-oriented policing 
works to eliminate the conditions that generate problems (Bayley, 2008). There are many 
other approaches adopted by police agencies to lower crimes. Signs-of-crimes policing 
reforms adopted the strategy to prosecute minor offenses (Bayley, 2008), and hot-spot 
policing methods involved episodic concentrations of police in one area or situation 
(Bayley, 2008). Similarly, the CompStat program shifted the focus of police agencies 
from output measurement to outcome measurement for police efforts (Bayley, 2008). 
Some police agencies adopted management practices from the private sector such as 
project management (Karlsen et al., 2007), information technology (Luen & Al-
Hawamdeh, 2001), and balanced score card techniques (Greasley, 2004). These reforms 
mostly focus on enhancing localism, establishing community engagement, citizen-
focused service delivery, and improving neighborhood police services (Bayley, 2008). 
These reforms have helped shift the focus of police performance from the utilization of 
inputs to the production of better outputs and outcomes (Coleman, 2008). 
Management reforms help the police departments cope with over-centralization, 
unjust resource allocation to more politically powerful units, and decision paralysis 
(Levine, 1985), and increase their integrity, leadership, flexibility, respect, support, and 
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professionalism (Metz & Kulik, 2008). They have lent an inculcation of flexibility, 
learning, and citizen-friendly values in the police force (Hodgson, 2001). Some scholars, 
however, argue that the impact of these management strategies on police performance is 
not as yet empirically determined (Terpstra & Trommel, 2009). 
2.3.2. The Role of Police Chiefs in Setting Management Strategies: 
In the US, police departments have always enjoyed a fair amount of operational 
independence, which leads to diversity among the various police departments in terms of 
their organizational structures and responsibilities (Bayley, 1996; Goldstein, 1977). 
Police agencies appoint and measure performance of their chiefs in dissimilar ways 
(Mastrofski, 2006). Police chiefs are appointed and removed based on crime rates under 
their respective jurisdictions, changes in the political regimes, and the emergence of 
scandals and crises (Mastrofski, 2006). In most agencies, the chiefs are elevated through 
the ranks, while some police departments prefer bringing their chiefs from the outside 
(Mastrofski, 2006). There is also remarkable variation in the education levels, training, 
work experience, and exposure to professional, business, and higher education 
organizations the chiefs of different local police departments might have (Mastrofski, 
2006).  
The introduction of technology, telephone services, CCTV cameras, automobiles, 
and information technology in police agencies has shifted the role of police chiefs from 
being proactive commanders to overseers, while the departments function on auto-pilot 
management (Mastrofski, 2006). Call-for-service systems such as 911 have restricted the 
ability of police chiefs to deploy their force in a pre-planned and strategic manner 
(Mastrofski, 2006), and have forced them to adopt other means such as community 
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policing by organizing groups of citizens to work with the police agency.  More 
discretion given to officers on the ground changed the nature of the relationship 
traditional police chiefs had with their officers in terms of controlling, constraining, and 
guiding them (Mastrofski, 2006). Police chiefs are also wrestling with increased notions 
of accountability as elected representatives, the media, and criminal courts regularly 
scrutinize police policies, practices, and procedures, especially for cases which attain 
some sort of notoriety due to human rights or other violations (Moore & Braga, 2003). 
Coleman (2008), however, observes that police agencies have failed to 
successfully incorporate these management reforms within their structures. The adoption 
of new policing methodologies requires the establishment of a comprehensive strategic 
management and results-based performance management regime. Coleman (2008) found 
the adoption of these systems wanting in Canadian local police agencies, while the police 
chiefs of these organizations were found to have insufficient skills and knowledge to 
implement them.    
Most of the management reforms in the police services have come from outside 
the police force through a top-down process (Bayley, 2008). The police department 
leadership, thus, plays a vital role in communicating the reforms across the organization, 
and ensures lower-level management support in order to successfully implement these 
reforms (Berg et al., 2008; Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005). To make the reforms 
successful, police leadership has employed several methods such as peer group network 
methodologies (Butterfield et al., 2005; Leishman et al., 1995). Furthermore, police 
chiefs are responsible for increasing cooperative behavior among their subordinates and 
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helping fulfill social security, self-esteem, and autonomy requirements of the police 
organization (Thibault et al., 2004).  
Given the importance of their role in the establishments of management reforms, I 
will send surveys to police chiefs to ascertain the level of the use of recommended 
practices in designing and implementing performance management systems in their 
respective agencies. 
2.3.3. Performance Management in Police Agencies: 
Performance management is one of the many tools used by police departments to 
reform their practices and procedures in order to improve their performance, and its 
adoption is increasing in police departments across the US (Karlsen et al., 2007). Before 
discussing performance management systems in the US, I review existing research on the 
implementation of these systems internationally.  
As an integral part of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, performance 
management has found its way into police departments in countries like the US, UK, 
Australia, and Netherlands (Butterfield et al., 2004; Andersson & Tengblad, 2009; Ashby 
et al., 2007; Cope et al., 1997).  Although widely applied, NPM reforms have faced 
resistance from police agencies, and sometimes have even been found to encourage 
police departments to embrace a more traditional work role, which means being event-
driven and focusing on emergency response (Andersson & Tengblad, 2009; Leishman et 
al., 1995; Thomas & Davies, 2005). Some scholars question the success of NPM in police 
departments compared to its success in other type of government systems (Ashby et al., 
2007). 
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Performance management under the name Policing Performance Assessment 
Framework is used by competent authorities in the United Kingdom (UK) to better 
manage local police departments (Van Sluis & Cachet, 2007; Collier, 2006). These 
systems enjoy ample political support, as they help the government to demonstrate its 
achievements backed with solid evidence (Loveday, 2005b). The system took its roots in 
the mid-1990s and has been expanding since each subsequent government (Maillard & 
Savage, 2012). The British performance management system is characterized by a high 
level of centralization, strong performance-based accountability systems, and the use of 
an elaborate and complex set of performance measures (Maillard & Savage, 2012). The 
government emphasizes an increase in the monitoring of police performance through 
explicit indicators for both local and national levels, which can be compared with other 
agencies (Maillard & Savage, 2012). Some police agencies in the UK were also found to 
engage in unethical methods to cope with performance management systems (O'Byrne, 
2001). The Surrey police department, for example, adopted perverse methods such as 
making bogus calls to look good on performance measures for problem resolution 
indicators (Loveday, 2005b), while the Greater Manchester Police was found to employ 
devious means in order to encourage criminals to admit the crimes they never committed 
and hence improve their clearance rate statistics (Loveday, 2006). 
Contrary to the perceptions of overzealous performance management in the UK 
police agencies as portrayed above, Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith (2010) argue that 
performance targets have been rather non-ambitious and easy to meet and hence have not 
contributed to decrease in overall crime rates. They further point toward the insufficiency 
of data collection methods in UK police departments to properly measure the various 
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types of organized crimes. Due to the difficulties in measuring organized crimes such as 
drug trafficking, the police rely on indicators of the number of arrests and convictions, 
which might not have the desired impact on the reduction of these crimes in society due 
to the ability of these groups to operate from within prisons (Mackenzie & Hamilton-
Smith, 2010). Hence, the measure of the supposed disruption of illegal activity does not 
translate into actual crime reduction (Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith, 2010).  
The application of performance management systems in police services in France, 
however, did not introduce radical changes in organizational structures or characteristics 
as witnessed in the British system (Maillard & Savage, 2012). The inherent secrecy of 
performance information pertaining to the various police agencies makes it extremely 
hard to compare their performance, and an absence of a body to audit police performance 
and take action leads to a weak application of the system (Maillard & Savage, 2012). 
Performance management practices in France are often used as political tools to show the 
public that the national government is interested in the affairs of local administration and 
their security (Maillard & Savage, 2012).    
In Germany, the government introduced performance management reform models 
in certain parts of the country, and performance indicators for police departments were 
linked to their management strategies and administrative processes in order to improve 
the overall effectiveness of these departments (Van Sluis et al., 2008). Belgium presents 
another example where performance management, as a part of New Public Management, 
was employed to regain the lost legitimacy of police departments after several untoward 
incidents (Van Sluis et al., 2008). In the Netherlands, the national government adopted 
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result-based agreements with local police departments in 2003 under the influence of 
NPM (Van Sluis et al., 2008).  
Coming back to the US, Poister and Streib (1999) found that only 230 out of 640 
cities used performance management in their police departments. 77.8 percent of police 
departments had performance measures for workload or output, 32.2 percent had 
performance measures for unit cost or efficiency, 64.8 percent had performance measures 
for outcomes or effectiveness, 56.5 percent had performance measures for service quality, 
and 53.0 percent of police departments used performance measures of citizen satisfaction.    
 CompStat is arguably the most talked about performance management 
methodology in the US. It was first adopted by the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) in the mid-1990s and has spread rapidly to other police departments and 
functions across the country since (Willis et al., 2007; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Van 
Sluis et al., 2008; Walsh, 2001). Inspired by NPM methodology, CompStat is essentially 
an information dissemination system which provides real-time crime rates to police 
officers and tracks the efforts adopted to deal with crime (Weisburd et al., 2003; Walsh, 
2001; Moore & Braga, 2003). Regular meetings are held where the police captains and 
leaders explain poor performance on the measures to city police chiefs, mayors, and 
council members, and proposals are submitted to improve performance (Weisburd et al., 
2003; Walsh, 2001; Moore & Braga, 2003).   
The CompStat model aims to ensure that local police officers are aware of the 
crime situation in their areas and are held accountable for performance, which helps 
decrease indolence and apathy among them (Shane, 2000; Loveday, 2005b). This model 
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has helped police chiefs to transfer responsibilities and enhanced discretion capabilities to 
mid-level police officers in complex situations where rapid actions are sometimes needed 
(Shane, 2000; Whisenand & Ferguson, 1996). The relief from micromanagement has 
provided more opportunities for police chiefs to focus on policy-related issues rather than 
on day-to-day management (Shane, 2000). Performance management practices offer 
managers ways to cope with an increasingly egalitarian culture in police departments by 
holding subordinates responsible for their performance and giving them appropriate 
discretion to improve performance on important metrics (Shane, 2000).  
The CompStat methodology was cited as the primary reason for a substantial 
crime drop in the city of New York, even when demographics, unemployment, and other 
social and economic factors in the city would suggest that crime rates should have 
increased during the time of its implementation (Bratton, 1999; Bratton & Malinowski, 
2008). Owing to its excellent performance, the adoption of CompStat in police 
departments in the US is widespread to the extent that 58 percent of large police agencies 
across the country had either adopted or were thinking of adopting a program similar to 
CompStat in 2006 (DeLorenzi et al., 2006). Based on the success of CompStat, the 
NYPD decided to implement the same methodology to manage traffic under the name of 
TrafficStat, which helps identify road conditions, ensure their correction, and increase 
public safety (Anemone & Spangenberg, 2000). The TrafficStat methodology was 
reported to bring a 28 percent decrease in traffic fatalities within one year of operation 
(Anemone & Spangenberg, 2000). 
The city of Baltimore, Maryland, adopted the CompStat methodology from New 
York, applied it to all the city agencies, and named it CitiStat (Behn, 2008), while cities 
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such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Lowell, Massachusetts, and Detroit, Michigan, have 
a CompStat-like system in place to manage their police departments (Dorriety, 2005; 
Geoghehan, 2006). In 2002, the state of Washington adopted a police management 
program called Washington State Patrol (WSP), which is also based on New York’s 
CompStat (Serpas, 2004). The WSP program also encompasses the fire marshal’s office 
and child clearinghouse in its ambits, and has brought efficiency in police operations as 
well as a higher level collaboration among the various police divisions within the state for 
an effective impact on the overall crime in the state (Serpas, 2004). The Metropolitan 
Nashville Police Department in Tennessee adopted the CompStat methodology, only to 
be accompanied by a randomized audit system where crime victims are selected at 
random and interviewed in order to ascertain if police reports are being accurately filed 
by the officers or not (Serpas & Morley, 2008). Similarly, the city of Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, adopted CompStat under the name Computer Optimized DEployment–Focus 
On Results (CODEFOR), which helped them achieve a double-digit percentage crime 
decrease between 1998 and 1999 (Eterno & Silverman, 2010). 
In 2003, Los Angeles adopted the CompStat methodology under the name 
CompStat Plus to better manage its police force (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008). 
CompStat Plus included additional components such as conducting diagnostic exercises 
to determine the causes of poor performance, establishing focused dialogues among the 
stakeholders to reach conclusions, and giving the affected police officers the discretion to 
chalk out their own plan of action (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008). The adoption of 
CompStat proved to be highly successful in Los Angeles, as crimes dropped by 4% and 
homicides dropped by 21% in the first year of the implementation of the program, a trend 
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that continued for at least another six years, while crime rates in the rest of the country 
did not show any such decrease (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Schick, 2004).  
The adoption of the CompStat methodology by the Columbia, South Carolina, 
police department was found to have a positive impact on the ability of police officers to 
collect and disseminate crime-related information, and was found to generate a 13 
percent decrease in violent crimes and an 18 percent decrease in property crimes reported 
in the city since the establishment of the program (Crisp & Hines, 2007). Although 
CompStat was developed for a large police department, the NYPD, even smaller cities 
such as Gardena (California), Tuscaloosa (Alabama), and Paradise Valley (Arizona) have 
successfully implemented CompStat and reduced crimes (Burnett, 2007; Dorriety, 2005; 
Wintersteen, 2007). In the state of Florida, CompStat was adopted under the name 
PowerTrac in Broward County and  STOP CRIME in the city of Plantation (DeHaven‐
Smith & Jenne, 2006; Larsen, 2002). 
In the late 1990s, Australia adopted CompStat for its police agencies under the 
name Operational Performance Review within their overall strategic plan for crime 
control, called the Operation of Crime Review Panels (Chilvers & Weatherburn, 2004; 
Mazerolle et al., 2007). There were, however, certain modifications made to the original 
NYPD CompStat. For example, New South Wales Police Services did not use the zero-
tolerance method applied by the NYPD in conjuncture with CompStat (Chilvers & 
Weatherburn, 2004). The officers were urged to focus on high-crime places, search for 
illegal weapons, and arrest known repeat offenders (Chilvers & Weatherburn, 2004). As a 
result, the number of known criminals arrested by the police increased by 30% within 
two years, while the prison population also increased simultaneously. Other crime 
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statistics such as robberies, home break-ins, motor vehicle theft, assault, and sexual 
assault dropped significantly (Chilvers & Weatherburn, 2004). The province of 
Queensland, Australia, adopted CompStat for police departments in all its districts, but 
only a few districts showed a drop in crime, and even within those districts, only a certain 
number of police divisions showed improvement (Mazerolle et al., 2011).   
Some scholars, however, do not agree with the proposed benefits that 
performance management systems might bestow on police agencies. They argue that 
police departments will revert back to regular policing methods as the focus of the public 
will move away from accountability and people will learn about the vices of the 
performance measurement system (Hoogenboezem & Hoogenboezem, 2005). Through a 
study on local police agencies in Canada, Mastrofski (2006) argues that although 
performance management systems such as CompStat are adopted and implemented in 
these departments, they are not effectively used and applied. Crisp and Hines (2007) 
point toward the difficulties in restructuring organizational culture and modus operandi in 
police departments in order to establish a viable performance management methodology. 
Most of the police agencies which adopted CompStat techniques under the influence of 
their success in New York were found to possess only superficial knowledge about the 
system (Eterno & Silverman, 2006).  
Other scholars have reported their concerns about a dramatic increase in citizen 
complaints of abuse of authority and violations of human rights by police personnel after 
the implementation of CompStat in New York (Eterno & Silverman, 2006). There was 
also a reported increase in the sense of alienation within minority communities, while the 
NYPD was found to change its tactics from being a service-oriented entity to one focused 
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on making arrests and issuing summons under the influence of CompStat (Eterno & 
Silverman, 2006). Police organizations following the CompStat methodology were found 
to be more centralized and top-down in their approach to organizational management, 
which further increased their isolation from the communities they were supposed to serve 
(Eterno & Silverman, 2006).   
Police captains were reported to experience fear, embarrassment, and humiliation 
and feel under pressure during their presentations, and would look for excuses to escape 
those meetings (Eterno & Silverman, 2006; Martin, 2003; Eterno & Silverman, 2010; 
Marzulli & O’Shaughnessy, 2000). The executives were found to blame poor 
performance entirely on lower ranks while taking all the credit for good performance 
themselves (Eterno & Silverman, 2006). The CompStat methodology failed to increase 
motivation among most of the low-ranking officers, while it is only a few officers who 
changed the approach to their job, helping increased the overall performance results of 
the department (Eterno & Silverman, 2006). 
Scholars also raised concerns about possible deliberate inaccuracies in data entry 
for law enforcement statistics in order to look good on the measures (Long & Silverman, 
2005; Manning, 2001; Willis et al., 2003b). Crime statistics being the primary source of 
performance evaluation might urge police officers not to seek crime victims actively or 
even cause them to refuse to take complaints from victims so as to keep their crime rates 
low (Eterno & Silverman, 2010). It was also reported that between the years 2003 and 
2005, a substantial number of felonies committed in New York were converted to 
misdemeanors by police officers in order to hide the true crime situation and show 
improved performance (Eterno & Silverman, 2010).  
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Other examples of perverse data fudging have been observed in Philadelphia 
(Pennsylvania), Atlanta (Georgia), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Broward County 
(Florida) (Webber & Robinson, 2003; Eterno & Silverman, 2010). Such inaccuracies in 
data might show an untrue picture of the effectiveness of CompStat and other 
performance management systems. These concerns, however, were not found to be true 
in a random audit of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department in 2005, where 99 
percent accuracy was found in the reports prepared by police officers (Serpas & Morley, 
2008). 
Scholars have also questioned the claim of CompStat to be an exclusive and 
powerful tool for crime reduction, as other techniques such as San Diego’s community 
policing, San Francisco’s alternative sentencing and community support methodology, 
Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, and Richmond, Virginia's Project Exile, were found to be 
at least as effective as CompStat strategy (Greene, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). 
The verdict on the effectiveness of performance management systems for police 
departments is still out. While some scholars argue that performance management helps 
improve police performance, others point toward the harmful impacts of this system. 
Most of the concerns cited above about the implementation of performance management 
strategies in police departments, however, relate to the limitations and hazards of 
performance management systems in general. For example, a major concern that we have 
seen with the CompStat systems is data manipulation. One of the recommendations given 
in the literature to deal with this issue is to involve lower-ranking police staff in 
specifying the targets and units of measurement (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; 
Butterfield et al., 2004; Burnett, 2007). 
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I propose that by following the recommended practices in designing and 
implementing performance management systems in police agencies, we can reduce the 
harmful impacts of the system and strengthen its positive impacts, and thus improve the 
performance of police agencies.  
2.4. Recommended Practices for Performance Measurement Systems  
Scholars have provided a wide array of recommended practices to design and 
implement performance management systems. Not only are the recommended practices 
extensive and haphazard, they are also at times in conflict with each other. It is, hence, a 
challenging exercise to isolate meaningful and potent recommended practices. Given the 
expanse and diversity of recommended practices in the performance management 
literature, it is necessary that I define a certain selection criteria.  
First, I collected the most popular recommended practices for designing and 
implementing performance management systems in the general public management 
literature (the number of such practices was 22).  Subsequently, I searched references for 
each of these practices in the police management literature to make sure the chosen 
practices are relevant to police agencies. I only found half (11 of 22) of these practices to 
have strong references in the police literature. Although the other practices also had 
references supporting their use, they were not as strong, recurring, and essential in police 
literature. In the interest of keeping this project practical, I only focused on these eleven 
practices.  
Given that goal-setting theory is closely related to performance management and 
provides us a structure to design and implement performance management systems, I 
used the four components of goal-setting (clarity, challenging, commitment, and 
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feedback) as the theoretical framework, and tried to link the eleven recommended 
practices to these components. Nine out of these eleven recommended practices could be 
linked, which shows that goal-setting theory resonates with the recommendations in the 
police literature and provides a strong theoretical framework to ground these practices 
upon. A description of the eleven recommended practices, their relation to goal-setting 
theory, and reasoning for their positive impact on police performance is provided below: 
2.4.1. Specific Targets: 
Target specificity is considered to be both an important recommended practice in 
the police literature and a fundamental component of performance management systems 
in this area. Police Chief William Bratton, for example, provided a guideline for his 
CompStat system to include targets which measure the exact percentage drop in specific 
categories of crime by a deadline, e.g. 3% drop in burglaries within six months (Bratton, 
1998). Similarly, in the report Law Enforcement Tech Guide for Creating Performance 
Measures That Work: A Guide for Executives and Managers, issued by the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice, Roberts (2006) 
suggests that performance targets should include quantification, e.g. “In FY 2004, reduce 
Part 1 violent crime by 2% over previous fiscal year”. Other police scholars such as 
Shane (2000) and Moore and Braga (2003) cite the clarity of performance targets in 
performance measurement systems as having a positive impact on police performance.  
Goal or target specificity falls under the clarity component of goal-setting theory. 
According to goal-setting theory, goal clarity helps increase organizational performance 
and the likelihood of the achievement of organizational goals (Locke, 1996; Kenis, 1979; 
Latham & Yukl, 1975; Steers, 1976; Ivancevich, 1976). Specific goals help direct the 
44 
 
energies of the employees and the agencies toward the desired directions and in specific 
amounts, rather than being scattered and diffused among necessary or unnecessary 
activities (Carroll & Tosi, 1973). Setting clear goals and targets helps organizations 
eliminate confusion, tension, stress, goal displacement, subjective interpretation, and 
dissatisfaction among employees, and increases their commitment toward organizational 
goals (Kenis, 1979; Elovainio & Kivimäki, 1996; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Latham & Yukl, 
1975; Steers, 1976; Ivancevich, 1976).  
Specific goals are less ambiguous about what is considered to be high 
performance (Locke & Latham, 1990a). Having clear targets with specific time limits 
helps suppress competing goals and interests as well as helping individual employees’ 
attention converge in one direction, which is positively related to team and organizational 
effectiveness (Bang et al., 2010; Carroll & Tosi, 1973). Hence, the more clearly goals and 
targets are defined, the less variance in performance will be experienced (Locke, 1996). 
The targets should be kept as clear and simple as possible, and any interpretative, 
evaluative, or priority ambiguity should be avoided (Boyne, 2006). Furthermore, specific 
goals help subjects evaluate the probability of success more deftly than for vague goals 
(Carroll & Tosi, 1973).  
 Some scholars like Seijts and Latham (2001), however, attach some conditions for 
the success of specific goals. They hypothesized that specific goals yield lower 
performance than “do your best” when employees lacked the required knowledge, while 
specific learning goals fare better in such situations based on the studies and findings by 
Earley et al. (1989), Kanfer and Ackerman (1989), and Winters and Latham (1996). A 
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persistent effort to attain specific goals in the learning stages directs the resources to goal 
achievement rather than learning (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Latham & Locke, 2007).  
The general public management literature is nevertheless supportive of the use of 
specific targets. Poister and Streib (1999), for example, asked the city managers across 
the US if the performance targets used in performance measurement systems, including 
for their police departments, are clear and unambiguous. Through a meta-analysis of the 
literature on Performance Based Budgeting (PBB), Hagar and Hobson (2001) found that 
the clarity of performance targets is an important factor in ensuring a successful PBB 
system. Grizzle (1985) included the clarity of targets as an essential component of a good 
performance measurement system. 
Hypothesis 1: Police departments who establish clearly-defined goals generate 
performance superior to other police departments.   
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 1: Our performance targets are specific and quantifiable, e.g. Reduce 
violent crime by 2% over the next year (Source: Bratton, 1998). 
 Survey Item 2: If we set more than one performance target, we specify which 
ones are more important and which ones are least important (Source: Bratton, 
1998). 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing target clarity. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 1 368 1.0 5.0 3.27 0.99 0.99 
Survey Item 2 366 1.0 5.0 3.36 0.86 0.74 
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2.4.2. Alignment with Strategy: 
There are two types of goals defined in the goal-setting literature: distal and 
proximal goals. Distal goals are long-term strategic goals, while proximal goals are short-
term targets based on the end goals (Latham & Seijts, 1999; Seijts & Latham, 2001). It is 
essential that all proximal, individual, team, or group goals are linked to and based upon 
the overall organizational goals (McConkie, 1979). Proximal goals provide clear markers 
of success and frequent feedback through which the employees can evaluate their 
progress and make accurate amends to their strategies accordingly (Seijts & Latham, 
2001; Latham and Seijts, 1999).  
Proximal goals provide smaller and controllable goals which help the employees 
to attain structurally sound wins, leading to the eventual attainment of the larger goal 
(Latham & Seijts, 1997). Assignment and reaching of proximal goals increases self-
efficacy among employees performing tasks, as by reaching smaller subgoals, they 
become more confident in attaining the broader high-level goals through an early 
assurance of success (Bandura, 1997; Latham & Brown, 2006; Stock & Cervone, 1990; 
Latham & Locke, 1991). Basing proximal goals on distal goals helps add clarity to the 
goals, as employees can relate performance on their task to overall organizational goals.    
In the context of police agencies, deriving from his long-term experience as the 
head of the police force in Newark, Shane (2000) recommends that all performance 
targets set by a police force should be derived from their overall goals. Furthermore, 
Coleman (2008) argues that performance measurement systems for police agencies which 
are not designed based on the overall goals of an agency will not be able to yield the 
desired impact on organizational performance. Other studies on police management also 
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support the notion that performance indicators should clearly translate the performance 
targets in order to increase the efficacy of performance management systems (e.g., Moore 
& Braga, 2003; Burnett, 2007).  
The idea that performance measurement is a tool for achieving the strategic goals 
of an organization is further supported by advisory literature in the police sector such as  
Striving For Excellence: A Guidebook For Implementing Standardized Performance 
Measures published by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Implementing an Agency-Level Performance Measurement System: A Guide 
for Law Enforcement Executives by Police Executives Research Forum, and the Law 
Enforcement Tech Guide For Creating Performance Measures That Work: A Guide for 
Executives and Managers by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US 
Department of Justice (Davis et al., 2008; Milligan et al., 2006; Roberts, 2006). 
Stock and Cervone (1990) found that proximal goals (as opposed to distant goals) 
help employees focus more persistently on tasks as it is harder for individuals to focus on 
end results in the distant future (Dweck, 1986; Stock & Cervone, 1990; Latham & Locke, 
1991; Latham & Brown, 2006). Proximal goals have been found to reduce uncertainty 
and improve error management, especially for complex tasks, by providing regular 
feedback if their progress is in tune with goal attainment and if they need to make amends 
to their strategies (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Latham & Brown, 2006; Latham & Seijts, 1999). 
Employees who were given distal goals and proximal goals were found to develop more 
task-relevant strategies (Seijts & Latham, 2001). Deriving performance measurement 
systems from strategic plans ensures that performance measurement supports activities 
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which lead to the attainment of those objectives, rather than the activities that might have 
no or harmful impacts on goal attainment (Tangen, 2004; Tangen, 2002a).        
The process of creating performance measurement systems begins with defining 
targets for results, outputs, and outcomes that organizations aspire to achieve through the 
program (Kelly & Rivenbark, 2003; Poister, 2003; Bouckaert & Van Dooren, 2010). 
Measurement indicators are then selected on the basis of program targets (Kelly & 
Rivenbark, 2003). The indicator selection process essentially defines how the targets and 
the progress toward them would be measured (Julnes, 2008; Bouckaert & Van Dooren, 
2010). Performance indicators, hence, should be aligned with the overall organizational 
strategy and program targets as they would be more helpful to policy-makers and 
managers in aligning their efforts toward organizational goals (Armstrong & Baron, 
1998; Poister, 2003). Basing performance targets on overall organizational goals and 
performance indicators on the performance targets helps reduce goal displacement and 
value displacement while increasing focus on critical activities.    
Ittner et al. (2003) emphasize establishing performance measures and targets 
based on the overall organizational strategy. Both contingency and economic theory 
support the alignment of control, information, and reward systems with the larger 
strategy. Alignment leads to improve communication, motivate performance, and provide 
faster feedback (Ittner et al., 2003). Ittner et al. (2003), however, found no association 
between aligning performance measures and targets with organizational strategy to 
performance. Hence, it is important to verify the proposed effectiveness of this practice in 
different contexts.     
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Proximal goals, however, may fail to increase performance for tasks requiring 
long-term behavior change and where the employees have a high level of interest in the 
overall distal goal, as they might reduce flexibility in strategies (Latham & Locke, 1991; 
Kanfer & Grimm, 1978). Poister and Streib (1999) hypothesized that setting performance 
indicators on organizational strategic goals was a good practice for performance 
measurement, and asked city governments across the US if they set their performance 
targets based on their overall goals and objectives, including for their police departments. 
Similarly, a meta-analysis of the literature on Performance Based Budgeting showed that 
performance indicators should be derived from and reflect the performance targets 
(Hagar & Hobson, 2001), which is considered to be an essential practice in designing a 
performance measurement system for the public sector (see Grizzle, 1988).  
Hypothesis 2:  Police departments who base performance targets on overall 
organizational goals will generate superior performance than other police departments.  
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 3: While determining our performance targets, we ensured that the 
targets are based on our strategic goals (Source: Poister & Streib, 1999). 
 Survey Item 4: We base the performance targets of our units on departmental 
objectives (Source: Poister & Streib, 1999).   
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing alignment with strategy. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 3 367 1.0 5.0 3.80 0.71 0.50 
Survey Item 4 367 1.0 5.0 3.73 0.76 0.58 
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2.4.3. Diversity of Targets: 
Having a diverse set of goals helps organizations clarify to their employees the 
diverse set of values they uphold, as well as the overall mission of the organization. 
Hence, the recommended practice for producing a diverse set of goals is closely related to 
the clarity component of goal-setting theory. Earlier studies in the public sector such as 
Scott and Tiessen (1990), Hoque and James (2000), and Ittner et al. (2003) support the 
argument that having more measures of performance helps improve organizational 
performance. Acknowledging the lack of a specific hypothesis regarding goal-setting 
theory, I would argue that setting multiple goals for organizational outcomes is beneficial 
for organizations. Having a diverse set of goals helps organizations focus on many 
outcomes at a time, incorporate various values, and be able to link outcomes and values 
together in order to acquire a holistic view of their success (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981).  
Although police outputs such as arrest rates, clearance rates, and efficiency are 
widely measured in the literature (e.g., Wang, Vardalis, & Cohn, 2000; Carringtonet al., 
1997; Tilley, 1995; Nicholson-Crotty & O'Toole, 2004), measuring outcomes is a better 
way to determine police performance than measuring outputs, as the outputs may or may 
not be leading to the desired outcomes (Loveday, 2006). Furthermore, measurement of 
outputs is termed to be an insufficient measure of police performance by some scholars 
(e.g., Coleman, 2008).  
Police scholars such as Shane (2000) and Moore and Braga (2003) argue that 
although police performance is frequently measured through output measures such as 
patrolling the streets, responding to citizen calls for assistance, investigating crimes, 
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arresting people who break the laws, and regulating traffic, it is in fact the outcome 
measures such as reducing crime, reducing criminal victimization, calling offenders to 
account, clearance rates, reducing fear and increasing perceptions of security, fair use of 
authority, and efficiency in managing resources which should be measured. Output 
measurement is easier and more readily available, while outcome measurement is more 
complex and hard to account for (Moore & Braga, 2003).  
Through their wide experience in serving in police departments and managing 
performance measurement systems, Shane (2000) and Moore and Braga (2003) argue that 
performance targets for police agencies should cover a wide array of factors such as 
reduction in criminal victimization, holding offenders accountable, increasing safety in 
public places, fostering a sense of personal security among citizens, efficiently using 
financial resources, and making fair and effective use of force. By measuring a broad set 
of outcomes, departments ensure that they neither delve into a myopic view of their 
performancenor disregard the broader organizational goals. Reports and guidebooks on 
designing and implementing performance measurement systems for police agencies 
(Davis et al., 2008; Milligan et al., 2006; Roberts, 2006) all support that performance 
targets and indicators should be based on a wide variety of dimensions of police 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 3: Police departments who base their performance targets on a wide variety of 
indicators will generate superior performance than other departments.  
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 5: We set performance targets for: 
- Reducing criminal victimization (crime prevention) (yes/no). 
- Increasing safety in public places (yes/no). 
- Improving citizen perceptions of crime decrease/safety (yes/no). 
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- Demonstrating fair and effective use of force (yes/no). 
- Holding offenders accountable (investigation and prosecution) 
(yes/no). 
- Providing quality service to the public (yes/no). 
- Efficiently using financial resources (yes/no). 
The variable for targets diversity was measured by aggregating every time the 
police chiefs responded “yes” (coded as 1). The “no” response was coded as 0. The table 
below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items that make up this 
hypothesis. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing diversity of targets. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 5 349 1.0 7.0 4.88 1.83 3.34 
 
A mean of almost 5 suggests that police agencies are more likely to base their 
performance targets on a wide variety of performance indicators. 
2.4.4. Communication of Targets: 
The recommended practice of communicating targets can be linked to two 
components of goal-setting theory, clarity and commitment. Agencies can clarify goals 
and targets for employees by using better communication. Similarly, while employee 
acceptance is essential to the success of any goal-setting effort, communication is key to 
achieving employee acceptance. Locke and Latham (1991) argue that goal setting is 
based on communication, as goals need to be communicated to the employees as well as 
understood in order for them to accept and act upon them. Furthermore, the motivational 
effects of goals can be dissipated and diluted over time; hence, there is always a need for 
goals to be regularly reinforced through effective communication within the organization 
(Miner, 2006).  
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Butterfield et al. (2004) showed that communicating targets throughout an 
organization is an important practice in police departments in the UK which have adopted 
performance measurement systems. Experienced and successful police chiefs from 
Newark, Los Angeles, and New York have also supported the idea of clearly 
communicating performance targets to all officers (Shane, 2000; Bratton & Malinowski, 
2008). In the Law Enforcement Tech Guide, the US Department of Justice advises that 
effective and ongoing communication with lower-level officers is necessary in designing 
and implementing an effective performance measurement system (Roberts, 2006). The 
communication should be organization-wide, available to all employees (Roberts, 2006). 
Keeping the employees informed about decisions made is an important aspect of 
participatory consultation, which leads to better employee performance (Wright & 
Hassan, 2013; Kim & Yukl, 1995; Yukl, Gordon & Taber, 2002). The notion that 
performance targets should be well communicated to the employees of an organization 
has been proven to be effective in many studies on Total Quality Management, Supply 
Chain Management, Human Resource Management and Business Process Re-engineering 
in the private sector and is an established best practice (Bae & Lawler, 2000; Ahmad & 
Schroeder, 2003; Wullenweber et al., 2008; Cho, Woods et al., 2006; Samson & 
Terziovski, 1999; Li et al., 2006; Tan et al., 1999). Poister and Streib (1999) included a 
question on the extent of communication that performance targets city managers and their 
police departments engage in while managing their performance measurement systems.  
Hypothesis 4: Police departments who communicate their performance targets to their 
rank and file will generate superior performance than other police departments. 
Survey Questions: 
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 Survey Item 6: We actively communicate our performance targets to our officers 
and other employees by regular newsletters and reports. 
 Survey Item 7: We regularly communicate performance targets to our employees 
through meetings and workshops (Survey Item 6). 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items that 
make up this hypothesis. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing communication of targets. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 6 362 1.0 5.0 3.86 0.73 0.53 
Survey Item 7 359 1.0 5.0 3.88 0.71 0.51 
 
 
2.4.5. Consultation with Officers: 
Participation in decision making by individuals was found to increase 
performance (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Lawrence & Smith, 1955), cost saving (Carroll & 
Tosi, 1973; Likert, 1961), acceptance of the decisions (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Maier, 
1963), quality of the decisions (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Maier, 1963), agreement and 
mutual understanding (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Hare, 1953; Bovard, 1948), and job 
satisfaction (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Vroom, 1965). Scholars such as Lawrence and Smith 
(1955) and Vroom (1964) argue that satisfaction among employees increases with 
participation, which leads to better outcomes (Carroll & Tosi, 1970).   
As individuals better understand what is expected of them through shaping goals, 
taking part in discussions, and providing their input, participation in goal setting and 
decision making help them better identify problems and feel more in control over the 
manner in which the goals are set as well as the means to reach them (Carroll & Tosi, 
1973). Goals set through participation also help increase acceptance and commitment to 
goals (Miner, 2006). Group goals might require a certain amount of coordinated planning 
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activities in order to achieve them, which can be enhanced through participation (Latham 
& Locke, 1991; Larson & Schaumann, 1990). Participation in goal setting can also help 
develop a shared vision among the employees, lower dysfunctional opportunism, and 
reduce negative feelings about other employees and teams (Locke & Latham, 2006). 
Hence, the recommended practice of consultation with officers can be linked to the 
commitment component of goal-setting theory.  Benefits of participation other than 
motivation, such as improving the quality of strategy development and increasing goal 
commitment, are recognized by the theory (Latham & Locke, 1991; Latham, Winters, & 
Locke, 1991). It is also argued that participation helps employees to better understand the 
object and develop strategy, which in turn helps improve performance; however, it has no 
direct effect on motivation (Latham, Winters, & Locke, 1991; Latham & Locke, 1991). 
Wright and Hassan (2013) distinguish employee participation in two categories: 
consultation and delegation. Consultation refers to the process of asking for ideas, 
opinions, and concerns from the employees, while delegation refers to giving employees 
the authority to take decisions and choose methods of fulfilling their tasks without 
seeking approval from their superiors (Wright & Hassan, 2013; Heller & Yukl, 1969; 
Yukl, 2013; Yukl & Fu, 1999). Consultation helps improve decision quality and 
employee satisfaction, while delegation helps enhance the sense of responsibility, job 
satisfaction, and eventually performance (Wright & Hassan, 2013; Vroom & Yetton, 
1973; Oldham & Hackman, 1980; Oldham & Hackman, 1990).  
Consulting with organizational employees before setting performance targets and 
measurement indicators is an established best practice in the fields of Human Resource 
Management, Business Process Redesign, Total Quality Management, and Supply Chain 
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Management, and has been proven to work by many scholars (Bae & Lawler, 2000; 
Ahmad & Schroeder, 2003; Wullenweber et al., 2008; Samson & Terziovski, 1999; Tan 
et al., 1999). The SEIU (2010) report on the use of Performance Based Budgeting across 
US states found that including opinions from junior officers and employees in the process 
of setting performance targets and measurement indicators reduces the chances of 
perverse behavior and data manipulation.  
Performance measurement system designers should note that public agencies 
work under a complex sets of goals, sometimes contradictory, and are answerable to 
more than one stakeholder such as politicians, agency heads, the public, the media, and 
grant authorities, which often have divergent interests and priorities (Dixit, 2002; 
Bouckart & Balk, 1999). It is recommended that performance targets and measures be 
decided only after due agreement by the manager, the team, and other stakeholders 
(Armstrong & Baron, 2000; Poister, 2003; Hatry, 2006).  
Although subordinate compliance might be sufficient for some tasks and 
environments, decision acceptance is necessary to inculcate initiative, judgment, or 
creativity from the lower employees (Hill & Schmitt, 1977). Employee participation, 
furthermore, increases human capital as it helps develop an environment where 
employees learn through collectively thinking about decisions and their implications 
(Vroom, 2003; Lawrence & Rick, 2001). Through employee participation, organizations 
strengthen their internal processes and team cogency by building positive relations 
between members while aligning individual goals to group or organization goals (Vroom, 
2003; Lawrence & Rick, 2001; Lawrence & Rick, 2001; Vroom & Yetton, 1973; Vroom 
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& Jago, 1988). These aspects further lead to an increase in employee motivation and 
focus (Lawrence & Rick, 2001; Vroom & Yetton, 1973; Vroom & Jago, 1988). 
By including subordinates in the decision-making process, leaders help develop 
feelings of ownership over the decisions within the employees, which results in a 
smoother and faster implementation of the decisions and a reduction to obstruction to 
change (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Erez & Kanfer, 1983). Subordinate participation, hence, 
can help manage complex and contentious issues better by resolving differences between 
people (Vroom & Jago, 1988). Incumbent and former police chiefs having experience 
with performance measurement systems in police departments credit this practice for 
better organizational performance (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008). Butterfield et al. (2004) 
emphasized the need to engage police officers in selecting performance targets in order to 
implement an effective performance measurement system. Providing suggestions on how 
to better design performance measurement systems for small police departments, Burnett 
(2007) noted that it is necessary that the system designers receive feedback from 
supervisors, officers, and investigators to include the information that would help them 
do their job.  
 The Striving For Excellence guidebook stresses the fact the police officers should 
be regularly surveyed about their perceptions of performance measurement systems as 
well as their opinions to make the system work better (Davis et al., 2008). Similarly, the 
report Implementing an Agency-Level Performance Measurement System: A Guide for 
Law Enforcement Executives by the Police Executives Research Forum suggests that 
agency employees should be involved in performance measurement system design and 
implementation process through advisory committees, task forces, and other methods 
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(Milligan et al., 2006). The Law Enforcement Tech Guide also advises the system 
designers to seek input from the employees as they will directly contribute to all the 
aspects of the organization’s operations; have direct knowledge of agency operations, the 
concerns of the community, and the needs and capabilities of the organization; and have 
insight into agency operations (Roberts, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Police departments who consult on-the-ground officers while setting 
targets and measurement indicators will generate superior outcomes than other police 
departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 8: We consult lower-ranking officers before specifying performance 
targets for the department and units. 
 Survey Item 9: We consult lower-ranking officers before specifying performance 
targets for them. 
 Survey Item 10: We actively seek suggestions and advice from our officers to 
improve our performance measurement system. 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing consultation with officers. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 8 361 1.0 5.0 3.62 0.79 0.63 
Survey Item 9 362 1.0 5.0 3.57 0.79 0.63 
Survey Item 10 363 1.0 5.0 3.77 0.82 0.67 
 
 
2.4.6. Officer Discretion: 
Goal commitment in lower-ranking employees can be increased by delegating 
power to them, as it increases the sense of ownership and decreases alienation among 
them (Locke, 1996). Performance measurement systems could be most effective in 
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improving program performance if managers are given the maximum possible discretion 
to make decisions regarding all management domains from hiring to expenditure 
allocation while staying within the pragmatic resource limits (Hatry, 2006). Being the 
agents, the managers know the situation on the ground better than anyone else (Ostrom, 
1990), and they know what areas need attention on which scales in order to improve 
performance. Giving them maximum possible discretion and holding them accountable 
only for the final performance yields the best from them and the agency as the whole 
(Gilmour & Lewis, 2006b; Drucker, 1993; Bale & Dale, 1998). This practice clearly 
relates to the commitment component of goal-setting theory. 
Shane (2000) supports giving discretion and authority to lower-level police 
officers to achieve their performance targets in order to produce better results from 
performance measurement systems. Scholars such as Loveday (2005b, 2006) and Caulkin 
(2009) argue that performance measurement systems can only be effective in improving 
the performance of police agencies if the police departments and their officers enjoy 
ample discretion and professional autonomy (Davis et al., 2008; Milligan et al., 2006; 
Roberts, 2006).  
Hypothesis 5b: Police departments which delegate decisions to their officers will 
generate superior performance than other police departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 11: Our officers enjoy discretion and autonomy in making operation-
level decisions to achieve performance targets. 
 Survey Item 12 Management does not interfere in day to day decisions made by 
the on-the-ground officers. 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing officer discretion. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 11 354 1.0 5.0 3.88 0.68 0.47 
Survey Item 12 353 1.0 5.0 3.62 0.85 0.72 
 
 
2.4.7. Leadership Support: 
Support from top management is essential for the success of mechanisms working 
under goal-setting such as Management By Objectives and performance management 
(Miner, 2006; Rodgers & Hunter, 1991). The leadership can increase goal commitment by 
persuading their subordinates that the goals are important and attainable by asserting their 
authority, communicating effectively, showing how the goals can benefit the individuals, 
challenging the employees, setting good examples, exerting pressure to perform, and 
serving as role models (Latham & Locke, 1991; Earley, 1986b; Mento et al., 1990; 
Ronan, Latham, & Kinne, 1973; Podsadoff & Fahr, 1989). Top leadership helps the 
utilization of performance management by imparting explicit and credible support and 
committing time and resources (Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright 2012). In the absence of 
proper leadership support, lower managers can be suspicious of the reforms to be a 
passing fad, which might lead to pro forma compliance (Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright 
2012). Leaders can also use performance information to hold employees accountable, 
which would encourage the managers to use the measures to compare their performance 
to that of other employees. 
Organizational leaders are important stakeholders for the implementation of 
performance measurement systems. All the steps of constructing a performance 
measurement system require top leadership commitment (Poister, 2003). Any 
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performance measurement system requires strong top management support, commitment, 
and leadership to steer the management process (Hatry, 2006; Poister, 2003). This 
support is necessary to engrain performance measurement in the overall management 
culture of the organization and, more importantly, is instrumental in motivating the 
employees to use performance measurement information for internal communication, 
decision making, and taking actions based on this information. Top leadership support 
also ensures a likely increase in resources available to the performance measurement 
system. 
Hagar and Hobson (2001) found that well-performing Performance Based 
Budgeting systems in the public sector need top management support, while support from 
top leadership has been shown to be necessary in establishing effective performance 
measurement in police departments by practitioners and scholars (Shane, 2000; Bratton & 
Malinowski, 2008). The Law Enforcement Tech Guide suggests that top leadership 
should be actively involved in introducing, championing, and promoting performance 
measurement systems, and their commitment is essential for the success of the program 
(Roberts, 2006).  
Hypothesis 6: Police departments where the top leadership supports performance 
measurement systems will generate superior outcomes than other police departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 13: As the chief of the department, I actively support performance 
measurement systems (Source: Poister & Streib, 2005). 
 Survey Item 14: The mayor of the city/town supports the department’s 
performance measurement system (Source: Poister & Streib, 2005). 
 Survey Item 15: The city/town council supports the department’s performance 
measurement system (Source: Poister & Streib, 2005).  
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The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing leadership support. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 13 350 1.0 5.0 4.10 0.69 0.48 
Survey Item 14 350 1.0 5.0 3.78 0.79 0.62 
Survey Item 15 353 1.0 5.0 3.67 0.80 0.64 
 
  The responses to leadership support questions suggest that the police chiefs 
consider themselves more supportive of the performance measurement system compared 
to the mayors and the city council.  
 
2.4.8. Performance Feedback: 
Feedback is a necessary condition for goal clarity to show positive results (Locke 
& Latham, 2006), while goal setting helps improve organizational performance only in 
the presence of feedback (Ivancevich & McMahon, 1982). Goal setting and feedback 
have a symbiotic relationship, as goal-setting improves performance by a greater margin 
in the presence of feedback, while both feedback and goal-setting would not have an 
impact on performance on their own (Miner, 2006). While feedback may come in many 
shapes and forms (e.g., formal, informal, self-evaluation), when provided by the 
superiors, it should be easy to interpret by the recipients in order to abstract the right 
message from it (Locke & Latham, 1990a).    
Feedback on progress on goals helps improve performance as employees attain a 
better understanding about the effect of their strategies and what they should alter or add 
to achieve their goals (Carroll & Tosi, 1973). Through feedback, employees become 
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more aware of what is expected of them, and hence direct their efforts in more accurate 
directions (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Pryer & Bass, 1957). Apart from performance benefits, 
employees might use feedback to enhance one’s image and impression to others (Latham 
& Pinder, 2005; Ashford & Black, 1996).  Employees who received regular performance 
reports through bulletins and personal letters felt more certain about their performance 
improvement compared to employees who did not receive feedback (Carroll & Tosi, 
1973; Weitz, Antoinette, & Wallace, 1954).  
It is, however, necessary that the feedback is directly relevant to the task, 
establishes goals, and compares current performance with a previously established goal 
or standard (Carroll & Tosi, 1973). Providing feedback signals that the leaders or 
managers have an interest in the work of the subordinates (Carroll & Tosi, 1973). 
Feedback, if provided in a disagreeable manner, might also create resentment and 
hostility among employees, which would lead to low performance (Carroll & Tosi, 
1973). Positive feedback may induce employees to set higher performance goals for 
future performance in order to achieve more self-satisfaction and recognition (Miner, 
2006).  
Employees need to know the results of their efforts in terms of success and failure 
and hence might be dissatisfied (Becker & Green, 1962; Kenis, 1979). Performance 
feedback helps increase performance only when specific goals are set, and the impact of 
goal-setting on organizational performance increases in the presence of performance 
feedback (Locke, 1996). People try to increase their performance level when they receive 
negative feedback (Locke, 1996; Podsakoff & Farh, 1989).   
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It is important that the results of the performance analysis be shared across the 
organization, employees, management, policy-makers, and the public (Hatry, 2006; 
Poister, 2003; Epstein, 1984). The analysis should be presented in a meaningful manner 
that is easy for all stakeholders to understand. Reports are meant to provide information 
on analysis results to the stakeholders; hence, they should be user friendly and should 
cater to the needs of the target audience (Poister, 2003). The reports should suffice for 
stakeholder needs and should not delve into overreporting or underreporting, as both 
could be harmful (Poister, 2003). 
Scholars and practitioners within the police literature have also found utility in the 
regular and accessible publication of performance reports in order to reap higher benefits 
from performance measurement systems in police departments, as they help inform 
officers about trends in their performance to help them make decisions for improving it 
(Shane, 2000; Butterfield et al., 2004; Moore & Braga, 2003). Choosing Gardena Police 
Department, California, as an exemplary model for a performance measurement system, 
Burnett (2007) found that the department makes an effort to timely disperse performance 
reports through e-mails, printing, and posting on bulletin boards. Moore and Braga 
(2003) noted that user-friendly reports play an important part in an effective performance 
measurement system through their study of the NYPD. 
Reports and guidebooks on designing and implementing performance 
measurement systems for police agencies support that efficient and effective feedback 
and performance information be provided to the employees and the public through 
regular reporting in formats which are easily decipherable for the target population 
(Davis et al., 2008; Milligan et al., 2006; Roberts, 2006) 
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Hypothesis 7: Police departments who provide timely performance feedback in a user-
friendly manner will generate superior performance than other police departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 16: We provide regular feedback to all our officers and other 
employees on their performance through formal and informal means. 
 Survey Item 17: We make our performance reports available on our website. 
 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing performance feedback. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 16 353 1.0 5.0 3.52 1.10 1.20 
Survey Item 17 351 1.0 5.0 3.87 1.10 1.20 
 
2.4.9. Performance Information Use: 
Performance measurement remains futile unless the information generated by the 
system is used to take management decisions (Moyniham & Ingraham, 2004; Van 
Dooren, 2008). Performance management should be used to improve the performance of 
an organization (Behn, 1995). More specifically, performance information use involves 
analyzing the measurement results by comparing them against standards, against past 
performance, or with other organizations, and then taking decisions on financial 
management, human resources, capital management, and information technology 
management to improve performance (Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004). Goal-setting theory 
stresses using performance information to make decisions (Locke & Latham, 1990a). 
Using performance information to reward employees can help increase their commitment, 
while making other decisions would help employees gain feedback about their 
performance and learn what is expected from them. Police literature, especially 
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CompStat, emphasizes using performance information to make organizational decisions 
(Bratton, 1998; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008).  
Hypothesis 8: Police departments who use performance measures to analyze performance 
and make decisions will generate superior performance than other police departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 18: We have regularly compared the performance of our officers, 
teams, and units based on their results on performance measures against standards 
or targets (Source: Poister & Streib, 1999). 
 Survey Item 19: We have regularly compared our performance against that of 
other similar police agencies in our state and/or across the nation to get a clearer 
idea of our own strengths and weaknesses (Source: Poister & Streib, 1999). 
 Survey Item 20: We have regularly analyzed trends in our performance over time 
on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis (Source: Poister & Streib, 1999). 
 Survey Item 21: We have regularly utilized performance information to develop 
strategic plans or help inform strategy more generally (Source: Poister & Streib, 
1999). 
 Survey Item 22: We regularly utilized performance information to assess and 
strengthen the performance of individual officers and staff members in our 
organization. 
 Survey Item 23: We have regularly utilized performance information to develop 
budgets and allocate resources. 
 Survey Item 24: We have regularly utilized performance information to revise our 
officer deployment plans. 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items for performance information use. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 18 364 1.0 5.0 3.50 0.85 0.72 
Survey Item 19 366 1.0 5.0 3.23 0.96 0.93 
Survey Item 20 368 1.0 5.0 3.83 0.83 0.68 
Survey Item 21 365 1.0 5.0 3.60 0.85 0.71 
Survey Item 22 362 1.0 5.0 3.67 0.86 0.74 
Survey Item 23 363 1.0 5.0 3.68 0.75 0.56 
Survey Item 24 362 1.0 5.0 3.72 0.77 0.59 
 
67 
 
2.4.10. Consultations with Citizens: 
Citizen participation is an important factor to help increase organizational 
performance. Although citizen participation does not feature much in the goal-setting 
theory literature, it is a recurring recommendation in the police as well as general public 
management literature. Citizens feel more involved in public service initiatives if their 
participation is sought by the public agency and feel that the program or policy 
understands their concerns, which leads to supportive efforts by the citizens toward the 
program (Lawrence & Rick, 2001; Lawrence & Daniels, 1996). Seeking participation 
from the citizen in the decision-making process helps decrease the distance between the 
citizens and the government and helps the government to be more aware of the needs of 
the community (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Gerrits & Edelenbos, 2004). 
The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process is considered to 
bring many benefits to an organization. Participation of the public, lower-ranking 
employees, and external consultants helps incorporate information and skills from 
various perspectives and decrease their opposition (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Gerrits & 
Edelenbos, 2004). Stakeholders bring their own experiences, ideas, resources, 
perceptions, solutions, information, and support to the process (Gerrits & Edelenbos, 
2004; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). Stakeholder involvement also makes the policy-making 
process more transparent and understandable while increasing acceptance of the decisions 
made (Gerrits & Edelenbos, 2004; Hill & Schmitt, 1977).  On the other hand, in places 
where stakeholder input is not taken, stakeholders can be obstructive to the process as 
they might feel that the organizational decisions are not in line with their interests and 
feel alienated (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006).  
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System designers should seek early input from the citizens and the target 
population at every important step of the process to ensure the end result will be 
compatible with their needs and avoid confusion in the end (de Lancer Julnes, 2008).  
Citizen satisfaction surveys have been proven to increase the effectiveness of Total 
Quality Management systems and supply chain management in the private sector 
(Samson & Terziovski, 1999; Li et al., 2006). The SIEU (2010) report credits the use of 
citizen satisfaction surveys as a part of Performance Based Budgeting (PBB) for having 
enabled high-quality and effective public service delivery in the states of Washington and 
Oregon. 
The police literature strongly recommends that citizens be consulted before 
setting targets for police agencies (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Moore & Braga, 2003). 
McDonald and Ridgeway (2010) and MacDonald (2002) argue that citizens should be 
involved in planning performance measurement systems in police departments. Bratton 
and Malinowski (2008) saw a positive role of citizen surveys as a part of the performance 
measurement system in helping them improve police services in New York and Los 
Angeles. Moore and Braga (2003) also support the use of citizen surveys as a part of 
performance measurement systems in order to improve police performance. Serpas and 
Morley (2008) stress the necessity of conducting citizen victimization surveys to better 
ascertain the performance of city police agencies. 
Involving the community in the decision-making process while designing and 
implementing performance measurement systems, keeping them informed, and satisfying 
their needs by incorporating their concerns is an important recommendation provided by 
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reports and books on police agencies such as the reports and guidebooks mentioned 
previously (Davis, et al., 2008; Milligan, et al., 2006; Roberts, 2006). 
Hypothesis 9: Police departments who engage citizens in the decision-making process 
while designing and implementing their performance measurement system will generate 
superior performance than other departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 25: We actively consult citizen groups before setting our 
performance targets (Source: Poister & Streib, 2005). 
 Survey Item 26: We actively seek suggestions and advice from citizens to 
improve our performance measurement system (Source: Poister & Streib, 2005). 
 Survey Item 27: We have formal systems for gathering citizen complaints and 
concerns about our performance measurement system. 
 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing consultation with citizens. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 25 351 1.0 5.0 3.23 0.84 0.70 
Survey Item 26 353 1.0 5.0 3.23 0.85 0.72 
Survey Item 27 353 1.0 5.0 4.13 0.90 0.82 
 
We observe comparatively lower means for the first two survey items, and a high 
mean for the third survey item. This suggests that police agencies make less of an effort 
to include the citizens in the decision-making process than they do to listen to their 
complaints.  
2.4.11. Quality Control: 
For any management strategy or system, there will always be a difference 
between the organizational goals and priorities of employees, which might lead to a 
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decrease in the effectiveness of the organization (De Haas & Kleingeld, 1999; Steers, 
1977). Furthermore, the environmental and internal dynamics of the organization might 
also result in the weakening of strategy. Performance measurement systems should be 
flexible and revised periodically to ensure that they remain congruent with the changes in 
organizational objectives and strategies (Tangen, 2004). Scholars such as Kennerley and 
Neely (2002) and Amaratunga and Baldry (2002) emphasize the dynamic nature of 
performance management systems and the need to upgrade them with the changing 
environment. 
Performance measurement system designing is not a one-time affair, as the goals 
and targets of these organizations are not static and should keep changing based on the 
environment (Erez & Kanfer, 1983). The managers need to update all performance 
aspects from data collection to reporting, and the processes involved in order to be 
relevant to the needs of the program (Mannion & Goddard, 2000; Meyer & Gupta, 1994; 
Leeuw, 2000). Problems such as targets becoming irrelevant, measurement methods 
becoming outdated, and employee learning to game the system are most likely to occur in 
performance measurement systems over time, which need to be resolved (Poister, 2003). 
The system should be periodically checked for quality, efficiency, and effectiveness, and 
corrective actions should be taken accordingly (de Lancer Julnes, 2008). It is important 
that all such actions are taken with customer and policy makers’ consent (Bouckaert & 
Van Dooren, 2010). Similarly, indicator formulation is not a one-time affair, as indicators 
will need to be modified with time according to the needs (Epstein, 1984). Changes in the 
environment such as the arrival of new technology or management systems could make 
the provision or analysis of some data more feasible, while a change in society values 
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such as an increase in interest in environmental issues could force the addition or 
omission of some performance indicators. 
External experts and consultants, whose input is necessary to make the programs 
function better, are important resources in the policy-making process as they can bring 
their expert knowledge to the system needed to manage a complex public service 
environment (Gerrits & Edelenbos, 2004). External consultants and experts might help 
decrease the problem of group-think and internal bias in organizations, while they might 
also provide fresh ideas and perspectives to problems (Janis, 1972, 1982, 1989). Seeking 
external help from experts and consultants in order to improve Performance Based 
Budgeting systems has been shown to improve the quality of systems through a meta-
analysis by Hagar and Hobson (2001) and is also one of the findings of the SEIU (2010) 
report.  
Poister and Streib (2005) included this practice in their survey on performance 
measurement practices across US cities including their police departments. Burnett 
(2007) emphasized the importance of quality control on data entry for performance 
measurement systems, in order to make them work better. Burnett (2007) emphasized the 
importance of external quality audits for performance measurement systems in police 
departments in order to enhance their effectiveness; this involves reviewing existing 
systems in order to keep them updated and reduce the chances of employee manipulation 
of the system. Other studies suggest that performance measurement system design and 
implementation is a complex affair, and help from external experts and consultants is 
often needed to improve research methodology, statistical analysis, information 
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technology, and other aspects of performance measurement systems (Milligan et al., 
2006; Roberts, 2006).   
Goal-setting theory, however, is silent of the use or effectiveness of this practice. 
Hypothesis 9: Police departments who conduct regular quality checks of their 
performance measurement systems will generate superior performance than other police 
departments. 
Survey Questions: 
 Survey Item 28: We periodically conduct quality checks of our performance 
measurement system and make appropriate changes (Source: Poister & Streib, 
2005).   
 Survey Item 29: We actively seek help from external consultants and experts to 
conduct quality checks of our performance measurement system. 
 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the responses to survey items 
that make up this hypothesis. 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of responses to survey items representing quality checks. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Survey Item 28 355 1.0 5.0 2.51 0.96 0.93 
Survey Item 29 351 1.0 5.0 3.50 083 0.69 
 
The means for the measures for quality control are the lowest among the 
recommended practices. This suggests that police agencies are generally not so keen in 
conducting quality checks of their performance measurement systems. 
 
The table below summarizes the relationship between the recommended practices 
for designing and implementing performance management systems in police agencies to 
the four components of goal-setting theory.  
Table 12: Relation between the recommended practices and the four components of goal-setting theory. 
73 
 
Condition  Hypothesis (Recommended Practice) 
Clarity 
Specific Targets (H1) 
Alignment with Strategy (H2) 
Diversity of Targets (H3) 
Communication of Targets (H4) 
Commitment 
Communication of Targets (H4) 
Consultation with Officers (H5a) 
Officer Discretion (H5b) 
Leadership Support (H6) 
Performance Information Use (H8) 
Feedback 
Performance Feedback (H7) 
Performance Information Use (H8) 
Challenging ??? 
Not Related 
Consultation with Citizens (H9) 
Quality Control (H10) 
 
 The practices of setting specific targets, aligning performance measures with 
organizational strategies, diversity of targets, and communicating the targets can be 
linked to the clarity component of goal-setting theory. Similarly, communication of 
targets, consultation with officers, officer discretion, leadership support, and using 
performance information can be linked to the commitment component. Only two 
practices, providing performance feedback and using performance information, can be 
tied to the feedback component, while the practices of quality control and consulting with 
citizens cannot be linked to any of the four components of goal-setting theory. It is to be 
noted that the practices of communication of targets and using performance information 
can be tied to two components each. The police literature, however, does not provide 
strong assertions about the use and effectiveness of recommended practices related to the 
challenging component of the theory. Contrary to the general public management 
literature, where setting goals that are neither too easy nor too difficult (e.g., smart 
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objectives) is emphasized, police literature only contains passing references to this 
important component of goal-setting theory. 
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3. CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology of this study is inspired by the Meier and O’Toole model for 
management (1999) and the subsequent research on public sector management in 
education, police, and local government based on this model (Meier & O’Toole, 2001; 
Andrews et al., 2005; Andrews et al., 2009; Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Walker et al., 2010, 
Nicholson-Crotty & O'Toole, 2004). In the Meier and O’Toole model for public 
management, the current performance of an organization is said to be dependent upon 
management strategies adopted and the past performance of that organization.  
Not only does past performance explain current performance, it also serves as a 
surrogate for organizational and environmental differences between organizations. 
Hence, we can use past performance as a proxy for variables that cannot be directly 
measured, such as leadership quality, employee motivation, job satisfaction, teamwork, 
goal clarity, communication, fairness, organizational structure, managerial competence, 
or rewards. Scholars such as Meier and O’Toole (2001), Andrews et al. (2005), Andrews 
et al. (2009), Meier and O’Toole (2007), Walker et al. (2010), and Nicholson-Crotty and 
O'Toole (2004) have used the Meier and O’Toole (1999) model, with past organizational 
performance as the super-control variable (represented by a single measure) and 
management strategy as the policy variable to find out the impacts of management 
strategies on the current performance of public schools, public transit agencies, police 
agencies, and local governments. Their equation is presented here: 
Current Performance = B0 + B1*Management Strategy + B2*Other Control Variables + 
B3*Past Performance + Error 
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I intend to use this model by introducing management strategy, i.e. the 
recommended practices in the design and implementation of performance management 
systems, to test my hypotheses.   
I used data from three sources. The statistics on reported crimes, which forms our 
performance indicators for the various police departments, come from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI). These statistics are prepared by the FBI on a yearly basis for many 
decades in the form of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which are available on their 
website. Following the various applications of the Meier and O’Toole model (e.g., Poister 
et al., 2013), I have used a time lag of three years between current and past performance; 
hence, the crime rates from 2009 are used to define past performance. Crime rates in 
different categories from 2012 (serving as the dependent variables) and crime rates from 
2009 (serving as past performance) are both derived through the UCR.   
Information on other control variables, such as the number of police officers and 
the population of cities/towns, also comes from the UCR. Demographic indicators which 
form other control variables such as poverty, minority population, and city area are 
derived from the US Census Bureau website, reported by city/town. Information on 
policy variables is collected through surveys sent to police chiefs to find out the way 
performance measurement is used by police departments.  
3.1. Dependent Variable – Police Performance 
The word “performance” incorporates the productivity, efficiency, equity, 
effectiveness, management, outcomes, impacts, and results of the activities, projects, and 
programs conducted by a government unit (Kearney & Berman, 1999; Armstrong, 2000; 
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Redburn et al., 2007). Performance is the answer to questions such as ‘To what extent 
were the goals reached?’, ‘What activities were carried out?’, ‘How well were the 
activities carried out?’, ‘How many resources were used?’, ‘Were the public sentiments 
respected?’, ‘Was the resource distribution equitable?’, ‘How were the employees 
managed?’, and ‘What was the effectiveness of the efforts?’ (Kearney & Berman, 1999; 
Armstrong, 2000; Redburn et al., 2007; Van Dooren, 2010).  
The focus and attention of performance rests on the task being carried out, the 
competence and capability of the agency and its employees, the quality of the final 
product, and the combined impact of their competence and effectiveness (Van Dooren, 
2010). The case of determining police performance is complicated because the police 
force has to maintain a balance between the demands of the community, social justice, 
organizational flexibility, budgeted resources, accountability, efficiency, and 
effectiveness (den Heyer, 2011).  
The basic function of the police force is to protect the life, property, and liberty of 
the citizens from unlawful behavior as well as to protect their political and civil rights, 
help promote commerce, promote domestic tranquility, and assure justice (Moore & 
Braga, 2003).  In order to achieve these larger goals, the police force engages in activities 
such as patrolling the streets, responding to citizen calls for assistance, investigating 
crimes, arresting people who break the laws, handling crowds, regulating traffic, and 
facilitating access to social and medical services (Moore & Braga, 2003; Goldstein, 
1977). These activities are a means to achieve the greater goals of police agencies (Moore 
& Braga, 2003). When we measure the performance of police agencies on the activities 
that they engage in, we measure how well they are performing on their outputs, while a 
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measure of how well they perform on the basic function category is akin to measuring 
their outcomes (Moore & Braga, 2003).  
Although police outputs such as arrest rates, clearance rates, and efficiency are 
widely measured in the literature (e.g., Wang, Vardalis, & Cohn, 2000; Carrington t al., 
1997; Tilley, 1995; Nicholson-Crotty & O'Toole, 2004), this project will focus on 
reported crime statistics, which is one of the outcomes of police performance (Moore & 
Braga, 2003). Measuring outcomes is a better indicator of true organizational 
performance, as the outputs may or may not lead to the desired outcomes (Loveday, 
2006). Furthermore, measurement of outputs is termed to be an insufficient measure of 
police performance by some scholars (e.g., Coleman, 2008). Hence, I will examine if 
following recommendations about the design and implementation of performance 
management systems increases the performance of police agencies in terms of reducing 
crimes.  
Scholars such as Moore and Braga (2003) and Milligan et al. (2006) present the 
various ways in which we can measure police outcomes. “Reducing crime” is the most 
important contribution of police efforts to society which can be measured through crime 
rate statistics (Moore & Braga, 2003). Reduction in “criminal victimization” can be 
calculated by measuring crime rates as well as through conducting victimization surveys 
(Moore & Braga, 2003). “Calling offenders to account” relates to the ability of the police 
force to bring criminals to court, which strongly relates to the reduction in crime rate 
(Moore & Braga, 2003). Police clearance rates are historically used to measure this 
outcome indicator of police performance (Moore & Braga, 2003).  
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Police performance should also be measured in “reducing fear and perceptions of 
personal security” among the citizens, which may or may not be dependent on crime rate 
statistics. Such perceptions can be measured through citizen surveys but pose difficulties 
in measurement due to the subjective difference in citizen perceptions of security and fear 
(Moore & Braga, 2003). Providing “safety and security in public places” is an important 
outcome of police departments, and citizen surveys and crime statistics can be employed 
to measure it (Moore & Braga, 2003). Police outcomes should also be measured on the 
“fair use of authority and allocation of services”, which can be measured through staffing 
reports, citizen complaints, number of times physical force is used, and spot checks on 
police officers (Moore & Braga, 2003).  
A comprehensive qualitative and quantitative measurement of police performance 
employing surveys, scrutiny of police agency records, interviews, and statistics will give 
us a much more complete picture of police outcomes (Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith, 
2011; Milligan et al., 2006; Fielding & Innes, 2006). However, given the enormous 
amount of complexity, time, resources, and problems associated with carrying out 
surveys, interviews, and the inspection of police records (Fielding & Innes, 2006), I will 
focus only on measuring crime rate statistics, which are readily available through the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Report database.  
3.1.1. Crime Rates as Dependent Variables:  
Crime rate statistics are used to measure three (reducing crime, reduction in 
criminal victimization, and safety and security in public places) out of the six police 
outcomes defined by Moore and Braga (2003). Tilley (1995) considered it obvious that 
crime incidence rates be measured as an outcome for police endeavors. Many scholars 
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consider crime reduction to be the bottom-line and the principle objective of all police 
activities, and hence an obvious measure for their performance outcome (Coleman, 2008; 
Spottiswoode, 2000; Moore & Braga, 2003; Tilley, 1995). Wang, Vardalis, and Cohn 
(2000) argue that all measures of police performance should be related to crime rate 
decrease in one way or the other, as crime rates provide objective measures of police 
performance (Wang, Vardalis, & Cohn, 2000). Historically, crime rates have been 
extensively used as the sole indicator of performance of police departments in the UK 
(Maillard & Savage, 2012). 
Researchers such as Carringto et al. (1997) and Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole 
(2004) used the number of criminal offenses as an indicator of police performance 
outcomes in their study of the police departments of New South Wales, Australia, and the 
US respectively. Similarly, Bratton and Malinowski (2008) cited a decrease in robberies, 
burglaries, and homicides as a measure of their improved performance as police officials 
in New York City in the 1990s. Hence, considering them the most important outcome, I 
have adopted crime statistics as the sole indicator of police performance. Scholars such as 
Bratton and Malinowski (2008) and Mastrofski (2006) argue that reduction in crimes is 
the main purpose of the implementation of performance measurement systems such as 
CompStat in police agencies.  
I, however, acknowledge that police functions can have only so much of an 
influence on crime statistics, as crimes depend in large part upon socio-economic factors 
well beyond the control of police services (Tilley, 1995; Carrington et al., 1997). Apart 
from the efforts and policies of the police force, crime statistics have been found to be 
affected by factors such as the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of the population (Bartels et al., 
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2010), the population size of the city (Bettencourt et al., 2010), the size of the immigrant 
population (Bianchi et al., 2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009), age (Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 
2008), male-to-female ratio (Edlund et al., 2007), race (Stacey et al., 2011; Blumstein & 
Rosenfeld, 2008; Cornell, 2012), legalized abortions (Donohue & Levitt, 2001), ethnicity 
(Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 2008; Cornell, 2012), education levels (Buonanno & Leonida, 
2009; Lochner, 2010), income inequality (Brush, 2007), poor economy, (Blumstein & 
Rosenfeld, 2008), gun control policies (Cornell, 2012), presence of violence-inducing 
facilities such as slaughterhouses (Fitzgerald et al., 2009), childhood exposure to lead 
(Reyes, 2007), and nation-wide crime trends (McDowall & Loftin, 2009), to name a few.  
Nevertheless, given the purpose, legitimacy, and force behind police departments, 
the crime reduction strategies adopted by the police have a debatable impact on the 
reduction of overall crime rates. This conjecture is supported by theories such as the 
theory of deterrent effect of policing on crimes rates (Wilson, 1978; Sampson & Cohen, 
1988) and the “control of urban order and incivilities” (Sampson & Cohen, 1988). 
Scholars such as Sampson and Cohen (1988), Chaiken et al. (1974), Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2004), Kovandzic and Sloan (2002), Marvell and Moody (2006), Levitt 
(1998), Marvell and Moody (1996), Corman and Mocan (2000), and Sherman and 
Weisburd (1995) all support an increase in police deployment to decrease crime rates 
using different analysis techniques in varying contexts.  
Hence, I argue that while crime rates are impacted by a host of other factors, 
police agencies and the strategies they adopt have a sizable impact on crime rate statistics 
within their jurisdiction. I have used crime rates in terms of the number of crimes 
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reported in various categories of crimes per 100,000 population to ensure uniformity 
across police jurisdictions.  
3.1.2. Data Source - Uniform Crime Report: 
I have used crime rates from city police departments for the year 2012 in different 
categories as the performance determinants and dependent variables. These data are 
derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR). 
The UCR has been serving as the official source of crime statistics for the US since 1920 
(Mooney & Harrison, 2009). The various city, county, state, university and college, 
tribal, and federal police agencies voluntarily submit reported crime incidents to the UCR 
system (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). The UCR data contains detailed and consistent 
information on various crime offenses, statistics on hate crimes, and the number of law 
enforcement officers killed and assaulted (Mooney & Harrison, 2009; Moore & Braga, 
2003).  
Of all the crime statistics datasets, the UCR is the most widely used as well as one 
of the most criticized (Hindelang, 1974; Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). UCR data are used by 
researchers, policy makers, Congress, and the media, while many questions have been 
raised by scholars such as Maltz (1999) over the reliability of the information in this 
dataset (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008).  
The major issue, however, that scholars have raised with the UCR dataset pertains 
to the concern that many crimes go unreported in the police records (Boivin & Cordeau, 
2011; Targonski, 2011). Gao and Perrone (2005) further note that many victims and 
witnesses face problems in recalling and reporting crimes correctly, while inconsistencies 
in resources available to police departments might also hamper proper crime reporting. It 
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is also pertinent to note here that crime reporting in the UCR is largely a voluntary act, 
which may leave some room for inconsistent reporting (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). The 
emergence of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) in the 1970s also started 
a debate in the literature whether NCVS is a better estimate of crimes than the UCR 
(Lynch & Jarvis, 2008; Decker, 1977). 
Nevertheless, given all its shortcomings, UCR still remains the most robust, 
comprehensive, and reliable data source for crime statistics in the US (Miles-Doan, 
1998). Gao and Perrone (2005) argue that it is only minor crimes which might escape 
reporting in a worrisome manner, while these inconsistencies are trivial for crimes such 
as theft and homicide. However, crimes such as forcible rapes mostly go unreported 
(Yung, 2014). Many scholars have compared the UCR data with crime statistics from 
other sources such as victimization rates (Sampson, 1987), Center for Health Statistics 
(CHS) (Hindelang, 1974), National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Mortality 
System (Rokaw et al., 1990), National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (Hindelang, 
1974), and various studies of comprehensive sexual violence (Lonsway, 2010), and found 
that UCR is consistent with all these more robust datasets. Gove et al. (1985) found a 
similarity in citizen perceptions of crimes and the data in UCR, and concluded that UCR 
data are valid estimators for serious crimes such as motor vehicle theft, robbery, burglary, 
and homicide, while not so much for larceny, rape, and aggravated assault. 
Lynch and Jarvis (2008) argue that although UCR data are based on voluntary 
reporting, 38 states have imposed mandatory reporting of the UCR for their police 
agencies, while 47 states plus the District of Columbia have state-wide reporting 
programs. Furthermore, UCR conducts basic data verification at least twice at the local 
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level where the data is being populated, as well at the central station where the data is 
compiled, which further helps increase the validity of the dataset (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). 
The fact that almost 85% of all police agencies in the US, covering 96% of its population, 
submit their UCR reports adds to the credibility of the dataset and helps in obtaining data 
on a population instead of on a sample (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). In a similar vein, Palusci 
et al. (2010) used UCR data to verify a new data collection method for child maltreatment 
deaths and found that the new method corresponds to the UCR results. 
Given that the UCR is an expansive information database collected over five 
decades and encompassing the entire country, it provides an opportunity for police 
agencies to compare their performance to other agencies at the city, county, and state 
levels (Moore & Braga, 2003). The data on crime contains detailed information on date, 
time, location, valuables stolen, and property harmed (Moore & Braga, 2003). Hence, in 
the current scenario, UCR is arguably the most readily available and effective dataset on 
city-wide crime statistics, the target population of this study (Moore & Braga, 2003). 
Many studies in the past have relied on UCR for crime statistics similar to the 
ones employed in this dissertation (e.g., Kawachi, Kennedy, & Wilkinson, 1999; Krivo & 
Peterson, 2004; Lee & Ousey, 2001; Wilkinson et al., 1984; Milligan et al., 2006). 
McCollister et al. (2010) used the UCR to evaluate the cost of crimes to society, while 
Ousey and Kubrin (2009) and Stacey et al. (2011) used the UCR data to compare 
immigration rates with violent crimes in the US. Lochner (2010), Lochner (2004), and 
Anderson (2009) used the UCR data to study the impact of education on crime rates, 
male arrest rate by age, and the impact of compulsory schooling laws on arrest rates, 
respectively.  
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Hence, I have used crime rates (defined as number of crimes per 100,000 
population) in several categories from the UCR for cities and towns with populations 
between 10,000 and 500,000 pertaining to 2012, which are given below: 
 Murders and Manslaughter: The willful (non-negligent) killing of one 
human being by another. The killing of another person through gross 
negligence. 
 
 Forcible Rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her 
will. 
 
 Aggravated Assaults: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the 
purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury.   
 
 Robberies: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, 
custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or 
violence and/or by putting the victim in fear. 
 
 Burglaries: The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. 
 
 Larceny and Theft: The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of 
property from the possession or constructive possession of another. 
 
 Motor Vehicle Theft: The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. 
 
 Total Crimes: Total of all the crimes in violent and property crime 
categories. 
 
The crimes in these categories are essentially different in nature from each other 
and are affected by different cultural, social, and economic characteristics. For example, 
the figures for motor vehicle thefts are the most reliable as nearly all these crimes are 
reported, while only 40% of rapes are reported to the police (Yung, 2014). It is, hence, 
important that we study multiple measures of crimes to obtain a complete picture. 
The tables below show the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
analysis. Table 13 presents the descriptive data for the dependent variables. We can 
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observe high variation in crime rate statistics across the various cities. Some cities report 
no crimes, while others show a high number of reported crimes. The coefficient of 
variation, however, typically suggests little variation in crime data, as the values are 
typically below 1.  
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (crime rates per 100,000 people for 2012). 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Murder 409 0.00 44.37 3.36 5.62 31.63 1.67 
Forcible Rape 408 0.00 164.30 31.16 25.36 643.06 0.81 
Aggravated Assault 409 0.00 1329.15 223.92 207.64 43113.48 0.93 
Robbery 409 0.00 970.03 80.38 96.02 9220.44 1.20 
Burglary 407 64.08 3887.30 702.05 495.97 245979.76 0.71 
Larceny Theft 409 330.56 13483.36 2493.25 1428.67 2041110.82 0.57 
Motor Vehicle Theft 408 2.37 1697.55 194.00 201.31 40526.03 1.04 
Total Crime 408 528.89 18527.50 3728.09 2120.01 4494422.24 0.57 
 
Table 14 presents the skewness and kurtosis of the dependent variables. The 
results show that the dependent variables mostly have a high skewness. While data with a 
skewness value of plus or minus 1 is generally considered to be highly skewed, most 
dependent variables are above 1. Murder, Robbery, Larceny Theft, and Motor Vehicle 
Theft have the highest skewness of more than 2. This suggests that most cities had crimes 
above the mean. The kurtosis statistics show a high peak for some of the dependent 
variables. Murder, Robbery, and Motor Vehicle Theft, in particular were found to have 
higher peaks than the Gaussian distribution.  
Table 14: Skewness and Kurtosis of crime rates per 100,000 people for 2012. 
 
N 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Murder  409 3.12 0.12 13.49 0.24 
Forcible Rape  408 1.37 0.12 2.74 0.24 
Aggravated Assault  409 1.63 0.12 3.17 0.24 
Robbery  409 3.45 0.12 21.29 0.24 
Burglary  407 1.87 0.12 6.32 0.24 
Larceny Theft 409 2.00 0.12 9.72 0.24 
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Motor Vehicle Theft 408 2.98 0.12 13.24 0.24 
Total Crime 408 1.87 0.12 8.33 0.24 
 
Table 15 represents correlations between all the dependent variables. We can 
observe a high correlation among all the measures of crimes, which suggests that crime 
rates in the different categories are interdependent, and when a city or town is high in one 
type of crime, it is likely to be high in other types as well. 
Table 15: Correlation for crime rates per 100,000 people in 2012 among different categories. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Murder  0.22*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.53*** 
2 Forcible Rape     0.45*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.19*** 0.45*** 
3 Aggravated Assault       0.61*** 0.67*** 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.69*** 
4 Robbery         0.67*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.77*** 
5 Burglary           0.63*** 0.45*** 0.81*** 
6 Larceny Theft             0.49*** 0.96*** 
7 Motor Vehicle Theft               0.60*** 
8 Total Crimes                
 N = 410         
 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
A further analysis of the dependent variables revealed many outliers. I used Box 
and Whisker plots to determine the outliers for crime rates in each of the seven categories 
of crime (see the Box and Whisker plots for each dependent variable in Appendices 10 
through 17). Most of the outliers were smaller cities with high crime rates, which have 
the potential to bias the data findings. The following table shows the descriptive statistics 
for the dependent variables, excluding outliers: 
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (crime rates per 100,000 people for 2012) excluding 
outliers. 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Murder 393 0.00 13.16 2.45 3.35 11.22 1.44 
Forcible Rape 396 0.00 83.45 28.30 20.65 426.56 0.73 
Aggravated Assault 401 0.00 721.26 206.10 174.71 30524.94 0.95 
Robbery 400 0.00 303.68 70.08 67.60 4569.46 0.96 
Burglary 405 64.08 2140.86 671.53 423.44 179301.93 0.63 
Larceny Theft 403 330.56 5601.50 2389.03 1182.19 1397582.08 0.49 
Motor Vehicle Theft 379 2.37 690.16 153.15 118.74 14098.82 0.78 
Total Crime 405 528.89 8551.98 3602.25 1802.17 3247828.82 0.50 
 
 Comparing the maximum values of table with and without the outliers suggests 
that several cities or towns with exorbitant crime rates have been removed. Although the 
number of observations has decreased, we get a more uniform data set closer to a 
Gaussian distribution. The skewness and kurtosis statistics below show that we attain a 
distribution close to normal after excluding the outliers, as the statistics for both skewness 
and kurtosis are mostly within the desired ranges. We only observe high kurtosis for 
Motor Vehicle Theft, but even that is much less compared to the kurtosis of this measure 
including the outliers.  
Table 17: Skewness and kurtosis of crime rates per 100,000 people for 2012, excluding outliers. 
 
N 
Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Murder  393 1.29 0.12 0.66 0.25 
Forcible Rape  396 0.72 0.12 -0.21 0.25 
Aggravated Assault  401 1.14 0.12 0.54 0.24 
Robbery  400 1.39 0.12 1.42 0.24 
Burglary  405 0.99 0.12 0.52 0.24 
Larceny Theft 403 0.64 0.12 -0.24 0.24 
Motor Vehicle Theft 379 1.67 0.13 3.20 0.25 
Total Crime 405 0.63 0.12 -0.36 0.24 
 
The table below presents the correlations between the dependent variables 
excluding all the outliers. The correlations do not change drastically after removing the 
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outliers, and we still see significant but relatively low correlations between the dependent 
variables. The correlation between robbery, burglary, and larceny/theft is high with total 
crimes, showing that these crimes dominated the total crime rates. 
Table 18: Correlation for crime rates per 100,000 people in 2012 across the various categories excluding 
outliers. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Murder  0.19*** 0.41*** 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.40*** 
2 Forcible Rape     0.42*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.49*** 
3 Aggravated Assault       0.58*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.32*** 0.64*** 
4 Robbery         0.67*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.67*** 
5 Burglary           0.64*** 0.55*** 0.80*** 
6 Larceny Theft             0.47*** 0.96*** 
7 Motor Vehicle Theft               0.58*** 
8 Total Crimes                
 N = 339         
 ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
3.2. Policy Variable: Recommended Practices for Performance Management Systems 
Survey questions are used to construct the policy variables regarding the ways in 
which the police agencies design and implement their performance management systems. 
I have included questions about the various performance management attributes such as 
target selection, measurement indicators, data collection, indicator analysis, reporting, 
actions on performance results, and general design considerations. These are reflections 
of the recommendations and advice from scholars. Police agency heads were asked to 
answer the survey questions based on their knowledge about the state of performance 
management practices between the years 2009 and 2012.  
All the survey questions are based on a five point Likert scale, being: 
- Strongly disagree (Coded as 1) 
- Disagree (Coded as 2) 
- Neither agree nor disagree (Coded as 3) 
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- Agree (Coded as 4) 
- Strongly agree (Coded as 5) 
I sent electronic surveys via SurveyMonkey to 1,000 city police chiefs across the 
U.S. from the 9,283 police agencies contained in the FBI’s UCR dataset. These emails 
were collected through the websites of each agency. After excluding cities and towns 
with populations below 10,000 and above 500,000 (N=4,100) and with missing data 
(n=2,021), the sample stood at 2,079 agencies.  
I selected small- and medium-sized cities for the study as we can find many 
existing studies in the literature on performance management systems in large police 
agencies (e.g., New York and Los Angeles), while there are relatively fewer such studies 
for small- and medium-sized agencies. Performance management systems were initially 
adopted by larger cities and are fairly widespread in such cities. Smaller and medium-
sized cities have only started to adopt these systems. Furthermore, I believe the 
characteristics of crime and performance management would differ between large and 
small- to medium-sized cities. I was also concerned that police chiefs of larger cities 
might be less likely to respond to the surveys compared to the chiefs of smaller cities.   
I sorted the small- and medium-sized cities (n=2,079) alphabetically and, using 
systematic sampling, selected every other agency in the list (n=1,039).  I searched for the 
email addresses of the police chiefs on their respective websites.  Whenever not 
available, I sent emails to the secretaries and assistants asking them to provide me with 
the emails of the chiefs (n=1,000). Finally, the selected 1,000 police chiefs were sent an 
alert letter on October 17, 2013 introducing the nature and objectives of the study. I sent 
the online link in an email on October 22, 2013, which directed the respondents to the 
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survey link on the SurveyMonkey website with November 6, 2013 as the survey 
completion deadline. I sent three reminders, on October 29, November 3, and November 
6, 2013, and final deadline brief extension of two days on November 7, 2013. The letters 
are attached in Appendix A through F.  
The first response was received on October 22, 2013 and the last was received on 
November 8, 2013. A total of 414 responses were received from 44 of the 50 states, 
which puts the response rate at 41.4%. Some of these responses had missing values. After 
removing the cases with missing values to at least one of the questions in the survey and 
removing the outliers, the number of observations stands at 269 cases. Given the high 
number of observations with missing values, I chose not to use samples with any missing 
values, as none of the available methods are perfect and the results might have been 
impacted given the extremely high number of missing values in the data. 
3.3. Control variables  
3.3.1. Strategic Planning:  
Bryson (2004) defines strategic planning as “a disciplined effort to produce 
fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other 
entity) is, what it does, and why it does it” (p. 6). Scholars such as Poocharoen and 
Ingraham (2007), Moynihan (2008), and Poister (2010) have suggested that performance 
measurement is done in tandem with strategic planning. Coleman (2008) argues that the 
implementation of performance measurement systems cannot improve organizational 
performance in the absence of an established strategic plan. 
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Researchers using the Meier and O’Toole model, such as Andrews et al. (2006), 
Meier, O’Toole, and Boyne (2007), Walker et al. (2010), and Poister et al. (2013), 
showed strategic planning to have an impact on organizational performance, while 
Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2013) showed that performance measurement was 
formulated through organizational strategic planning in a local transit industry. Deriving 
results from these studies, I have assumed that the relation between the adoption of 
strategic planning and performance improvement will be positive. The following survey 
questions were used to explain strategic planning:  
 Survey Item 30: Our agency developed strategies through a systematic 
planning process after analyzing the needs, interests, challenges, 
opportunities, and expectations of various external stakeholders (Source: 
Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 Survey Item 31: We conducted a situational analysis examining the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to identify the strategic 
issues facing our agency (Source: Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 Survey Item 32: We have established strategic goals and used them to 
drive decisions and actions throughout the agency (Source: Poister, 
Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 
The table below shows descriptive statistics for the responses of police chiefs 
regarding the extent to which they use strategic planning.  
Table 19: Descriptive statistics for survey items representing strategic planning. 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Survey Item 30 406 1.0 5.0 3.70 0.82 0.68 0.22 
Survey Item 31 407 1.0 5.0 3.65 0.87 0.75 0.24 
Survey Item 32 406 1.0 5.0 3.93 0.85 0.72 0.22 
 
3.3.2. Logical Incrementalism:  
Logical incrementalism, or muddling through, is an approach to strategy 
formulation which advocates small changes and improvements to be made over time to 
the organization based on previous experiences and arising issues (Lindblom, 1959, 
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1979). Studies such as Andrews, Boyne (2006), Walker et al. (2010), Andrews et al. 
(2009), Meier, O’Toole, and Boyne (2007), Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2013), and 
Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (forthcoming), have included logical incrementalism as an 
alternate management approach to strategic planning and have found it to have mixed 
impacts on organizational performance. Questions are included in the table below to find 
out the extent to which organizations engage in logical incrementalism. These questions 
are derived from Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2013). See below for survey questions. 
 Survey Item 33: We have frequently reassessed our performance in light of 
changing circumstances and adjusted strategy accordingly (Source: 
Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 Survey Item 34: We have tried to maintain flexibility for future options and 
made changes in strategy when suggested by newly emerging information 
(Source: Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 Survey Item 35: Strategy in our agency is heavily influenced by 
interpersonal relationships and power politics inside and outside the 
agency (Source: Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013). 
 
Table 20: Descriptive statistics for survey items representing logical incrementalism. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Survey Item 33 406 1.0 5.0 4.10 0.79 0.63 0.19 
Survey Item 34 407 1.0 5.0 4.15 0.64 0.43 0.15 
Survey Item 35 408 1.0 5.0 2.62 1.00 0.99 O.38 
 
 The means for the first two survey items of logical incrementalism are very high, 
while the mean for the last survey item is on the lower side. This suggests that while the 
police agencies keep their strategies flexible, they are not so much affected by 
interpersonal relationships and internal politics.  
3.3.3. Interaction between Strategic Planning and Logical Incrementalism:  
Scholars such as Quinn (1978), Behn (1988), Barzelay and Campbell (2003), and 
Poister (2010) have advocated the use of strategic planning to be done within a context of 
purposeful logical incrementalism to have a beneficial impact on organization 
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performance. I believe that it will be erroneous on my part if I do not include strategic 
management elements in this study, as performance measurement is not only a part of the 
overall management strategy (Moynihan, 2008) but also works with strategic planning to 
improve performance (Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013).  
3.3.4. Size of police force:  
I used the measure of officer-to-population ratio to define the size of police forces. 
This measure also serves as the surrogate for the agency’s budget and available funds. 
Scholars such as Sampson and Cohen (1988), Chaiken et al. (1974), Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2004), Kovandzic and Sloan (2002), Marvell and Moody (2006), Levitt 
(1998), Marvell and Moody (1996), Corman and Mocan (2000), and Sherman and 
Weisburd (1995) have found that more police officer deployment helps decrease crime 
rates in the affected areas. I have used total police employees (sworn police officers and 
civilian police employees) per 100,000 populations. Data for both number of employees 
and population come from the UCR database.  
3.3.5. Population:  
I have used measures of population in the respective jurisdictions. As the sample 
includes cities and towns between populations of 10,000 and 500,000, there might be vast 
differences between the samples. These differences in policing and crime dynamics are 
addressed in the study by including population as a control variable. The figures for 
population come from the 2010 U.S. Census. 
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3.3.6. Poverty:  
Poverty was used by Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole (2004) as a control variable 
for police performance. Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) found that poverty has a 
negative impact on police performance due to an increase in desperation among the 
people. In the absence of precise figures of poverty for the cities and towns included in 
the study, I have used income per capita of each city/town to define this measure as 
available in the 2010 U.S. Census.  
3.3.7. Percent Minority:  
Used by Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole (2004) along with population density and 
poverty as a measure of socio-economic environment of police departments, this measure 
was found to have no impact on crime rates (Tilley, 1995; Carrington et al., 1997). Other 
scholars such as Bianchi et al. (2012), Ousey and Kubrin (2009), Stacey et al. (2011), 
Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008), and Cornell (2012) have all found impacts of ethnic 
composition of the population on crime rates. These data also come from the 2010 U.S. 
Census. 
3.3.8. Population Density:  
Scholars such as Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole (2004) and Bettencourt (2010) 
used population density as a control variable in their study on the impacts of management 
strategies on police performance. The population figures come from the UCR data, while 
the figures for area are derived from the 2010 U.S. Census.  
The following table represents the descriptive statistics for the control variables. 
Looking at the minimum, maximum, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation 
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statistics, we see a high variance among cities on most of the control variables. Only the 
variables for employee ratio and income per capita show relatively low variation based 
on the measure of coefficient of variation.  
Table 21: Descriptive statistics for control variables. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
Employee Ratio  408 14.21 705.09 236.55 92.38 8533.83 0.39 
Population 409 10022.00 398904.00 46261.93 54106.69 2927533804.97 1.17 
Income per Capita 409 9194.00 81290.00 22385.41 8297.90 68855189.90 0.37 
Percent Minority 409 1.40 96.20 19.83 16.39 268.77 0.83 
Population Density 409 149.10 19290.70 2568.43 2286.87 5229768.90 0.89 
 
The skewness and kurtosis statistics for the control variables show non-normal 
distribution for most of the measures, but not as much as for the dependent variables. All 
variables show high skewness. The variables representing strategic planning and logical 
incrementalism are shown to be skewed toward the left, while the rest of the control 
variables are skewed rightwards. The kurtosis statistics also do not show as many peaks 
as the dependent variables. Percent minority, performance information use, strategic 
planning, and logical incrementalism have a kurtosis value closer to zero, which suggests 
that their peaks are not too far above those of a Gaussian distribution. 
Table 22: Skewness and Kurtosis of control variables. 
 
N 
Skewness Kurtosis 
  Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Employee Ratio 408 1.45 0.12 3.80 0.24 
Population 409 3.23 0.12 13.57 0.24 
Income Per Capita 409 2.49 0.12 10.70 0.24 
Percent Minority 409 1.34 0.12 1.70 0.24 
Population Density 409 3.40 0.12 16.15 0.24 
Strategic Planning   404 -0.74 0.12 1.25 0.24 
Logical Incrementalism  407 -1.33 0.12 4.81 0.24 
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Finally, the table below presents the correlation between the control variables and 
total crime statistics of 2009 and 2012. The correlations suggest that police agencies 
working in higher crime areas are more likely to hire more officers per capita. Areas with 
higher income rates and population density are suggested to have lower crime rates, while 
a higher number of minorities is positively and significantly correlated with crime rates.   
Table 23: Correlation for control variables and current and past crime rates. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Employee Ratio  -0.21*** -0.03 0.25*** -0.08 0.50*** 0.44*** 
2 Population   0.02 0.18*** 0.07 0.01 0.02 
3 Income Per Capita    -0.28*** 0.13** -0.36*** -0.40*** 
4 Percent Minority     0.21*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 
5 Population Density      -0.10* -0.13** 
6 Total Crime 2009       0.93*** 
7 Total Crime 2012        
  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
 
3.3.9. Regions: 
In order to control for regional effects, the respondent cities were divided into four 
regions, Midwest, Northeast, South, and West, based on the states the cities belonged to. 
The list of states along with their regions is provided below.  
Table 24: Regions. 
Midwest Northeast South West 
Illinois Connecticut Arkansas Arizona 
Indiana Maine Florida California 
Iowa Massachusetts Georgia Colorado 
Kansas New Hampshire Kentucky Idaho 
Michigan New Jersey Louisiana Nevada 
Missouri New York Maryland Oregon 
Nebraska Pennsylvania Mississippi Utah 
Ohio Vermont North Carolina Washington 
South Dakota   Oklahoma   
Wisconsin   South Carolina   
North Dakota   Tennessee   
   Texas   
    Virginia   
    West Virginia   
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The following table shows the number of respondents (police agencies) in each of 
the four regions. We can see that all the four regions are represented, with the smallest 
number of respondents coming from the Northeast, while the most respondents belonged 
to the South region. 
Table 25: Number of respondents per region. 
  Frequency Percent 
Midwest 108 26 
Northeast 39 10 
South 162 39 
West 103 25 
Total 412 100 
  
3.3.10. Past Performance:  
Past performance is the principal component of the Meier and O’Toole model 
(1999, 2001). Past performance not only explains a large part of the current performance 
in public sector organizations, but also serves as a surrogate for the various organizational 
and environmental variables for organizations such as leadership quality, employee 
motivation, job satisfaction, teamwork, communication, fairness, organizational structure, 
managerial competence, and rewards. Although some of the policy and control variables 
used in the analysis partially explain aspects such as leadership and communication, there 
are still many other aspects which are ignored, underlining the importance of using past 
performance to explain all of these unexplained aspects. Past performance is regularly 
used in studies in the public sector to find out the size of randomness and to reduce the 
distortion caused by a multitude of control variables while studying the impact of the 
management strategy or effort of the outcome measures (Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; see 
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Harris & Sass, 2006; Koedel & Betts, 2008; Rothstein, 2008; Roderick, Jacob, & Bryk, 
2004).  Hence, I expect past police crime rates to not only serve a as proxy for 
management structural variables but also for the multitude of factors which might impact 
crime rates independent of police strategy.  
Past performance has been used as a control variable in studies using Meier and 
O’Toole’s model, such as Andrews et al. (2009), Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole (2004), 
Meier and O’Toole (2009), and Hicklin et al. (2008). We can find a three- to four-year 
difference between past and current performance in similar studies such as Andrews et al. 
(2009) and Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2013). 
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4. CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1. Policy and Control Variables from Survey Items 
Wherever possible, I used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using SPSS 20.0 to 
combine the survey items into their respective variables, while dropping the items with 
poor loadings. Table 26 below describes the items that make up each of the policy 
variables and two control (strategic planning and logical incrementalism) policy 
variables, along with each variable’s Cronbach’s alpha value. The proposed items to 
define officer discretion and quality control, however, did not load and hence I used only 
one item to define them. 
Table 26: Survey items used to construct policy and control variables using EFA. 
Variables Survey Item 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Specific Targets 
Our departmental performance targets are specific and quantified 
(for example, reduce violent crime by X% over the next year). 
0.632 If we set multiple performance targets for the department, we 
formally specified which are more important and which are least 
(prioritized the targets). 
Alignment with 
Strategy  
We ensured that our departmental targets and performance measures 
are based on our strategic goals. 
0.623 
We tied the performance targets of our operating units on the overall 
objectives of the agency. 
Communication 
of Targets  
We have regularly communicated departmental performance targets 
to our officers through a variety of means (written communications, 
informal communications, meetings and workshops). 
0.806 
We have regularly communicated individual performance targets to 
our officers through a variety of means (for example, roll calls and 
performance reviews). 
Consultation 
With Officers  
We have regularly consulted with police officers within the ranks 
before specifying performance targets for our department and units. 
0.830 
We have regularly consulted with officers within the ranks before 
specifying performance targets for individual officers or teams. 
We have actively sought suggestions and advice from officers within 
the ranks to improve our performance management system (target 
selection, performance indicator selection, and analysis and reporting 
methods used). 
Consultation 
with Citizens 
We have actively consulted with citizen groups before setting our 
goals, objectives, and performance targets. 
0.735 
We have actively sought suggestions and advice from the citizens to 
improve our performance management system (target selection, 
performance indicator selection, and analysis and reporting methods 
used). 
Performance  
Feedback  
We have regularly published our unit and department performance 
reports to the citizens. 
0.689 
101 
 
We have made our performance reports available on our website 
(Please provide the URL for the latest report, if applicable). 
Leadership 
Support  
As the chief of the department, I have actively supported our 
department’s performance management system. 
0.862 
Our Mayor or city manager has actively supported the department’s 
performance management system. 
Our city/town council has actively supported the department’s 
performance management system. 
Performance 
Information Use  
We have regularly compared the performance of our officers, teams, 
and units based on their results on performance measures against 
standards or targets. 
0.891 
We have regularly compared our performance against that of other 
similar police agencies in our state and/or across the nation to get a 
clearer idea of our own strengths and weaknesses. 
We have regularly analyzed trends in our performance over time on a 
weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. 
We have regularly utilized performance information to develop 
strategic plans or help inform strategy more generally. 
We regularly utilized performance information to assess and 
strengthen the performance of individual officers and staff members 
in our organization. 
We have regularly utilized performance information to develop 
budgets and allocate resources. 
We have regularly utilized performance information to revise our 
officer deployment plans. 
Strategic 
Planning 
Our agency developed strategy through a systematic planning 
process after analyzing the needs, interests, challenges, opportunities, 
and expectations of various external stakeholders. 
0.705 
We conducted a situational analysis examining the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to identify the strategic issues 
facing our agency. 
We have established strategic goals and used them to drive decisions 
and actions throughout the agency. 
Logical 
Incrementalism 
We have frequently reassessed our performance in light of changing 
circumstances and adjusted strategy accordingly. 
0.715 
We have tried to maintain flexibility for future options and made 
changes in strategy when suggested by newly emerging information. 
 
The Cronbach’s Alpha values are fairly high for most factor scores, suggesting 
the items loaded well on the factors. While most of the items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 
over 0.70 (which is considered good), only three items (target clarity, alignment with 
strategy, and performance feedback) have a Cronbach’s alpha between 0.60 and 0.70, 
which is considered to be acceptable. 
Other independent policy variables where factor scores are not used are presented 
in the following table: 
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Table 27: Survey items used to represent some policy variables. 
Variables Survey Item Description 
Diversity of 
Targets  
We set performance targets for (select all that apply): 
 Reducing criminal victimization (crime prevention). 
 Increasing safety in public places. 
 Improving citizen perceptions of crime decrease/safety. 
 Demonstrating fair and effective use of force. 
 Holding offenders accountable (investigation and 
prosecution). 
 Providing quality service to the public. 
 Efficiently using financial resources. 
Sum of the 
number of 
performance 
targets used 
(1 to 7) 
Officer 
Discretion  
We have given our officers considerable discretion and 
autonomy in making operation-level decisions to achieve 
performance targets. 
Likert scale of 
1-5 
Quality 
Control  
We have periodically conducted quality checks on our 
performance management system and make appropriate changes. 
Likert scale of 
1-5 
 
4.2. Data Testing for Policy Variables 
4.2.1. Test for Normality: 
To enhance the analysis further before showing the results, I present the skewness 
and kurtosis statistics for all variables. These statistics test the normality of the variables. 
Skewness is the measure of lack of symmetry on the normal distribution. Kurtosis 
measures whether the data is peaked or flat compared to the Gaussian distribution graph.  
 The skewness and kurtosis measures for policy variables show that their 
distribution is close to a Gaussian distribution. Only the variables of alignment with 
strategy, communication of targets, officer discretion, and performance information use 
have values slightly over 1. Similarly, the kurtosis values are also not too far away from 
0.      
Table 28: Skewness and Kurtosis of policy variables. 
 
N 
Skewness Kurtosis 
  Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Statistic 
Standard 
Error 
Specific Targets  365 -0.42 0.13 0.06 0.25 
Alignment with Strategy 366 -1.02 0.13 2.45 0.25 
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Diversity of Targets 412 -0.31 0.13 -1.03 0.26 
Communication of Targets  358 -1.06 0.13 2.79 0.26 
Consultation with Officers  358 -0.88 0.13 1.48 0.26 
Officer Discretion  354 -1.08 0.13 2.55 0.26 
Leadership Support 345 -0.27 0.13 0.35 0.26 
Performance Feedback 349 0.17 0.13 -0.52 0.26 
Performance Information Use 351 -1.04 0.13 2.61 0.26 
Consultation with Citizens  349 -0.24 0.13 -0.57 0.26 
Quality Control 351 -0.88 0.13 0.21 0.26 
 
     
4.2.2. Multicollinearity Analysis: 
 To explore collinearity issues between the policy variables, I ran tolerance and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics. The results do not show high multicollinearity, 
as shown in the table below. Most variables show VIF values below 5 and hence low 
multicollinearity. Only the variables for strategy formulation such as strategic planning 
and logical incrementalism have high VIF statistics, and that too is mainly due to the 
interaction term between the two variables which is included in the analysis. 
Table 29: Multicollinearity statistics for independent variables. 
  
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Specific Targets 0.56 1.79 
Alignment with Strategy 0.53 1.88 
Diversity of Targets 0.83 1.21 
Communication of Targets 0.62 1.61 
Consultation with Officers 0.67 1.48 
Officer Discretion 0.86 1.16 
Leadership Support 0.60 1.67 
Performance Feedback  0.75 1.34 
Performance Information Use 0.39 2.59 
Consultation with Citizens 0.75 1.34 
Quality Control 0.63 1.60 
 
  
 
  
However, regressing the variable for performance information use on other policy 
variables reveals a high collinearity between the variables. This suggests that the 
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regression models based on these policy variables will be affected by multicollinearity 
issues.   
Table 30: Regression analysis with performance information use as dependent variable. 
 b Std. Error 
Specific Targets 0.10* 0.27 
Alignment with Strategy  0.16*** 0.05 
Diversity of Targets 0.04* 0.05 
Communication of Targets  0.13** 0.02 
Communication with Officers 0.10* 0.05 
Officer Discretion  -0.10* 0.04 
Leadership Support  0.15*** 0.38 
Performance Feedback 0.04 0.37 
Consultation with Citizens  0.09* 0.05 
Quality Control 0.31*** 0.42 
R-Square 0.628  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level. 
 
 In order to further test for multicollinearity, I conducted Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) using Lisrel 8.80. I obtained good overall model fit indices 
(RMSEA=0.058, CFI=0.98, SRMR=0.061) and all factor loadings above 0.49.  However, 
I found 8 out of 126 correlations to be significant at the 0.7 level or higher.  This suggests 
that the model fits only when Lisrel allows for a high correlation among the police 
variables. 
4.2.3. T-tests to Measure Non-Response Bias: 
Realizing that response bias might be at play, as police agencies with particular 
characteristics might be more inclined to respond to the survey than others, I ran t-tests 
on the data comparing the respondents to non-respondents on their populations, 
population densities, violent crime rates, property crime rates, and total crime rates. The 
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following two tables represent the group statistics and independent samples test of the 
sample data: 
Table 31: Group Statistics between responders and non-responders. 
  Responded N Mean 
Population 
Yes 406 45097.96 
No 594 46018.33 
Population 
Density 
Yes 406 2579.06 
No 594 2983.20 
Violent 
Crimes 
Yes 406 337.15 
No 594 353.81 
Property 
Crime 
Yes 406 3357.33 
No 594 3257.99 
Total 
Crimes 
Yes 406 3694.48 
No 594 3611.80 
 
Table 32: Independent Samples Test between responders and non-responders. 
      
      
      
      
   
 
 
 
The t-test failed to show any bias in most of the agency characteristics, as 
population, violent crimes, property crimes, and total crime rates are all not significant. 
Population density, however, is statistically significant between the respondents and the 
non-respondents. The group statistics show that the mean population density for the non-
respondents is higher than that of the respondents. Since the difference in the means of 
the population densities is inconsequential, and there is no statistically significant 
difference in means between the other four characteristics, the bias should not cause 
serious problems for the analyses.      
  
  
F Sig. t 
Population 0.96 0.33 -0.27 
Population Density 4.21 0.04 -2.68* 
Violent Crimes 0.03 0.95 -0.85 
Property Crimes 0.64 0.43 0.85 
Total Crimes 0.71 0.40 0.63 
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4.2.4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation:  
The descriptive statistics for the policy variables are presented in the table below. 
There is a wide difference between the minimum and the maximum values of the 
variables, while the means are above the neutral values but not too high. These results are 
not surprising, as the adoption and implementation of performance management systems 
in police agencies is not very advanced in small- and medium-sized agencies. Poister and 
Streib (1999) found only 77% of police agencies to be using performance management 
systems as far back as the late 1990s, while only 58% of police agencies were found to be 
using CompStat, a specific form of performance management system (DeLorenzi et al., 
2006).   
Police agencies have been refining performance management systems to make 
them more effective in helping them achieve their objectives (Behn, 2008). This learning 
curve has allowed them to identify and introduce more recommended practices in 
designing and implementing performance management systems (Serpas, 2004; Serpas & 
Morley, 2008; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008). The use of recommended practices in 
implementing performance management systems in police agencies is not as high as 
might have been expected given the evolution that performance management systems 
have gone through over the last couple of decades.  
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Table 33: Descriptive statistics for factor scores of policy variables. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
Specific Targets  365 -2.94 2.14 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Alignment with Strategy 366 -4.12 1.83 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Diversity of Targets 349 1.0 7.0 4.88 1.83 3.34 
Communication of Targets  358 -4.41 1.74 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Consultation with officers  358 -3.81 1.96 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Officer Discretion  354 1.00 5.00 3.88 0.68 0.47 
Leadership Support  345 -3.72 1.71 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Performance Feedback 349 -2.29 1.88 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Performance Information Use 351 -4.15 2.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Consultation with Citizens  349 -2.98 2.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Quality Control  351 1.00 5.00 3.51 0.83 0.69 
       
 
 To further analyze the policy variables, please find below the descriptive statistics 
of aggregate scores instead of factor scores to determine true frequency, mean, and range. 
The variation in the N is due to non-responses of the surveyed police chiefs on certain 
questions. Only a moderate use of these practices can be observed.  
Table 34: Descriptive statistics for policy variables. 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
Specific Targets  365 2.00 10.00 6.62 1.58 2.51 
Alignment with Strategy 366 2.00 10.00 7.54 1.35 1.81 
Diversity of Targets 349 1.00 7.00 4.88 1.83 3.34 
Communication of Targets  358 2.00 10.00 7.73 1.30 1.69 
Consultation with officers  358 3.00 15.00 10.94 2.07 4.29 
Officer Discretion  354 1.00 5.00 3.88 0.68 0.47 
Leadership Support  345 4.00 15.00 11.54 2.03 4.10 
Performance Feedback 349 4.00 15.00 10.42 2.23 4.95 
Performance Information Use 351 8.00 35.00 25.25 4.10 16.78 
Consultation with Citizens  349 2.00 10.00 6.46 1.50 2.24 
Quality Control  351 1.00 5.00 3.51 0.83 0.69 
       
 
The table below represents the correlations of the independent variables. We can 
see low but significant correlations between these variables. However, some higher 
correlations stand out in the table. Specific Targets is found to be highly correlated 
(above 0.50) with Alignment with Strategy and Performance Information Use.  
Alignment with Strategy is also found to be highly correlated with Performance 
108 
 
Information Use. Hence, Specific Targets, Alignment with Strategy, and Performance 
Information Use are found to be highly correlated with each other. Understandably 
enough, Communication of Targets was also found to be correlated with Consultation 
with Officers.  Both these variables are also found to be correlated with Performance 
Information Use.   
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Table 35: Correlation for policy and other management variables. 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
Specific 
Targets  
 
0.59
** 
0.26
** 
0.47
** 
0.33
** 
-
0.03 
0.46
** 
0.28
** 
0.56
** 
0.26
** 
0.37
** 
0.43** 
0.18
** 
2 
Alignment 
with Strategy 
    0.29
** 
0.53
** 
0.38
** 
0.12
* 
0.47
** 
0.30
** 
0.64
** 
0.31
** 
0.43
** 
0.52** 0.29
** 
3 
Diversity of 
Targets 
      0.31
** 
0.18
** 
0.07 0.28
** 
0.18
** 
0.36
** 
0.19
** 
0.25
** 
0.28** 0.24
** 
4 
Communicatio
n of Targets 
        0.53
** 
0.17
** 
0.43
** 
0.26
** 
0.63
** 
0.27
** 
0.45
** 
0.47** 0.37
** 
5 
Consultation 
with Officers  
          0.26
** 
0.37
** 
0.21
** 
0.51
** 
0.29
** 
0.35
** 
0.39** 0.26
** 
6 
Officer 
Discretion  
            0.16
** 
0.15
** 
0.14
* 
0.19
** 
0.22
** 
0.18** 0.13
* 
7 
Leadership 
Support 
              0.37
** 
0.57
** 
0.34
** 
0.41
** 
0.40** 0.25
** 
8 
Performance 
Feedback 
               0.37
** 
0.31
** 
0.33
** 
0.26** 0.16
** 
9 
Performance 
Information 
Use 
                  0.40
** 
0.60
** 
0.60** 0.36
** 
10 
Consultation 
with Citizens  
                 0.27
** 
0.36** 0.18
** 
11 
Quality 
Control 
                     0.44** 0.24
** 
12 
Strategic 
Planning 
                        0.50
** 
13 
Logical 
Incrementalism 
                         
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.3. OLS Regression Analysis 
Following the Meier and O’Toole (1999, 2000) model, I have used OLS 
Regression to conduct the analysis. Although some multicollinearity issues persist, the 
data is fairly normal. The OLS regression results are provided below. The annual 
reported crime rates for 2012 in seven categories and total crime rates for towns and 
cities in the sample serve as the dependent variables. For an improved analysis, I am 
showing regression results for the sample including, as well as excluding, the outliers.  
I have included eleven policy variables which measure the recommended best 
practices, each related to a particular hypothesis. The variables measure the degree to 
which each police organization reported that it provided specific targets, aligned 
performance measures with organizational strategy, had a wide variety of targets, 
communicated targets to the officers, provided discretion to the officers, consulted with 
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citizens, provided feedback to public, leadership supported performance management 
systems, engaged in regular quality control, and used performance information to make 
organizational decisions. Nine out of eleven of these recommended practices come under 
the ambits of goal-setting theory, while the other two are popular in the police 
performance management literature. 
 Furthermore, I have included control variables such as income per capita, percent 
minority, population density, officer-to-population ratio, and regions of the location of 
the agency, as these variables have been shown to influence crime rates in previous 
research. Following the recommendations of the Meier and O’Toole model (1999, 2001), 
past performance in terms of reported crime rates in 2009 is included as the supercontrol 
variable, which serves as a surrogate for the various organizational and environmental 
variables which might have an impact on organizational performance.  
Below, I present the OLS regression results for the reported crime rates in eight 
categories including as well as excluding the outliers. In the discussion section, I will talk 
about the implication of these results on the hypotheses, and I will end with a conclusion 
where I will discuss the theoretical and practical implications, along with the weaknesses 
of this study and suggestion for future research.  
4.3.1. Murder and manslaughter: 
 The impact of recommended practices on the rate of murder and manslaughter 
(reported crime per 100,000 population) is minimal, as only the recommended practice of 
making use of the performance information generated through the performance 
measurement system to analyze the results and make decisions is suggested to be 
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significantly impacting murder rates. The table further suggests that formulating 
strategies through either strategic planning or logical incrementalism helps police 
agencies perform better in terms of decreasing murder rates, while formulating strategies 
through a blended approach of the two methods is counterproductive. These findings are 
contrary to other findings (e.g., Poister, Edwards, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013) which 
suggest that a blended approach for strategy formulation supports better performance in 
organizations. Other findings suggest that murder rates are higher in areas with higher 
income per capita, percentage of minorities, population, and more police employees per 
capita. Murder rates in the cities and towns in the Northeast region seem to be lower than 
those in the West region.      
Table 36: OLS Regression models for murder and manslaughter crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.25 
Alignment with Strategy 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.28 
Diversity of Targets 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.11 
Communication of Targets 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.25 
Consultation with Officers  0.17 0.24 0.17 0.24 
Officer Discretion 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.29 
Leadership Support  -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 
Performance Feedback -0.10 0.20 -0.10 0.20 
Performance Information Use -0.96*** 0.32 -0.96** 0.32 
Consultation with Citizens  0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20 
Quality Control 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.27 
Strategic Planning -1.90* 1.03 -1.90* 1.03 
Logical Incrementalism -2.23* 1.07 -2.23* 1.07 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism 0.38* 0.20 0.38* 0.20 
Income Per Capita 0.00003* 0.00 0.00003*** 0.00 
Percent Minority 0.04* 0.01 0.04** 0.01 
Population Density 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Population 0.00001* 0.00 0.00001*** 0.00 
Employee Ratio 984.40*** 231.34 984.40*** 231.34 
Northeast -1.22* 0.72 -1.22* 0.72 
Midwest 0.31 0.53 0.31 0.53 
South -0.11 0.52 -0.11 0.52 
Murder Rates for 2009 0.13*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.04 
R-Square 0.35  0.35  
N  269  269  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.2. Forcible Rape: 
 The results suggest that consultation with officers in designing and implementing 
performance management systems helps decrease the per capita rates of forcible rapes, 
only when we included the outliers. No impact of any of the recommended practices is 
found to be significant for this category of crime. An overwhelming majority of the 
regressions results mirror these results. Similar to murder and manslaughter, having more 
police employees per capita is related to an increase in the crime rates in this category. A 
larger number of minorities and higher income per capita, however, is suggested to be 
decreasing forcible rapes.     
Table 37: OLS Regression modes for forcible rape crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets  -1.24 1.65 0.11 1.37 
Alignment with Strategy -0.87 1.83 -0.18 1.50 
Diversity of Targets -0.25 0.69 -0.75 .57 
Communication of Targets 0.92 1.62 1.45 1.34 
Consultation with Officers  -2.81* 1.55 -1.62 1.33 
Officer Discretion 1.69 1.88 0.90 1.55 
Leadership Support  0.45 1.47 -0.30 1.21 
Performance Feedback -0.84 1.29 0.13 1.06 
Performance Information Use 0.49 2.06 -0.84 1.70 
Consultation with Citizens  1.04 1.32 0.88 1.09 
Quality Control 0.33 1.75 -0.34 1.44 
Strategic Planning 4.60 6.73 6.93 5.51 
Logical Incrementalism -0.13 7.02 4.06 5.77 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism -0.33 1.32 -1.00 1.08 
Income Per Capita -0.001*** 0.00 -0.001*** 0.00 
Percent Minority -0.28** 0.09 -0.22*** 0.08 
Population Density 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00002* 0.00 
Employee Ratio 3523.16* 1522.36 2472.51* 1254.85 
Northeast -0.91 4.68 1.59 3.85 
Midwest 2.91 3.47 3.55 2.88 
South 1.01 3.42 1.39 2.81 
Forcible Rape Rates for 2009 0.51*** 0.05 0.48*** 0.05 
R-Square 0.45  0.50  
N  269  262  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.3. Aggravated Assaults: 
 The results suggest that none of the recommended practices to design and 
implement performance measures systems have an impact on aggravated assault rates. 
The results further suggest that aggravated assaults are less likely to occur in areas with 
higher income per capita.    
Table 38: OLS Regression modls for aggravated assault crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets  -3.23 8.43 -3.19 8.44 
Alignment with Strategy -12.30 9.33 -13.09 9.38 
Diversity of Targets 4.84 3.57 4.80 3.57 
Communication of Targets .312 8.30 -0.10 8.32 
Consultation with Officers  5.02 7.94 5.32 7.95 
Officer Discretion -9.37 9.73 -10.12 9.77 
Leadership Support  1.72 7.51 1.69 7.51 
Performance Feedback -1.10 6.62 -0.98 6.62 
Performance Information Use 5.21 10.61 5.59 10.63 
Consultation with Citizens  5.46 6.78 5.03 6.80 
Quality Control -9.06 8.92 -8.35 8.97 
Strategic Planning -10.53 34.40 -10.24 34.42 
Logical Incrementalism -17.74 35.70 -17.26 35.73 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism 3.11 6.73 3.08 6.73 
Income Per Capita -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
Percent Minority 0.27 0.49 0.32 0.50 
Population Density -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
Employee Ratio 1273.92 7933.18 172.75 8043.24 
Northeast 0.26 23.83 1.01 23.86 
Midwest -3.50 17.77 -2.86 17.80 
South 5.35 17.58 5.65 17.59 
Aggravated Assault Rates for 2009  0.64*** 0.04 0.65*** 0.04 
R-Square 0.71  0.69  
N  269  268  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
114 
 
4.3.4. Robbery: 
 Only the recommended practice of providing discretion to officers is suggested to 
help decrease reported robbery crime rates in US cities/towns. An increase in income per 
capita, however, is found to increase the number of robbery incidents.   
Table 39: OLS Regression models for robbery crime rates for 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets -1.35 2.44 -1.61 2.36 
Alignment with Strategy -2.24 2.69 -2.07 2.61 
Diversity of Targets 1.27 1.03 1.03 1.00 
Communication of Targets -0.12 2.43 0.50 2.35 
Consultation with Officers  2.18 2.29 2.81 2.22 
Officer Discretion -9.02*** 2.78 -8.65*** 2.68 
Leadership Support  -0.53 2.17 -1.10 2.10 
Performance Feedback 2.44 1.91 1.78 1.86 
Performance Information Use -2.97 3.06 -2.34 2.97 
Consultation with Citizens  1.36 1.99 1.66 1.94 
Quality Control 0.36 2.58 -0.04 2.51 
Strategic Planning 0.81 9.94 1.12 9.59 
Logical Incrementalism -2.39 10.33 -2.13 9.95 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism 0.20 1.95 0.05 1.88 
Income Per Capita 0.00002*** 0.00 0.00002* 0.00 
Percent Minority -0.15 0.16 -0.18 0.16 
Population Density 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001 
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Employee Ratio -3049.54 2398.40 -1020.49 2365.71 
Northeast 2.75 6.92 0.95 6.68 
Midwest 6.33 5.21 5.39 5.04 
South 6.66 5.06 4.17 4.92 
Robbery Rates for 2009 0.75*** 0.03 0.74*** 0.03 
R-Square 0.87   0.84 
N  269   265 
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.5. Burglary: 
 Contrary to the hypothesis, the recommended practice of having performance 
targets for a wide variety of police objectives is suggested to increase burglary rates only 
in the model including the outliers. Providing more discretion to the officer is also found 
to be counterproductive, and the OLS results in both models suggest that this practice 
helps increase burglary incidents. Cities and towns with a higher income per capita and 
percentage of minorities also show higher burglary rates in the model including outliers, 
while these are not significant for the model without the outliers. The Midwest and South 
regions report fewer burglaries compared to the West region.    
 
Table 40: OLS Regression models for burglary crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets -11.27 17.79 -8.90 16.62 
Alignment with Strategy -14.74 19.62 -8.05 18.36 
Diversity of Targets 14.38* 7.46 10.71 6.99 
Communication of Targets 15.01 17.56 14.70 16.40 
Consultation with Officers  2.33 16.69 2.11 15.58 
Officer Discretion 40.90* 20.39 31.65** 19.10 
Leadership Support  18.65 15.83 17.88 14.78 
Performance Feedback -10.38 13.93 -17.48 13.06 
Performance Information Use -7.31 22.30 -2.72 20.84 
Consultation with Citizens  -8.96 14.35 -2.98 13.43 
Quality Control -21.32 18.78 -24.41 17.54 
Strategic Planning 33.90 72.47 27.56 67.69 
Logical Incrementalism 37.40 75.23 32.81 70.26 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism -6.32 14.18 -5.64 13.24 
Income Per Capita 0.000004* 0.002 0.00 0.002 
Percent Minority 0.21* 1.10 -0.18 1.03 
Population Density -0.004 1.01 -0.001 0.01 
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Employee Ratio -7634.59 16802.05 -9483.88 15693.36 
Northeast -15.82 50.52 -21.58 47.18 
Midwest -33.82* 37.55 -37.50 35.07 
South -52.70* 36.69 -57.22* 34.27 
Burglary Rates for 2009 0.87*** 0.04 0.86*** 0.04 
R-Square 0.79  0.81  
N  269  268  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.6. Larceny/Theft: 
  Alignment of performance measures with the overall organizational strategy and 
goals is found to be effective in reducing larceny and theft rates, but only in the model 
including the outliers. An increase in income per capita and the number of minorities also 
suggests a decrease in the rates of larceny and thefts in the model excluding the outliers. 
Interestingly enough, we can also observe that formulating strategy based only on 
strategic planning and logical incrementalism has a negative impact on police 
performance, which goes against the findings for murder rates, where these methods 
showed a positive impact.  
Table 41: OLS Regression models for larceny/theft crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets 7.12 45.46 1.91 45.45 
Alignment with Strategy -83.40* 49.90 -78.36 50.51 
Diversity of Targets 3.67 19.06 7.12 19.05 
Communication of Targets -59.24 45.21 -60.05 45.13 
Consultation with Officers  50.77 42.48 46.56 42.36 
Officer Discretion -75.45 51.88 -64.28 52.63 
Leadership Support  -16.27 40.37 -15.59 40.25 
Performance Feedback -10.19 35.40 -3.65 35.40 
Performance Information Use 88.84 57.13 80.91 57.06 
Consultation with Citizens  26.50 36.73 24.77 36.66 
Quality Control -52.25 47.98 -47.03 48.08 
Strategic Planning 306.61* 184.96 268.37 185.72 
Logical Incrementalism 340.31* 191.99 311.10 191.87 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism -57.32 36.18 -50.69 36.22 
Income Per Capita -0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 
Percent Minority -5.54 2.55 -5.99* 2.55 
Population Density 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Population 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001 
Employee Ratio 61164.17 46165.04 63491.14 47099.96 
Northeast -180.04 130.73 -188.60 130.38 
Midwest -162.87 95.53 -174.87* 95.53 
South -228.13 93.59 -229.84* 93.44 
Larceny/Theft Rates for 2009 0.85*** 0.03 0.83*** 0.04 
R-Square 0.83  0.81  
N  269  266  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.7. Motor Vehicle Theft: 
 None of the recommended practices to design and implement performance 
management are found to have a significant impact on the rate of reported motor vehicle 
theft. The population density in found to increase motor vehicle thefts in both models, 
while an increase in employee ratio is suggested to increase such crime in the OLS model 
excluding the outliers. The Northeast and South regions are also found to have fewer 
reported motor vehicle theft rates than the West region.  
Table 42: OLS Regression models for motor vehicle theft crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
  
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets -0.43 7.50 -1.25 4.95 
Alignment with Strategy 3.69 8.26 -5.62 5.42 
Diversity of Targets -4.68 3.16 -1.49 2.08 
Communication of Targets -7.92 7.39 0.01 4.95 
Consultation with Officers  9.68 7.03 7.14 4.62 
Officer Discretion 0.92 8.53 4.85 5.66 
Leadership Support  0.05 6.68 -2.98 4.50 
Performance Feedback -6.01 5.87 0.56 3.88 
Performance Information Use 3.37 9.39 -0.40 6.30 
Consultation with Citizens  4.75 6.05 1.78 3.98 
Quality Control 4.19 7.93 -5.07 5.30 
Strategic Planning -23.38 30.53 13.91 20.13 
Logical Incrementalism -6.69 31.75 24.58 20.93 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism 2.39 5.98 -4.28 3.96 
Income Per Capita -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Percent Minority 0.21 0.47 -0.31 0.342 
Population Density 0.01* 0.003 0.004* 0.002 
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Employee Ratio 9520.58 7010.19 11176.95* 4923.71 
Northeast -34.55 21.70 -38.35* 14.31 
Midwest -21.79 16.01 -13.83 10.40 
South -35.01* 15.87 -28.05* 10.46 
Motor Vehicle Rates for 2009 0.78*** 0.04 0.68*** 0.03 
R-Square 0.76  0.75  
N  269  249  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.3.8. Total Crime: 
  None of the recommended practices is found to have a significant impact on 
police performance. An increase in minority percentage is suggested to decrease the total 
reported crime rates, while the Midwest and South regions are found to have lower crime 
rates than the West region.   
Table 43: OLS Regression models for total crime rates for 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Including Outliers Excluding Outliers 
 b Std. Error b Std. Error 
Specific Targets -5.01 59.47 -4.77 59.68 
Alignment with Strategy -100.00 65.34 -99.69 65.62 
Diversity of Targets 21.16 24.91 21.08 24.98 
Communication of Targets -60.96 59.16 -61.20 59.37 
Consultation with Officers  59.02 55.64 59.07 55.76 
Officer Discretion -34.79 68.07 -34.65 68.24 
Leadership Support  4.79 52.78 4.73 52.90 
Performance Feedback -29.89 46.31 -30.05 46.45 
Performance Information Use 100.70 74.84 100.91 75.06 
Consultation with Citizens  20.62 48.20 20.61 48.30 
Quality Control -75.38 62.71 -75.22 62.88 
Strategic Planning 292.59 241.91 292.60 242.40 
Logical Incrementalism 352.48 250.96 352.77 251.51 
Strategic Planning*Logical Incrementalism -56.47 47.31 -56.52 47.41 
Income Per Capita -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Percent Minority -6.90* 3.43 -6.90* 3.43 
Population Density 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Population 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001 
Employee Ratio 31799.24 60810.07 31414.63 61172.21 
Northeast -203.37 170.76 -202.72 171.35 
Midwest -220.92* 124.95 -221.00* 125.21 
South -312.02* 122.34 -311.90 122.60 
Total Crime Rates for 2009 0.87*** 0.03 0.87*** 0.03 
R-Square 0.86  0.86  
N  269  268  
Significance *p=0.05. **p=0.01. ***p=0.001.    
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4.4. Discussion 
The table below summarizes the OLS regression results presented in the above 
section. The rows represent the dependent variables and the columns represent the 
recommended practices. The recommended practices that came out to be statistically 
significant in helping reduce crime rates at least at a p-value of 0.05 on a one-tailed test 
are marked in green color with an arrow pointing downwards. The results which were 
contradictory to the hypotheses and suggested an increase in per capita crime rates with 
an increased use of recommended practices in designing and implementing performance 
management systems are marked in red with an arrow pointing upwards.  The following 
table shows the results of the OLS regressions including the outliers: 
Table 44: Summary of results – crime rates in 2012 v/s recommended practices including outliers. 
 
Spec. 
Targets 
Align. 
w/ 
Strategy 
Div. of 
Targets 
Comm. 
of 
Targets 
Cons. w/ 
Officers 
Officer 
Discretion 
Lead. 
Support 
F/back 
to 
Officers 
Perf. 
Info. 
Use 
Cons. w/ 
Citizens 
Quality 
Control 
Murder 
and Mans. 
        
 
  
Forcible 
Rape 
           
Aggr. 
Assault 
           
Robbery            
Burglary            
Larceny/ 
Theft 
           
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft 
           
Total 
crime 
           
 
 We can observe only four instances out of 88 where the results were found to be 
statistically supporting the hypothesis, while two instances suggest a harmful impact of 
the use of recommended practices on police performance.  
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The table below shows the results of the OLS regressions excluding the outliers: 
Table 45: Summary of results – crime rates in 2012 v/s recommended practices excluding outliers. 
 
Spec. 
Targets 
Align. 
w/ 
Strategy 
Div. of 
Targets 
Comm. 
of 
Targets 
Cons. w/ 
Officers 
Officer 
Discretion 
Lead. 
Support 
F/back 
to 
Officers 
Perf. 
Info. 
Use 
Cons. w/ 
Citizens 
Quality 
Control 
Murder 
and Mans. 
        
 
  
Forcible 
Rape 
           
Aggr. 
Assault 
           
Robbery            
Burglary            
Larceny/ 
Theft 
           
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft 
           
Total 
crime 
           
 
   
A look at the above table also reveals only a weak link between the recommended 
practices to design and implement performance management systems and police 
performance in terms of the reported crime rates. Only two (officer discretion and 
performance information use) of the eleven recommended practices were found to be 
supporting the hypotheses for murder and robbery crimes respectively. Officer discretion, 
however, is found to increase burglary crime rates, which is against the hypothetical 
expectations of the study.  
The following table links these results back to the components of goal-setting 
theory, which forms the theoretical framework of this study: 
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Table 46: Recommended practices and goal-setting theory, including results. 
Conditions  Recommended Practices 
Support for 
Hypotheses 
Clarity 
Specific Targets (H1) 0 of 8 
Alignment with Strategy (H2) 0 of 8 
Diversity of Targets (H3) 0 of 8 
Communication of Targets (H4) 0 of 8 
 Communication of Targets (H4) 0 of 8 
Commitment 
Consultation with Officers (H5a) 0 of 8 
Officer Discretion (H5b) 1 of 8 
Leadership Support (H6) 0 of 8 
Performance Information Use (H8) 1 of 8 
Feedback 
Performance Feedback (H7) 0 of 8 
Performance Information Use (H8) 1 of 8 
Challenging ???  
Miscellaneous 
Consultation with Citizens (H9) 0 of 8 
Quality Control (H10) 0 of 8 
 
 As reported earlier, only officer discretion and performance information were 
found to support the hypothesis only in a single iteration out of eight. It is curious that the 
commitment and feedback components of goal-setting theory are found to have a positive 
impact on performance, while the clarity component showed no such impact. The two 
recommended practices which could not be linked to any of the four components of goal-
setting theory also did not show any significant results. 
I suspect that these results appear significant by chance only. If we adopt the rule 
of thumb to consider the results to be significant at least 5% of the time based on chance, 
it can be noted that three instances (two supporting and one opposing results) where the 
results came out to be significant can be attributed to chance. I would, hence, prefer to err 
toward being cautious and would not consider these three results to be meaningful. These 
results, hence, do not show any significant impact on police performance. 
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4.4.1. Specific Targets (Hypothesis 1): 
Goal clarity is one of the essential assumptions of goal-setting theory and is 
considered to be an important aspect of designing performance management systems for 
police agencies (Hagar & Hobson, 2001; Moore & Braga, 2003; Shane, 2000). It is 
argued that clear and specific goals help direct the energies of the employees and the 
agencies toward the desired activities and in specific amounts, rather than being scattered 
and diffused among the necessary and unnecessary activities (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; 
Boyne, 2006). The OLS regression results, however, do not support this notion as the 
variable for target clarity does not come out to be significant for any of the seven 
measures of crimes or for total crimes.  
These findings do not support the expectations of police scholars and practitioners 
such as Shane (2000) or Moore and Braga (2003). Other police scholars such as Roberts 
(2006) and practitioners such as Bratton (1998) strongly supported that the targets for 
police agencies should be specific and quantifiable. Bratton’s assertions are especially 
important as, being the police chief of New York in the 1990s, he was one of the 
designers and implementers of the first CompStat system. The null findings on this 
measure provide support to other police scholars who do not have a favorable view of 
defining clear and quantifiable targets for crimes, as crime reduction is considered to be a 
complex affair and is dependent upon holistic socio-economic dynamics (Weisburd et al., 
2003).    
While it cannot be ascertained whether it is the case in this study or not, these 
findings may concur with those of Seijts and Latham (2001), who proposed that clear and 
specific goals yield lower performance when employees lack the required knowledge to 
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do the job or when goals are not challenging (Miner, 2006). Although crimes under the 
category of murder and manslaughter are the most valid crime rates available in the UCR, 
they are largely unpredictable, complicated, and not under the direct control of police 
agencies for multiple reasons (Sherman, 1992). Setting clear and specific targets might 
encourage police agencies to focus resources on attaining their goals instead of engaging 
in learning behavior, which is needed to find ways to improve understanding regarding 
complex social problems such as murder and manslaughter (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; 
Latham & Locke, 2007).   
There might be other weaknesses with the study which might have contributed to 
the null findings. Being a cross-sectional study, this dissertation ignored the length of 
time since the police agencies might have been providing clear targets along with setting 
priorities for them. Recommended practices are considered to be more effective when 
they are in place for a longer time as the organizations become accustomed to them and 
learn to benefit from them. Since the surveys were directed toward police chiefs, they 
might have biased opinions on how much specificity exists in the goals and targets they 
set. Police chiefs might have a high opinion of their own ability to set specific goals, or 
be satisfied with the way they set these targets. In relatively larger police agencies, it 
might not even be the police chief who sets these targets, as the captains might be 
responsible for setting targets for their teams. Hence, the chief would have limited 
knowledge of how specific these targets might be.  
Furthermore, having specific targets is only one of many management practices, 
while there are other more important factors (e.g., socio-political and socio-economic 
environment) which might impact crime rate statistics. Hence, even if the effect of having 
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specific targets might be real, it might not be large enough to show significant impacts, 
given the small sample size of the study. Although the VIF scores did not suggest so, I 
suspected multicollinearity to be at play (based on the CFA analysis) in producing the 
null findings for the impact of recommended practices on police performance. In order to 
check for this issue, I ran bivariate correlations between the policy variables and the 
dependent variables. I found only a couple of instances where specific targets might have 
been weakly correlated with any of the dependent variables. Hence, it can be argued that 
while multicollinearity might exist among the policy variables, it might not be the reason 
for producing these null findings.       
4.4.2. Alignment with Strategy (Hypothesis 2): 
Aligning performance measures and targets with broader organizational strategy 
was not found to increase performance of police agencies. Only one out of the 8 
categories of crime (larceny/theft) was affected positively by the use of this practice, but 
these results did not remain significant when we conducted the analysis removing the 
outliers.  
By aligning performance measures and targets with overall strategy, police 
agencies can assure that the activities that might have no or harmful impacts on attaining 
broader organizational goals are avoided (Tangen, 2004; Shane, 2000; Poister, 2003; 
Coleman, 2008). The null findings of the regression results do not provide support to the 
assertions of police scholars such as Coleman (2008) and Moore and Braga (2003), who 
recommended that police agencies base their performance indicators on overall agency 
goals and strategies. Performance measures based on short-term targets might not be 
useful in helping reduce crimes that require long-term behavioral, economic, and cultural 
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change, such as reducing the number of forcible rapes and robberies (Latham & Locke, 
1991; Kanfer & Grimm, 1978). The results supporting null hypotheses also strike a chord 
with studies in other contexts such as by Ittner et al. (2003), who found that aligning 
performance measures to organizational strategy had no impact on the performance of 
private firms. 
These results, however, might be caused by some of the weaknesses similar to the 
ones mentioned in the specific targets section. Aligning targets for a longer period of time 
produces more long-term clarity among the employees, and hence the employees in such 
an agency would have better performance than the ones belonging to an agency which 
recently aligned its performance measures to overall strategy and goals. Being high-up in 
the organization, the police chiefs are more aware of the broader organizational goals 
than the officers. While the link between the overall goals and performance measures 
might be more obvious for the chiefs, the officers might struggle to understand that link. 
The chiefs might also have biased opinions of their ability to link the measures to the 
goals. Although aligning performance measures to organizational strategy might be a 
good practice, it might not have enough of an impact to be detected with such a small 
sample. Similar to specific targets, I did not find alignment with strategy to be strongly 
correlated with policy variables, which reduces the chance of multicollinearity in 
influencing these results.  
4.4.3. Diversity of Targets (Hypothesis 3): 
The police literature supports the notion of having a wide variety of performance 
goals (Shane, 2000; Moore & Braga, 2003). However, like the previous results, the OLS 
regression results do not show any impact of having multiple targets on organizational 
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performance. The categories of targets come from the suggestions of police scholars such 
as Moore and Braga (2003) and Shane (2000), who emphasized that police performance 
should be measured in terms of reduction in criminal victimization, holding offenders 
accountable, increase in safety in public places, increase in a sense of personal security 
among the citizens, efficient usage of financial resources, and fair and effective use of 
force. The null and negative impact on performance for this measure leaves it open to 
police scholars to debate whether such a categorization is as useful as previously thought 
and whether measuring police performance over a wide variety of outcomes produces the 
desired results.  
However, the study ignores the length of time since a diverse set of targets were 
available to the employees, which might convolute the results. Being so high up, the 
police chiefs might be unaware of the target categories available to the employees or even 
have a biased opinion on how many of the eight categories included in the questionnaire 
they consider important and have targets for.  The small sample size also does not help 
capture the real but small effects of this practice. Finally, I did not find significant 
bivariate correlations between target diversity and the dependent variables, reducing the 
chances of multicollinearity to influence the results.   
4.4.4. Communication of Targets (Hypothesis 4): 
Goal-setting theory is essentially a theory of internalized or accepted goals 
(Miner, 2006). Communicating performance targets to the employees is essential to attain 
agreement and acceptance from them and to keep them motivated (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; 
Locke & Latham, 1991; Miner, 2006). Although the notion of communicating 
performance targets having a positive impact on police performance is supported by 
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theory as well as by empirical studies (Butterfield et al., 2004; Shane, 2000; Bratton & 
Malinowski, 2008), none of the measures of crimes in the various categories were 
affected by communicating targets to the police officers. The null findings do not provide 
support to the findings of Butterfield et al. (2004), who showed that communicating 
targets throughout the organization is an important practice in police departments in the 
UK which have adopted performance management systems, or the recommendations of 
Roberts (2006), who asserted that communication should be organization-wide in a police 
agency and made available to all the employees.  
It is the goal of future research to ascertain whether these findings paint a true 
picture of the impact of communication on police crime rates. Good communication of 
performance targets is an established practice in the field, and it is highly likely almost all 
police agencies engage in good target communication, which decreases variation.  
There might, however, be new communication regiments in place, and some 
police agencies might have been communicating more effectively than others over longer 
periods of time. Furthermore, the survey was directed toward police chiefs, who might 
have a more positive opinion of how well they communicate with their officers. Hence, 
false perceptions of self-performance might explain the null hypotheses regarding this 
recommended practice. While multicollinearity might not be reason for the null findings, 
given that the bivariate correlations were also not significant, the small but real effects of 
this practice on organizational outcomes might not be evident with such a small sample 
size.   
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4.4.5. Consultation with Officers (Hypothesis 5a): 
Employee participation is reputed to increase agreement, understanding, 
commitment, and job satisfaction among employees (Carroll & Tosi, 1973; Vroom, 1965; 
Wright & Hassan, 2013), and goal-setting theory also attributes a positive impact of 
employee participation in decision-making to organizational performance (Latham, Erez 
& Locke, 1988). The positive effects of participation and consultation are circumstantial, 
as they are found to work when employees have low intrinsic motivation and people are 
accustomed to participation (Miner, 2006). The findings from the OLS regression 
confirm the ambiguity in the literature, as consulting with police officers in specifying 
performance targets and seeking suggestions to improve performance management 
systems did not appear to impact any of the measures of crimes.   
The police literature is widely supportive of officer consultation to be a necessary 
condition in order to design and implement performance management, with scholars such 
as Bratton and Malinowski (2008), Butterfield et al. (2004), Davis et al. (2008), Milligan 
et al. (2006), Roberts (2006), and Burnett (2007) behind this assertion. It is hence, 
surprising to see none of the seven measures of crimes being affected by officer 
consultation.  
One of the reasons behind these results might be that only the perceptions of 
police chiefs were taken on the extent to which they involve their officers in decision-
making processes, which might be biased as the police chiefs might have views which 
might not mirror reality. Also, what different police chiefs might consider to be “good 
consultation” is open for interpretation, while the nature and requirements of consultation 
might be different for larger agencies compared to smaller ones, owing to the differences 
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in the number of officers. This study also ignores the length of time since the police 
agencies started consulting with their officers, while possible real but small effects might 
also be less likely to be captured with this small sample size. To check for 
multicollinearity, I ran bivariate correlations between the policy variables and dependent 
variables, where the correlation between officer consultation and the crime rates in 
different categories did not come out to be statistically significant.        
4.4.6. Officer Discretion (Hypothesis 5b): 
Delegating power to lower-level employees leads to increased organizational 
performance (Locke, 1996). Providing maximum possible discretion to the employees 
and holding them accountable only for final performance is considered to yield the best 
performance from them (Gilmour & Lewis, 2006b; Hatry, 2006). This recommended 
practice, however, does not live up to expectations as it is found to be significantly and 
positively impacting only one measure of crime, robbery rates. On the contrary, we see a 
negative impact on the use of officer discretion on burglary rates, another measure of 
crime performance. These results are consistent in both the OLS regression models 
including as well as excluding the outliers. The police literature, on the other hand, is 
very supportive of providing discretion to the on-the-ground police officers and 
empowering them to make decisions in order to increase their performance (Shane, 2000; 
Loveday, 2005b, 2006; Caulkin, 2009; Davis, Cordner, et al., 2008; Milligan et al., 2006; 
Roberts, 2006).  
Since the police officers on the ground have the most current and comprehensive 
knowledge about criminals, their hideouts, their links, and their activities, empowering 
them to take an operational role helps reduce red-tape and time to take decisions. 
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Furthermore, discretion helps police officers be more innovative in their techniques. 
Given so much support in the police as well as the goal-setting literature, it is, hence, 
surprising to see that the measure for officer discretion has a positive impact on only one 
of the seven crime categories, and has a harmful impact on another measure of crime. 
The increase in burglary crimes due to providing more discretion to officers can, 
however, be a case of reverse causality where police agencies that are affected by higher 
crime rates might provide more discretion to their officers in order to deal with them. The 
harmful impacts can also be attributed to multicollinearity issues, as the bivariate 
correlation between officer discretion and burglary rates did not come out to be 
significant.  
Furthermore, the study ignores the length of time a particular agency was 
providing discretion to its officers, and the chiefs of police might have a biased opinion 
of how much discretion they allow to their officers. As far as other null findings are 
concerned, it is always difficult to capture the (possible real but) small effects with such a 
small sample size.     
4.4.7. Leadership Support (Hypothesis 6): 
Leadership support is considered to be an essential ingredient in improving 
organizational performance in the goal-setting theory literature (Miner, 2006; Rodgers & 
Hunter, 1991). Leaders help increase the use and effectiveness of performance 
management systems by imparting explicit and credible support and committing time and 
resources, which is likely to increase importance and commitment among the employees 
(Latham & Locke, 1991; Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright, 2012; Poister, 2003). The police 
literature has also emphasized the importance of leadership in implementing effective 
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performance management systems (Shane, 2000; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Roberts, 
2006). Especially the literature surrounding CompStat is full of emphasis on William 
Bratton’s leadership and support in designing the performance management system for 
the NYPD. It is hence surprising that the OLS regression results do not show leadership 
support having any significant impact on the performance of police agencies for any of 
the 7 measures of crime representing police performance.  
This discrepancy in the results and theoretical expectations can lie in the survey 
method. As the surveys were directed toward police chiefs, they might be biased in terms 
of how much they support their respective performance management systems. The survey 
questions to explore leadership support also included support from political leadership 
such as the mayor and the city council, which might not be as consequential to the 
effectiveness of performance management systems as the support from police 
management leadership. The study also ignores the length of time since leaders started 
supporting the performance management system. The sample is also too small to be able 
to capture the possible real but small effects. Multicollinearity, however, might not be an 
issue here as the bivariate correlations between leadership support and the crime rates in 
different categories were not found to be significant.   
4.4.8. Performance Feedback (Hypothesis 7): 
Providing performance feedback to the employees on how successful they have 
been in terms of reducing crimes is another recommended practice which was not found 
to have no impact on any of the 8 categories of crime, although findings from the police 
literature such as by Burnett (2007) and Moore & Braga, (2003) strongly support 
providing performance feedbacks. Choosing Gardena Police Department, California as an 
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exemplary model for performance management system, Burnett (2007) found that the 
department makes effort for timely dispersion of performance reports through e-mails, 
printing, and posting on bulletin boards. Moore & Braga (2003) noted that user-friendly 
reports play an important part in an effective performance management system through 
their study of the NYPD. Scholars and practitioners pertaining to the police literature 
have also found utility in the regular and accessible publication of performance reports in 
order to reap higher benefits from performance management systems in police 
departments (Shane, 2000; Butterfield et al., 2004; Moore & Braga, 2003). Feedback is 
considered to be a necessary condition for goal setting to help improve organizational 
performance in the goal-setting literature (Miner, 2006; Ivancevich & McMahon, 1982).  
Given its support from police as well as the goal-setting literature, it is open to 
question why feedback did not show any impact on the measures of crimes. While 
feedback helps employees better understand their strategies and what is expected of them 
(Carroll & Tosi, 1973), if provided in a disagreeable manner, it might create resentment 
and hostility among employees, which might be counterproductive to performance 
(Carroll & Tosi, 1973). Feedback can be ineffective if it is too convoluted for the 
recipient to extract the right message out of it (Locke & Latham, 1990a). Furthermore, 
the impact of feedback on performance might only be contextual. For example, providing 
regular feedback to police officers belonging to agencies with lower crime rates might 
help increase their morale and motivation. On the other hand, providing regular feedback 
to officers belonging to poorly performing agencies might lead to a decrease in their 
sense of self-worth and motivation, especially when the reasons of poor performance are 
not under their control.   
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Another possible reason behind these results might lie in the fact that the survey 
was conducted with police chiefs, who might have biased perceptions of their own 
competence in terms of their ability to provide feedback to their employees. The study 
also did not include the length of time since the feedback was provided to the officers. 
The possible real but small effects of providing feedback to officers might also not have 
been noted, given the small sample size. As previously described, I did not find 
significant bivariate correlations between leadership support and the dependent variables.     
4.4.9. Performance Information Use (Hypothesis 8): 
Finally, the entire exercise of measuring performance remains futile unless 
decisions are made and actions are taken based on the information generated by these 
systems (Moyniham & Ingraham, 2004; Van Dooren, 2008). Although using 
performance information is universally recommended in the performance management 
literature, the goal-setting theory literature does not address this aspect. The police 
literature, especially pertaining to the implementation of CompStat by NYPD Chief 
William Bratton emphasized the use of performance information generated from the 
system to be used to make decisions (Bratton, 1998).  
The OLS regression results partially confirm the assertions of the police as well as 
the performance management literature, as performance information use is by far the 
most successful of all the recommended practices analyzed in this study. It is the only 
practice out of the eleven which positively and significantly impacts police performance, 
as using performance information to make decisions is suggested to reduce murder crime 
rates in both models, including and excluding the outliers. This positive impact, however, 
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can be attributed to multicollinearity, as the bivariate correlation between performance 
information use and murder crime rates was not found to be significant. 
The null findings for the remaining six categories of crime and total crimes may 
be explained by the fact that the police chiefs were asked whether they analyzed the 
information generated through performance measurement systems, and more importantly, 
whether they took decisions based on this information and analysis. Police chiefs might 
have a biased opinion on how well they utilize performance information to run their 
departments. As in other cases, being a cross-sectional study, this dissertation ignores the 
impact of utilizing performance information over time. The small but real effects might 
also be difficult to capture given the small sample size of this study.  
4.4.10. Consultation with Citizens (Hypothesis 9): 
Although citizen participation and involvement in designing and implementing 
performance management systems for public agencies is considered to be an important 
practice in improving police performance (Moore & Braga, 2003; Bratton & Malinowski, 
2008), it is not given much attention in the goal-setting theory literature. Bratton and 
Malinowski (2008) saw a positive role of citizen surveys as part of the performance 
management system in helping them improve police services in New York and Los 
Angeles. Moore and Braga (2003) also support the use of citizen surveys as part of 
performance management systems in order to improve police performance.  
The results from the OLS regressions do not support the assertions of police 
literature, as none of the seven measures of crimes were found to be impacted by this 
practice. While consulting with citizens in other contexts might help police agencies 
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reach other important goals such as improving perceptions about the police and 
increasing support of their activities (Lawrence & Rick, 2001; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006), 
citizen consultation in designing performance management systems does not show any 
positive results. One reason for these results might be that selecting performance targets 
and designing performance management systems is a specialized process and requires 
more expertise than what citizens might offer. 
The effects of consulting with citizens over time, as well as the length of time this 
practice was in use, cannot be determined owing to the cross-sectional nature of this 
study. Police chiefs might also have a biased opinion of how much they interact with the 
citizen; moreover, consulting with citizens could mean different things for police chiefs. 
While smaller police agencies might include informal discussions with citizens as 
consultation, larger police agencies might regard more formal contacts through meetings 
as a measure of consultation. The possible real but small effects of this practice might 
also not be picked up due to the small sample size of this study. There are, however, 
relatively low chances of multicollinearity causing the null findings as the bivariate 
correlations between citizen consultation and police performance were not found to be 
significant.   
4.4.11. Quality Control (Hypothesis 10): 
Performance management systems work in a dynamic environment, and all 
aspects of performance management systems need to be updated to keep the system 
relevant and running (Kennerley & Neely, 2002; Mannion & Goddard, 2000). Although 
regular revisions and upgrade of performance management systems is considered to be an 
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important aspect of performance management systems design and implementation 
(Tangen, 2004), goal-setting theory is silent on the effectiveness of this measure.  
The police literature is also not as vocal on the effectiveness of this practice to 
help performance management systems reach police outcomes, although police scholars 
such as Burnett (2007) and Roberts (2006) do recognize it as an important aspect of 
police management.  Thus, it is not very surprising to observe that this measure failed to 
significantly affect any of the measures of crimes in the eight categories through the OLS 
regressions in both models, including as well as excluding the outliers. The survey 
addressed the recommended overview of performance management systems by asking 
two questions, one related to periodic quality checks, and the other asking whether the 
police agencies used external help in conducting these checks. These two questions, 
however, did not load on a single factor score. I used only the earlier question to define 
this measure, which might not give a complete picture of how well agencies conduct 
quality checks, and more importantly, whether they take decisions based on the 
recommendations that come out of such checks. 
Unlike all of the other recommended practices, police chiefs might be the best 
people to inquire about this practice, as they would know better than anyone else whether 
their department conducts quality checks on performance management systems or not. A 
biased interpretation of what “regular” might mean to the different chiefs, however, 
might still be at issue. The study also ignores the length of time since the agencies were 
conducting these quality checks. Furthermore, the possible impacts of quality checks on 
performance would be too small to be identified, given the small sample size of this 
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study.  Bivariate analysis looking at the correlation between conducting quality checks 
and the various categories of crime also did not show significant results.    
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1. Implications for Theory 
Although the findings do not suggest a link between the recommended practices 
and police performance, I have indeed found them related to goal-setting theory. Hence, 
even with these results, we can find a justification for the use of these practices in goal-
setting theory. Goal-setting theory is a well-established theory, and there is a plethora of 
evidence supporting the various assumptions of goal-setting theory in numerous contexts. 
Owing to their relation with goal-setting theory, we cannot entirely write off their use.  
The null findings might also point toward the incomplete test of goal-setting 
theory. As we have seen, I could find the recommended practices to be related to only 
three out of the four components of goal-setting theory. While most of these practices 
were related to the clarity, commitment, and feedback components of goal-setting theory, 
I could not link any of the available practices to the challenging component of this theory.  
Employees will not exert as much effort to reach goals that are not challenging, as 
they strive to achieve goals so that they may achieve self-satisfaction as well as 
recognition from their peers and superiors. Employees are more likely to feel good about 
their own performance as well as attract praise for their work if the targets are not too 
easy, and their peers and superiors consider that they have put in effort and skills to 
achieve these tasks. On the hand, employees are discouraged to exert their effort and 
skills when the goals are set to be too difficult, as they are not optimistic about reaching 
them. Hence, it is argued that police literature should include more recommended 
practices which could be linked back to the challenging component of goal-setting 
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theory, as setting difficult but doable goals is an essential condition for the success of 
setting goals.   
Furthermore, the results might be a reflection of a weakness in goal-setting 
theory, where setting clear and specific goals has been recommended to improve 
performance for rudimentary tasks, but is not found to be as useful to achieve objectives 
which require innovation, creativity, and learning (Latham and Seijts, 1999; Seijts & 
Latham, 2001).  
5.2.    Implications for Practice 
The purpose of this dissertation was to provide theoretical foundations for the 
available recommended practices in police literature and test their effectiveness, so we 
that we might be able to provide clear guidelines to police managers, as well as public 
managers in general, on how to better design and implement their performance 
management systems. Unfortunately, these results do not provide us the opportunity to 
make any such claims. Out of the selected practices, only performance information use 
and providing discretion to officers were found to be supporting the hypotheses in one 
instance each. Given that we tested the hypotheses in 88 instances, I suspect these two 
significant results to be a result of chance alone. These results, hence, raise questions 
about the efficacy of recommended practices. The results from this study suggest that the 
most popular recommended practices available in the police literature might not be as 
effective as they are thought to be. While these practices might be good ways to design 
and implement performance management systems, their impact is may be too little to be 
effective in improving organizational performance. Police scholars should look in other 
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directions to find better and more effective ways to design and implement performance 
management systems.       
Furthermore, the effect and need of recommended practices might be contextual. 
While some recommended practices might be useful in certain situations, they might 
have a neutral or even negative impact on police performance in other situations. For 
example, providing performance feedback to officers in areas with lower crime rates 
would boost their morale and motivate them to work harder. On the other hand, officers 
might lose their sense of pride and self-worth when they receive consistently negative 
feedback of their performance in a troubled area of a city, a situation over which they 
might not even have any control.  
5.3. Weaknesses 
The study uses cross-sectional analysis and hence neglects the progress in police 
performance over time, as well as a comparison of pre- versus post-implementation of the 
recommended practice. The study also ignores the length of time each recommended 
practice was in place. An extended use of recommended practices has more impact on 
performance, as not only do these practices become embedded in the organizational 
culture, but the employees also become accustomed to them and gain experience dealing 
with them. Furthermore, any problems with the implementation of the practices might 
also be isolated.    
Although I used past performance as the supra control variable for all unknown 
effects, it is still an incomplete measure to entirely control for the plethora of socio-
economic, socio-political, and agency-specific characteristics. To name a few examples, 
crime rates in any city or town might depend on available job opportunities for the youth, 
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the extent of political discontent among the minority, or whether the police officers are 
competent to conduct their duties.   
The dissertation studies only one aspect of police performance. Although crime 
rates are important indicators of police performance, they are only a part of a bigger 
picture of policing success. A reduction in crime rates may or may not have an impact on 
the perceptions of crime rates among the citizens or sense of safety and security among 
the citizens. Furthermore, going too far in trying to reduce crimes might result in a brutal 
use of force and excessive measures by police officers. The adoption of a performance 
management system by the NYPD is one such example, where increased reports of police 
abuse and human rights violations were received during the period police adopted a strict 
implementation of CompStat.    
Furthermore, the crime rates used in this study are only the reported crimes, 
which may or may not be a true representation of the actual crimes committed in the 
respective jurisdictions. While some marginal communities might be shy to contact the 
police due to negative perceptions of the police force, police officers might also be 
discouraged to look for crimes and avoid dealing with them in order to keep their 
numbers clean (e.g., see Eterno & Silverman, 2010). Reported crime rates in categories 
such as motor vehicle thefts are more reliable measures of the actual crime situation 
compared to forcible rapes, where less than half of cases are reported to the police.  
Response bias is another possible source of weakness in the study, as the agencies 
which use recommended practices in designing and implementing performance 
management systems might be more interested in responding to the survey, while the 
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others might choose not to. The sample might have thus ignored the performance of 
agencies which do not use performance management systems.  
Biased perceptions of the police chiefs concerning their own ability to design and 
implement performance management systems might not necessarily be a true reflection 
of how these systems were actually implemented. In some cases, police chiefs might not 
even be the right people to ask such questions. For example, police chiefs might have a 
high opinion of their own ability to set specific goals or provide feedback to the officers, 
which might not be how the employees on the ground could perceive these 
characteristics. Police chiefs sitting at the top might not even be aware of the on-the-
ground situation, such as how much discretion the captains allow their officers. 
The relatively small sample size of the study might prevent us to pick up possible 
real but small effects of recommended practices on police performance due to low 
statistical power. Crime rates are too wide a concept to be strongly impacted by a specific 
management function adopted by the police, while other complex socio-economic factors 
might be at play to determine the crime rates in a town or city. For example, while the 
adoption of performance management practices by the police is usually touted as the 
reasons behind the decrease in crime rates in New York in the late 1990s (Bratton & 
Malinowski, 2008), Levitt and Dubner (2005) propose in their book Freakonomics that 
the real reason behind this decrease was the legalization of abortion in the 1980s, which 
helped have fewer young men on the streets of New York.  
Reverse causality might be another factor which might explain these weaknesses. 
As performance management systems are becoming an increasingly popular source to 
reduce crimes, the police agencies with more performance failures and higher crime rates 
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might be the ones who are the most pressed to use these systems to help them reduce 
crimes. These agencies might also be more likely to adopt performance management 
systems more seriously and following the recommended practices. For example, such 
police agencies might provide more discretion to their officer to go after criminals or 
consult with citizens to ensure their buy-in.  
   Nevertheless, given all its weaknesses, this study is a first step toward 
empirically verifying the utility of following the recommended practices in designing and 
implementing performance management systems and provides limited evidence of the 
effectiveness of following recommended practices.  
5.4. Suggestions for Future Research 
In order to strengthen future studies, I recommend that time series and panel data 
study designs be adopted in order to look at the impact of recommended practices on the 
performance of police agencies over time. Especially data allowing the analysis of police 
performance before and after the implementation of performance management systems 
and recommended practices would be extremely useful in determining the effectiveness 
of these practices.  
One of the more important weaknesses in the study was related to the fact that the 
surveys were directed toward police chiefs, which increased the chances of bias and 
perception errors. In order to reduce this bias, more police officers from the rank and file 
should be included in the survey process. Police officers might have a better 
understanding of the actual situation in their department with respect to certain 
recommended practices. Asking police officers how well targets are communicated to 
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them and how much discretion they enjoy might be a better determinant of these aspects 
rather than soliciting the opinions of police chiefs. 
As reported earlier in the study, crime rate statistics only provide a partial picture 
of police performance. Future research should include other aspects of police 
performance such as citizen perceptions of safety and how well they perceive police to be 
doing their job in order to better ascertain police performance. Finally, police agencies 
work in restricted environments where they only have limited control of their outcomes. 
Police outcomes such as crime reduction, citizen safety perceptions, and holding 
offenders to account are strongly impacted by other environmental characteristics such as 
the economy, population pressure, judicial system, and culture. Hence, I propose that 
future studies examine the impacts of the adoption of performance management systems 
and recommended practices on police outputs such as arrest rates, patrol hours, and 
clearance rates. I also propose conducting similar studies in areas such as local transit and 
waste management, where public agencies might have more control over and impact on 
their performance outcomes.        
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Appendix: 
Appendix A: Alert letter sent to police chiefs on October 17, 2013. 
 
Dear Chief [LastName],  
 
The Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology at the Georgia State University and I are interested in learning about performance 
management practices in the US police agencies over the past few years. To this end, we are conducting a survey of over one thousand 
police chiefs or their delegates across the country. As the police chief of [XXX] police department, your contribution to the research 
effort will be highly appreciated.  
 
Police agencies will benefit from this research as we will be able to ascertain the efficacy of performance management systems and 
identify ways to better design and implement performance management systems for police agencies. We are committed to send results 
of the study to all who participate by early 2014.  
 
In a few days you will receive an e-mail from me with a link to the online survey, which should require no more than 10 minutes to 
complete online. Since we are particularly interested in the time period from 2009 to 2012, if you have been employed at the police 
agency for less than a year, please pass this request on to another individual close to you in rank, who was employed with the agency 
for at least five years. You can also forward this survey to a peer to complete.  Please ask them to contact us via email at 
opasha1@gsu.edu so that we can send the online survey directly to them.  
 
This survey will be used solely for research purposes. I want to assure you that your responses will be strictly confidential, and that 
only summary information across all respondents will be reported without identifying any responses by individuals or individual 
police agencies.  
 
I would appreciate your timely response to the survey when you receive the email notification.  A high response rate is helpful in 
assuring the validity of the data. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact me at 404-413-0134 or via email at 
opasha1@gsu.edu.  
 
We will greatly appreciate your cooperation with this effort.    
 
 
Thank you and best regards,  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Candidate Public Policy/Administration  
Department of Public Management & Policy  
Georgia State University 
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Appendix B: Survey link sent to police chiefs on October 22, 2013. 
 
Dear Chief [LastName],    
 
Recently, you received an e-mail notifying you about our survey of [XXX] police department regarding performance management 
practices over the past few years. This research is carried out in collaboration with the Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology 
at Georgia State University and will help us ascertain the efficacy of performance management systems and identify ways to better 
designing and implementing performance management systems for police agencies.  
 
Please follow the link to access the survey:  
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
We request that you complete the survey by Wednesday, November 6, 2013.  
 
This survey will be used solely for research purposes. I want to assure you that your responses will be strictly confidential, and that 
only summary information across all respondents will be reported without identifying any responses by individuals or individual 
police agencies.  
 
This survey is administered online and hosted by Survey Monkey, which permits you to exit and re-enter the survey at different times 
until you have completed the survey.  Once you have completed the survey and are ready to submit your responses, click "Done."  At 
that point your responses will be logged into the system, and you will not be allowed to re-enter the survey.  
 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me at: opasha1@gsu.edu.    
 
We greatly appreciate your time and participation in this survey. The results promise to be of real interest to police agencies and we 
are committed to send results of the surveys to all who participate once compiled and analyzed.    
 
Thank you,  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Candidate Public Policy/Administration  
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies  
Georgia State University 
 If you do not wish to be a part of this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx
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Appendix C: First reminder for the survey sent to police chiefs on October 29, 2013. 
 
Dear Chief [LastName],    
 
Recently, you received an e-mail about our survey of [XXX] police department regarding performance management practices over the 
past few years.  
 
Please follow the link to access the survey:  
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
We request that you complete the survey by Wednesday, November 6, 2013.  
 
The results promise to be of real interest to police agencies and we are committed to send results of the surveys to all who participate 
once compiled and analyzed.  
 
We greatly appreciate your time and participation in this survey.    
 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me at: opasha1@gsu.edu.    
 
Thank you,  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Candidate Public Policy/Administration  
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies  
Georgia State University  
If you do not wish to be a part of this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx  
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Appendix D: Second reminder for the survey sent to police chiefs on November 3, 2013. 
 
Dear Chief [LastName]  
 
As the Police Chief of [XXX] Police Department we request you to fill the following survey by Wednesday, November 6:  
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
This online survey should take no more than 10 minutes.  
 
Conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the Georgia State University, this survey promises to be of real 
value to police agencies by finding the most effective management practices adopted by the police agencies. 
 
We greatly appreciate your help and support and are committed to share the results of the analysis with you by early next year.  
 
Thank you and best regards  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Public Policy Candidate  
Georgia State University  
opasha1@gsu.edu  
If you do not wish to be a part of this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx  
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Appendix E: Third reminder for the survey sent to police chiefs on November 6, 2013. 
 
Dear Chief [LastName]  
 
Please don't forget to fill out the survey for [XXX] Police Department Today, Wednesday, November 6:  
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
This online survey should take no more than 10 minutes.  
 
Conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the Georgia State University, this survey promises to be of real 
value to police agencies by indicating the most effective management practices to achieve police outcomes such as crime reduction.  
 
We greatly appreciate your help and support and are committed to share the results of the analysis with you by early next year.  
 
Thank you and best regards  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Public Policy Candidate  
Georgia State University  
opasha1@gsu.edu  
If you do not wish to be a part of this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx  
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Appendix F: Last reminder and brief extension sent to police chiefs on November 7, 2013 
 
Dear Chief [LastName]  
 
We have more than 360 completed responses to our police management survey from your region. We are still hoping that the [XXX] 
Police Department can participate as well. So, we are extending our deadline until tomorrow and encourage you to complete it by 5 
PM on Friday, November 8.  You can access this online survey at:  
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
The survey should take no more than 10 minutes.  
 
Conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the Georgia State University, this survey promises to be of real 
value to police agencies by indicating the most effective management practices to achieve police outcomes such as crime reduction.  
 
We greatly appreciate your help and support and are committed to share the results of the analysis with you by early next year.  
 
Thank you and best regards  
 
Obed Q. Pasha  
PhD Public Policy Candidate  
Georgia State University  
opasha1@gsu.edu  
 
If you do not wish to be a part of this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx 
 
 
 
. 
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Appendix G: Test for normality for dependent variables. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Murder .276 414 .000 .635 414 .000 
Forcible Rape .119 414 .000 .873 414 .000 
Aggravated Assault .155 414 .000 .842 414 .000 
Robbery .201 414 .000 .707 414 .000 
Burglary .115 414 .000 .862 414 .000 
Larceny Theft .103 414 .000 .875 414 .000 
Motor Vehicle Theft .204 414 .000 .711 414 .000 
Total Crime .102 414 .000 .882 414 .000 
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Appendix H: Test for normality for control variables. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Income per Capita 0.13 414 0.00 0.81 414 0.00 
Percent Minority 0.15 414 0.00 0.87 414 0.00 
Population Density 0.20 414 0.00 0.68 414 0.00 
Employee Ratio 0.11 414 0.00 0.91 414 0.00 
Population 0.25 414 0.00 0.63 414 0.00 
Performance Management 0.11 298 0.00 0.94 298 0.00 
Strategic Planning 0.16 298.00 0.00 0.94 298 0.00 
Logical Incrementalism 0.27 298.00 0.00 0.83 298 0.00 
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Appendix I: Test for normality of policy variables  
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Target Setting 0.14 365 0.00 0.95 365 0.00 
Alignment to Strategy 0.30 298 0.00 0.83 298 0.00 
Diversity of Targets 0.19 349 0.00 0.89 349 0.00 
Communication of Targets 0.30 298 0.00 0.83 298 0.00 
Consultation with Officers  0.21 298 0.00 0.90 298 0.00 
Officer Discretion 0.40 298 0.00 0.71 298 0.00 
Consultation with Citizens 0.16 298 0.00 0.92 298 0.00 
Feedback to Public 0.14 298 0.00 0.95 298 0.00 
Leadership Support 0.19 298 0.00 0.93 298 0.00 
Quality Control  0.35 298 0.00 0.79 298 0.00 
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Appendix J: Box and Whisker plot for Murder Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix K: Box and Whisker plot for Forcible Rape Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix L: Box and Whisker plot for Aggravated Assault Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix M: Box and Whisker plot for Robbery Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix N: Box and Whisker plot for Burglary Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix O: Box and Whisker plot for Larceny/Theft Crime Rate for 2012  
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Appendix P: Box and Whisker plot for Motor Vehicle Crimes Rate for 2012  
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Appendix Q: Box and Whisker plot for Total Crime Rate for 2012  
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